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I. NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY NETWORK PUMP   
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the advances being made in technology and the shift in the Navy and 
Department of Defense to Network Centric Warfare, the need for information superiority 
has never been more critical. Information superiority has many components. Of critical 
importance is information security. Over forty years ago, when information security for 
computer-based systems was first discussed, the military leadership looked for general 
purpose, high-assurance, multi-level secure (MLS) computers and software. These modes 
of thinking led us to the systems we have today. What we have discovered, though, is that 
these systems are extremely difficult to build and difficult to incorporate into an 
operational environment, because of their expense and user hostile operating 
environment. We have also discovered that, since industry does not require or support our 
specialized security needs, DoD was forced to create specialized systems and code. As a 
result these projects are difficult to scale. 
Because of the learning curve the DoD has endured, we now know that part of the 
information security answer lies in a scalable security solution that does not depend on 
general-purpose MLS systems. Instead, we need to use commercial products for general- 
purpose computing, incorporated with special-purpose and trusted devices, for the 
separation of data at different security levels. 
 
B.  CURRENT WAY OF DOING BUSINESS 
The military currently uses the DoD Security Clearances and Classifications of 
Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, Top Secret/Sensitive Information, and 
Compartmentalization (defined in Appendix B) [Ref. 1]. Its users operate at different 
levels, and a majority of the time at multiple levels, within the organizational structure. 
Information is compiled at various data sensitivity levels, but it also incorporates low-
level data with high-level data to provide the necessary information at the system high-
level being evaluated. This is where the problem comes in. What is the best way to get 
the low-level data to the high-level system/user without compromising the low-level 
system? The process being used today is the manual method. A user, for example, might 
2 
prepare a Top Secret Brief for the daily meeting. The required information for the brief, 
to be comprehensive, resides at the Unclassified, Secret and Top Secret levels. The user 
must go to each system, identify what data is required, save it to a disk (at each level), put 
the disk in the Top Secret system and consolidate the data. This data may reside in the 
same space, building, or in any variety of different locations. Once the disk is placed in 
the Top Secret system it is now classified as Top Secret and cannot be used again in a 
lower-level system. This is always the case when data is being transferred from a low-
level system to a high-level system over an external medium. The medium gets classified 
to the level of the highest system it is introduced to. This process results in many man-
hours, numerous disks that become classified at system high, and the need to declassify 
or account for new classified media.  It is very easy for a user to fail to properly label the 
disk or inadvertently place the high-level disk in a low-level system, compromising the 
low-level system, creating security violations and potential information security leaks.  
A solution to this problem is to provide a means to transfer information from a 
lower sensitivity level to a higher one efficiently and effectively over a secure medium 
without compromising either system. In this one can create a multi-level secure system 
out of COTS components and a simple communications component. One proposed 
solution is the Naval Research Laboratory’s Network Pump (NP).  
 
C. THE NETWORK PUMP (NP) 
As with any IT investment, it is important to remember that there is no Holy Grail 
of IT that can solve all problems. The NP is no different; instead it is one of the key 
components for a proposed security architecture.  When analyzing security architecture 
there are two major concepts: 
• Prevent intrusion of unauthorized entities (e.g. virus, access controls, etc.) 
• Prevent unauthorized information flow between computers. 
This second concept is where the NP fits into the architecture. In concept, using 
the Bell-La-Padula (BLP) model, low-level systems should pass information to high-level 
systems, but high-level systems should not be able to pass information to low-level 



















Figure 1.   Bell and LaPadula (BLP) Model  
This should be easy to implement. In actuality, though, this is a difficult concept 
to enforce. For example, when a low-level system sends information to high-level one 
several things could happen. First, because “high” cannot send information down, “low” 
never knows if high received the message. It is also possible for low to send information 
too fast for high to handle and overflow high’s buffer, leading again to lost information. 
If high were allowed to send an acknowledgment to low we have violated the security 
policy and opened up a communication channel that can be exploited. The NP provides 
one solution to this problem. By controlling acknowledgments, the NP provides both 
systems with increased reliability and performance, and ensures confidentiality, integrity 
and authenticity, while preventing the creation of a covert channel. 
It does this by receiving a ‘wrapped’ low-level message into its buffer and then, 
using a mathematical algorithm, generating an acknowledgement signal based upon 
probabilistic times. It uses a moving average of the past high acknowledgment times, and 
sends it to the low system. It also sends the message to the high system and receives an 
acknowledgment from high to verify receipt of the message. The low system will not 
send another message until it receives acknowledgment (from the NP) for the last 
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message it transmitted. The users on both ends will need to login to the NP using a 
username and password controlled by the NP residing on the high side [Ref. 3].  
 
D. BENEFITS OF THE NETWORK PUMP 
The NP is a component that most people, crossing platforms for processing 
classified information, would say is long in coming. The NP provides for Direct, Indirect 
and Infrastructure benefits.  
1. Direct Benefits   
• Reduction in time: Personnel will be able to utilize their time better since 
they are not performing all the steps previously stated for processing 
information. 
• Reduction in Material: The numerous disks required for moving data from 
one medium to the next are no longer required. 
• Reduction in costs: Initially the NP will cost money, but the costs saved on 
disks and man-hours will offset the investment. 
• Reduction in processing of classified material: Depending on the level of 
classification for the material, the material will need to be accounted for 
and held in a secure location. The NP takes the place of the disks, reducing 
both the generation of classified material and the need to account for the 
disk originally being used to transfer data. 
2. Indirect Benefits  
• Improve Customer service: A user will be able to compile information 
more quickly, providing a product with all the information in one 
document/disk/file. 
• Eliminate the inadvertent violation of computer ethics: many times a user 
will inadvertently take a classified disk and insert it into an unclassified 
work station, upload information and then place it back into a classified 
work station. (No classified disk can be placed in an unclassified system 
without changing the classification of the system). 
3. Infrastructure Investment Benefits 
• Reduction in time to provide a desired output (Brief, Intelligence report, 
consolidation of requirements, etc.): If the user can do it all from one 
terminal he/she can save time and get the required product out sooner, 
providing a better service by the organization to the customer. 
• Adding flexibility: The NP can be a flexible component allowing a 
workstation to transfer from a low-level system to a high-level system or 
allowing a high-level system to receive data across compartment 
boundaries. 
5 
E. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
ALIGNMENT 
The first question to answer, when deciding whether to invest in the NP, is 
whether it aligns with DoN strategy concerning IT? According to the DoN Information 
Management and Information Technology Strategic Plan for FY 02-03 [Ref 4] It’s 
mission is to put information to work for our people. In order to accomplish this mission 
the DoN has established eight goals and associated objectives quoted below [Ref. 4]: 
1. Provide an interoperable information technology infrastructure that 
ensures knowledge superiority. 
2. Infuse advanced information technology into war-fighting and 
business processes. 
3. Maximize the value and manage the risk associated with 
information technology investments. 
4. Proactively encourage the creation and sharing of knowledge to 
enable effective, timely, and agile decision-making. 
5. Exploit emerging information technologies to achieve information 
dominance. 
6. Ensure information resources and critical infrastructures are secure 
and protected. 
7. Build IM/IT competencies to shape the workforce of the future. 
8. Foster and incentivize a technology-enabled and information-rich 
culture. 
The NP is well aligned with all of the goals that are not related to creating culture. 
As discussed earlier, a key component of information/knowledge superiority is the 
security of our information and communications systems. This leads to increased mission 
readiness and enhanced organizational effectiveness and efficiency, addressing goals 1, 2, 
3, and 6. By investing in the NP we are able to directly increase the security of our 
information.   
We are also able to support goals 4 and 5 by taking advantage of the newest and 
most technically advanced commercial systems because smaller, trusted devices will 
ensure our security. 
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The NP provides a viable secure solution to a complicated problem. The NP will 
enable users to conduct analysis and compilation of data more efficiently, while 
providing a more timely delivery of a desired product. The NP enables alternatives to 
moving data whether from a low-level system to a higher one or across compartments 
within a security level. However, the key to incorporating any system into an 
organization is to ensure that the system or component falls within the organizations 
strategic plan and enhances the productivity of the user, providing a more efficient 
process of conducting operations securely. 
 
F. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NP 
To incorporate the NP into the DoD infrastructure it is necessary to get the NP 
through the hurdle of Certification and Accreditation. The NRL has produced and 
provided many useful documents for the C&A of the NP, but the key requirement for 
Certification and Accreditation is the creation of a Protection Profile (the end user 
requirements for a component) and an understanding of the DITSCAP (Department of 
Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process) 
requirements and process.  
In the fall of 2001 the Department of the Navy sent out guidance for IT systems, 
stating that all systems will be certified and accredited [Ref. 5]. The minimum assurance 
requirement for a component will be C3 (from the TCSEC) or EAL 3 (from the Common 
Criteria). Prior to October of 2002, the Certification and Accreditation guidance was 
provided by DoD instruction 5200.28 which required systems to be accredited using the 
DITSCAP and components using the TCSEC.  On October 26, 2002, DoD Instruction 
8500.1 cancelled DoD Instruction 5200.28, [Ref. 6], and shifted component certification 
requirements from the TCSEC standard to the common criteria. Chapter Two will take a 
close look at the TCSEC as compared to the Common Criteria and a comparison and 
contrast of the evaluation assurance level of EAL 5 with the TCSEC B2. It will also 




The thesis has two goals:  
• To create a Protection Profile for the NP. This will identify the security 
functions applied to the security-related vulnerabilities, threats and 
objectives to address the threats.  
• To identify correct approaches to certify and accredit the NP within DoN, 
utilizing the latest documentation. 
The purpose of this study is to explore the Certification and Accreditation process 
as defined by the Department of Defense, and identify applicable metrics for analyzing a 
specific piece of equipment for Certification and to evaluate its security level and its 
ability to integrate securely with other systems.  The study is intended to identify the 
security functions from the Common Criteria, which will be used to evaluate the NP. This 
study will also provide a draft Type SSAA for Certification and Accreditation of the NP. 
The thesis will document changes in the DITSCAP that redefine what is required 
for systems and components for certification and accreditation. We will address the 
following question:  
What is the certification process required for the NP in selected environments, 
and what is the appropriate certification plan by which to implement the process? 
We will also address the following supporting questions:  
• What is the NP, and what is the Protection Profile required to securely 
incorporate the NP in an operational environment?  
• Based on the current DITSCAP, and Navy Information Assurance 
documents, what certification and accreditation requirements apply to the 
NP in shipboard environments? 
• What security assurances must be implemented in order to authorize the 
NP for use in a selected environment? 
• If the NP is to be integrated into a system, what factors will impede 




Currently the Navy operates information systems at many system security levels.  
Because of the rapidly changing technology and the proliferation of COTS/GOTS 
hardware and software, the Navy, DoD, and other Federal Agencies find themselves 
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facing a dilemma of how to enforce their unique security policy requirements while still 
taking advantage of COTS/GOTS products.  The NP was developed to overcome the 
drawbacks of creating a customized information system and private industry’s lack of 
incentive to produce an information system that meets DoD standards. The NP provides a 
small, relatively inexpensive component that can be used with COTS technology to 
enable data transfers from low to high security levels and across compartmental 

























II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand what is involved in documentation for Certification and 
Accreditation of the NP, we review here the following documents: DoD Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria, Common Criteria, DoD Information Technology 
Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) and Information Assurance. 
This first part of the literature review provides an understanding of the evaluation criteria 
required to assess the NP for given environments. We look at the existing criteria as 
outlined in the “Rainbow Series” security classification documentation as the previously 
accepted DoD criteria and then it will look at the new Common Criteria. The Common 
Criteria is the future evaluation criteria for systems and components. After presenting the 
two criteria, we present a comparison on the specific level (EAL 5) at which the NP will 
be evaluated. Following this the DoD IA policy and DITSCAP are reviewed, as a basis 
for discussion in Chapter IV [Ref’s. 7, 8, 9, 10]. 
 
B. TRUSTED COMPUTER SECURITY EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The National Computer Security Center is responsible for the Trusted Computer 
Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) that are incorporated in the “Rainbow Series.” This 
review includes the TCSEC (DoD 5200.28-STD), Interpretation of The TCSEC (NCSC-
TG~05), and the DoD TCSEC in Specific Environments (CDC-STD~03-85). These 
documents identify the minimum security protection required in different network 
environments. 
1.  System Security Environments 
There are two security environments to consider when identifying which system 
evaluation criteria to use:  
• Closed Security Environment  
• Open Security Environment 
The Closed Security Environment defines an environment in which the 
application developers have sufficient clearance and authorization to 
provide an acceptable presumption that they have not introduced 
malicious logic, and in which the configuration control provides sufficient 
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assurance that the applications are protected against introduction of 
malicious logic prior to and during the operation of system applications 
[Ref. 7].   
An Open Security Environment is one in which system applications are 
not adequately protected against the insertion of malicious logic. It 
includes systems in which the application developer does not have 
sufficient clearance (or authorization) to provide an acceptable 
presumption that they have not introduced malicious logic. Moreover, for 
an Open System the configuration control in the open environment does 
not provide sufficient assurance that applications are protected against the 
introduction of malicious logic prior to ordering the system application. 
[Ref. 7] (e.g. a non-cleared commercial software programmer for a small 
public company could introduce a backdoor into software purchased by 
DoD). 
In respect to the NP, the Closed Security Environment is assumed. All personnel 
involved in the development have sufficient clearance, and those who maintain the NP in 
the future will be required to have sufficient clearance to access the NP in a given 
physical location. 
2.  Security Clearances and Data Sensitivities 
For the purpose of this thesis we will use the standard DoD security clearances 
and data sensitivity classifications: Unclassified (U), Unclassified but sensitive (N), 
Confidential (C), Secret (S), Top Secret Background Investigation (TS BI), Top Secret 
Special Background Investigation (TS SBI), One Category (1C) and Multi-category 
(MC). Detailed Definitions are listed in Appendix B. 
3.  Structure of the Evaluation Criteria 
The system evaluation criteria in the TCSEC are divided into four divisions: D, C, 
B, and A. The order is established in a hierarchical form, with A being the highest and D 
being the lowest. Divisions B and C have subdivisions (B3, B2, B1, C2 and C1) to further 
delineate system evaluation criteria. In order to qualify for a higher division, all of the 
lower division requirements must be met along with the additional requirements for the 
applicable division. This analysis will cover the detailed differences of the 
divisions/subdivisions D, C1, C2, B1, and B2 with a summary of the differences of B3 
and A1 [Ref. 11]. The reason for not covering B3 and A1 in detail is because the NP is 
only being evaluated up to B2. The following is a breakdown of divisions and their 
requirements: 
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Division D. Minimal Protection. It contains only one class and is reserved for 
those systems that have been evaluated but fail to meet the requirements for a higher 
evaluation class. 
Division C. Discretionary Protection. This division is divided into two classes C1 
and C2. Classes in the division provide for discretionary (need-to-know) protection along 
with accountability. 
Class C1. Discretionary Security Protection.  
Security Policy - This class requires the security policy of discretionary access 
control (DAC) that defines and controls the access between named users and objects in 
the system. Access control lists are used to specify and control the sharing of objects by 
individuals or defined groups.  
Accountability - This class provides accountability through the process of 
identification and authentication prior to any action being taken by the user on the 
system. It also requires the system to protect authentication data, so that unauthorized 
users cannot access the data.  
Assurance - The system will provide operational assurance to protect it from 
external interference or tampering. It will incorporate life cycle assurance through 
security testing to ensure security mechanisms work as claimed in the system 
documentation. This testing will assure that there are no means to compromise system 
security.  
Documentation – The documentation will be required to provide a user’s guide to 
describe how the security protection mechanisms work together. The documentation will 
provide a Trusted Facility Manual to address cautions about the system and privileges 
that should be controlled when running the system. Test and Design documentation 
should also be provided to the evaluators to describe the test procedures, how the security 





Class C2: Controlled Access. 
Security Policy – Same DAC policy as C1, but includes object reuse. Under 
object reuse no information produced by a previous user’s actions is to be available to 
any user that obtains access to an object released back to the system. 
Accountability – The same as C1, but is enhanced to include that the system 
should be able to uniquely identify individual users and associate the user with all 
auditable actions. The system will also be required to create and maintain an audit trail of 
accesses to the objects it protects. The audit data shall be protected by the system to limit 
access to only those who are authorized to review the data. The system will be required to 
record the following types of information: use of identification and authentication 
mechanisms, introduction of objects into user’s address space (e.g. file open), deletion of 
objects, actions taken by users and system administrators, and other security relevant 
events. Each record shall include: date and time of event, type of event, and success or 
failure.   
Assurance – The same as C1, with the additions of the system being able to 
isolate resources that are subject to access control and auditing requirements. Testing 
shall include a search for obvious flaws that would allow violation of resource isolation 
or that would permit unauthorized access to the audit or authentication data. 
Documentation – The same as C1, with the additions to include in the Trusted 
Facility Manual the procedures for examining and maintaining the audit files as well as 
the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event. 
Division B. Mandatory Protection. The system must preserve the integrity of 
sensitivity labels and use them to enforce a set of mandatory access control (MAC) rules. 
Class B1. Labeled Security Protection. Calls for all the requirements for class C2. 
It will also include an internal statement of a security policy model, data labeling, and 
MAC over named subjects and objects must be present. The capability must exist for 
accurately labeling exported information. Any flaws identified by testing must be 
removed. 
13 
Security Policy – The same as C2, but to include labels and label integrity. 
Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the specific subjects or 
objects with which they are associated. When exported by the system, sensitivity labels 
shall give the system administrator the ability to specify the printable label names 
associated with human-readable sensitivity labels that represent the sensitivity of the 
output. This class shall also enforce MAC policy. 
Accountability – The same as C2. 
Assurance – The same as C2, with the addition of design specifications and 
verifications. An informal or formal model of the security policy supported by the system 
shall be maintained over the life cycle of the system along with a demonstration that the 
model is consistent with its axioms. 
Documentation – The same as C2, with the addition that an informal or formal 
description of the security policy model, enforced by the system shall be available. An 
explanation must be provided to show that it is sufficient to enforce the security policy.   
Class B2. Structured Protection. Calls for all the requirements from B1. It also 
includes the addition that covert channels be addressed. 
Security Policy – The same as B1, with the addition of trusted path.  The system 
shall support a trusted communication path between itself and user for initial login and 
authentication. Exclusively, a user shall initiate the communication path. For auditing the 
system shall be able to audit the identified events that may be used in the exploitation of 
covert storage channels.    
Assurance - The same as B1 with the addition of covert channel analysis. The 
system developer shall conduct a thorough search for covert storage channels and make a 
determination of the maximum bandwidth of each identified channel. Design 
specifications and verification must have a formal model of the system security policy to 
be maintained over the life cycle of the system. Configuration management shall also be 
in place during the development and maintenance of the system to maintain control of 
changes to the descriptive top-level specification, other design data, implementation 
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documentation, source code, the running version of the object code, test fixtures, and 
documentation. 
Documentation - The same as B1 with the following additions: In the Trusted 
Facility Manual the requirement that the system modules containing the reference 
validation mechanism shall be identified. In the design documents the additional 
requirements in the descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an 
accurate description of the system interface. Documentation shall describe how the 
system implements the reference monitor concept and give an explanation why it is 
tamper resistant. The documentation shall also present the results of the covert channel 
analysis and the tradeoffs involved in restricting the channels, and all auditable events 
that may be used in the exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be identified. 
After completion of the covert channel analysis the bandwidth of known covert storage 
channels, the use of which is not detectable by auditing mechanisms, shall be provided. 
Class B3. Security Domains. Calls for all the requirements for Class B2. It must 
satisfy the reference monitor requirement that it mediate all accesses of subjects to 
objects, be tamper proof and be small enough for analysis and testing. A security 
administrator is to be supported by audit mechanisms to signal security-relevant events. 
System recovery procedures are also required. Finally, the system must be highly 
resistant to penetration. 
Division A. Verified Protection. This division uses formal security verification 
methods to assure that DAC and MAC are employed in the system and can effectively 
protect the system. Division A comprises only the class A1.  
Class A1. Verified Design. The systems are functionally equivalent to those in 
Class B2. However, they require greater amounts of documentation to provide assurance 
starting with the formal model of security policy and formal top-level specification 





4.  Risk Assessment 
To identify the class evaluation criteria level for a system it is necessary to 
identify the risk associated between the user and the data. In Table 1, it shows the cross-
reference of the Risk Index to the Minimum Security Class.  
 
Risk Index Security Operating Mode Minimum Security Class 
0 Dedicated No Minimum Class 
0 System High C2 
1 Limited Access, Controlled, 
Compartmented, multilevel 
B1 
2 Limited Access, Controlled, 
Compartmented, multilevel 
B2 
3 Controlled, Multilevel B3 
4 Multilevel A1 
5 Multilevel * 
6 Multilevel * 
7 Multilevel * 
(*) The asterisk indicates that computer protection for environments with that risk 
index is considered to be beyond the state of current computer security technology. 
Table 1. Security Risk Index  
(From Ref. 13) 
The risk index is derived from the formula 
Risk = Rmax – Rmin, 
where Rmax is the maximum data sensitivity as shown in Table 2 and Rmin is the 
minimum user clearance as shown in Table 3. Each data level receives a rating starting 
with unclassified at 0 and Top Secret (MC) rating of 7. 
 
Minimum User Clearance Rmax 
Unclassified (U) 0 
Not Classified but Sensitive 1 
Confidential (C) 2 
Secret (S) 3 
Top Secret (TS) 5 
Top Secret with One Category (1C) Secret or Top 
Secret 
6 
Top Secret with Multiple Categories (MC) Secret 
or Top Secret 
7 
Table 2. Rating Schedule for Maximum Data Sensitivity (Rmax)  
(From Ref. 13) 
 
Each user clearance is assigned a rating, starting with unclassified users receiving 
a rating of 0 and multiple category users receiving a rating of 7.   
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Minimum User Clearance Rmin 
Uncleared or not Authorized (U) 0 
Not Cleared but Authorized Access to Sensitive 
Classified Information 
1 
Confidential (C) 2 
Secret (S) 3 
Top Secret (TS) and/or Background Investigation 
(BI) 
4 
Special Background Investigation (SBI) 5 
One Category (1C) 6 
Multiple Categories (MC) 7 
Table 3. Rating Schedule for Minimum User Clearance (Rmin) 
(From Ref. 13) 




Table 4. Security Risk Index Matrix 






(*) The asterisk indicates that computer protection for environments with that risk 
index is considered to be beyond the state of current computer security technology. 
Table 5. Security Risk Index Matrix 
(From Ref. 13) 
 
Maximum Data Sensitivity 
 U N C S TS 1 MC 
U 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
N 0 0 1 2 4 5 6 
C 0 0 0 1 3 4 5 
S 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 
TS(BI) 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
TS(SBI) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 





MC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum Data Sensitivity 
 U N C S TS 1 MC 
U C1 B1 B2 B3 * * * 
N C1 C2 B2 B2 A1 * * 
C C1 C2 C2 B1 B3 A1 * 
S C1 C2 C2 C2 B2 B3 A1 
TS(BI) C1 C2 C2 C2 C2 B2 B3 
TS(SBI) C1 C2 C2 C2 C2 B1 B2 





MC C1 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 
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In the majority of calculations for assessing the risk index for the NP, the risk 
index is 0. The data is always at a lower classification level than the user’s clearance. As 
Table 1 shows, the class level of C2 correlates with a risk index of 0. The higher class of 
B2 is required when the NP is used in a compartmentalized environment and used for 
Multiple Categories with possible users in the physical environment being cleared only 
for TS (SBI). The data maintains the same security level, but not all personnel have the 
need to know within the secure environment. 
 
C.  THE COMMON CRITERIA 
 
The Common Criteria was developed to provide an international standard for 
evaluation of IT security. Personnel involved in its development were from Canada, 
Europe, and the United States. The goal was to incorporate the Canadian Criteria 
(CTCPEC), European Criteria (ITSEC), and the United States Criteria (TCSEC) into one 
document. The Common Criteria provides for a standard that enables systems to be 
evaluated, compared, and certified under the same requirements. This in turn increases 
the ease of integration of subsystems by allowing network administrators to cross 
reference security evaluations. It ensures that the components integrated meet the desired 
level needed to maintain the system assurance level [Ref. 8]. 
Version 1.0 of the Common Criteria was published in January 1996, and Version 
2.0 was published in 1998. Version 2.0 was accepted by the International Organization 
for Standards (ISO) as a Final Committee Draft (FCD), and formally accepted in 1999. 
The overall purpose of the Common Criteria is to provide the guidance for certification 
and accreditation for a component or system at a given Evaluation Assurance Level 
(EAL). The Common Criteria is divided into three parts:  
• Part 1 - Introduction and General Model 
• Part 2 – Security Functional Requirements 
• Part 3 – Security Assurance Requirements.  
There is also a supporting document of Common Evaluation Methodology 
divided into two parts (CEM 1 and 2) still in version 1.0 [Ref. 8]. 
18 
This review will focus on Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements. The goal is to 
understand the EALs as the NP is being evaluated for an EAL 5 level of assurance. 
1. The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)  
EALs are evaluation classes that provide an increasing scale that balances the 
level of assurance obtained with the cost of feasibility of acquiring that degree of 
assurance. There are seven EALs (EAL1-EAL7) in a hierarchical structure with EAL 1 
being the lowest and EAL7 being the highest. Each incremental EAL contains all the 
requirements of the preceding lower EAL plus its additional requirements for its specific 
level. Table 6 delineates the requirements for each EAL. 
Assurance Components by 






EAL1  EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7 
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2 
ACM_CAP  1 2 3 4 4 5 5 
Class ACM: 
Configuration 
Management ACM_SCP  1 2 3 3 3 
ADO_DEL  
 






1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ADV_FSP  1 1 1 2 3 3 4 
ADV_HLD  1 2 2 3 4 5 
ADV_IMP  1 2 3 3 
ADV_INT  1 2 3 
ADV_LLD  1 1 2 2 





1 3 3 3 
AGD_ADM  
 




AGD_USR  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ALC_DVS  1 1 1 2 2 
ALC_FLR    





ALC_TAT  1 2 3 3 
ATE_COV  1 2 2 2 3 3 
ATE_DPT  1 1 2 2 3 




ATE_IND  1 2 2 2 2 2 3 
AVA_CCA  1 2 2 
AVA_MSU  1 2 2 3 3 




AVA_VLA  1 1 2 3 4 4 
Table 6. Evaluation assurance level summary 
(From Ref. 8) 
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To use this table the user looks for the desired EAL (top row) and crosses it with 
the Assurance Class in the far left column. The numbers in the matrix indicate the level 
of the Assurance Class that must be obtain to qualify for the specific EAL. The increasing 
number represents more stringent requirements. Each EAL increase is directly 
proportional to the increasing numbers in the matrix.  
Example: To identify the Tests required for an EAL 3 rating the user would find 
EAL 3, cross with the Assurance Class of Class ATE (Tests), and identify that there are 
four Assurance Families associated with its testing requirements. Each of the four 
Assurance Families has a specific test requirement to be met.  Looking at Table 6 the first 
test requirement of ATE_COV requires the 2nd level of ATE_COV (ATE_COV.2). The 
breakdown of all the Assurance Family requirements can be found at 
http://www.commoncriteria.org/part3.htm (The Assurance Family requirements 
incorporate approximately 200 pages of detailed description in Part 3 of the Common 
Criteria which would be too lengthy to be of use for this review).    
A closer look at the increasing requirements EALs is as follows: 
EAL 1 – Functionally Tested. This is required when some confidence in correct 
operation is required, but threats to security are not viewed as serious. Table 7 indicates 
the requirements for EAL 1. 
 
Assurance class Assurance components 
Class ACM: configuration 
Management 
ACM_CAP.1 Version numbers 
 
Class ADO: Delivery and 
Operation 
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up 
Procedures 
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification Class ADV: Development 
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance Class AGD: Guidance 
Documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
Class ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance 
Table 7. EAL 1 Requirements 
(From Ref. 8) 
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EAL 2 – Structurally Tested. This is required when low to moderate levels of 
independently assured security requirements are needed in the absence of readability of 
the complete development record. Table 8 indicates the requirements for EAL 2. 
Assurance class  Assurance components 
Class ACM: Configuration 
Management 
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items 
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures Class ADO: Delivery and  
Operation 
 
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures 
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification 
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design 
Class ADV: Development 
 
 ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance Class AGD: Guidance 
Documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage 
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing 
Class ATE: Tests 
 
 ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample 
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation Class AVA: Vulnerability 
Assessment AVA_VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis 
Table 8. EAL 2 Requirements 
(From Ref. 8) 
EAL 3 – Methodically Tested and Checked. This is required when a moderate 
level of independently assured security is needed. This level requires a thorough 
investigation of the system and its development without incurring substantial re-
engineering costs. It also requires development environment controls and configuration 
management. Table 9 indicates the requirements for EAL 3. 
Assurance class  Assurance components 
ACM_CAP.3 Authorization controls Class ACM: Configuration 
Management ACM_SCP.1 TOE CM coverage 
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures Class ADO: Delivery and 
Operation ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures 
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification 
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design 
Class ADV: Development 
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance Class AGD: Guidance 
Documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
Class ALC: Life cycle 
Support 
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures 
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage 
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design 
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing 
Class ATE: Tests 
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample 
AVA_MSU.1 Examination of guidance 
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation 
Class AVA: Vulnerability 
Assessment 
 AVA_VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis 
Table 9. EAL 3 Requirements 
(From Ref. 8) 
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EAL 4 – Methodically Designed, Tested and Reviewed. This is required when a 
moderate to high level of independently assured security is needed. It is requires testing 
by an independent search for obvious vulnerabilities. It requires development controls 
supported by a life cycle model and automated configuration management. Table 10 
indicates the requirements for EAL 4. 
 
Assurance class  Assurance components 
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation 
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures 
Class ACM: Configuration 
Management 
 ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage 
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification Class ADO: Delivery and 
Operation ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures 
ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces 
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design 
ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF 
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design 
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration 
Class ADV: Development 
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance Class AGD: Guidance 
Documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures 
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model 
Class ALC: Life cycle 
Support 
 ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools 
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage 
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design 
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing 
Class ATE: Tests 
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample 
AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis 
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation 
Class AVA: Vulnerability 
assessment 
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis 
Table 10. EAL 4 Requirements 
(From Ref. 8) 
 
EAL 5- Semi-formally Designed and Tested. This is required for a high level of 
independently assured security, in a planned development. It requires a formal model, a 
semi-formal presentation of the functional specification, and high level design and a 
semi-formal demonstration of correspondence. An independent search for vulnerabilities 
is also required to include assurance of resistance to a penetration attacker with moderate 
attack potential, covert channel analysis and modular design. Table 11 indicates the 
requirements for EAL 5. 
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Assurance class  Assurance components 
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation 
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures 
Class ACM: Configuration 
Management 
 ACM_SCP.3 Development tools CM coverage 
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification Class ADO: Delivery and 
Operation ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures 
ADV_FSP.3 Semiformal functional specification 
ADV_HLD.3 Semiformal high-level design 
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF 
ADV_INT.1 Modularity 
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design 
ADV_RCR.2 Semiformal correspondence demonstration 
Class ADV: Development 
 
ADV_SPM.3 Formal TOE security policy model 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance Class AGD: Guidance 
Documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures 
ALC_LCD.2 Standardized life-cycle model 
Class ALC: Life cycle 
Support 
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards 
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage 
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: low-level design 
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing 
Class ATE: Tests 
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample 
AVA_CCA.1 Covert channel analysis 
AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis 
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation 
Class AVA: Vulnerability 
Assessment 
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant 
Table 11. EAL 5 Requirements 
(From Ref. 8) 
 
EAL 6- Semi-formally Verified Design and Tested. This is required for high-risk 
situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional cost. It requires the 
system to have a modular and layered approach to design. It also requires an independent 
search for vulnerabilities that must include a systematic search for covert channels and the 
development environment and configuration management are further strengthened. Table 12 
indicates the requirements for EAL 6. 
  
 
Assurance class  Assurance components 
ACM_AUT.2 Complete CM automation 
ACM_CAP.5 Advanced support 
Class ACM: 
Configuration 
Management ACM_SCP.3 Development tools CM coverage 
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification Class ADO: Delivery 
And operation ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures 
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Assurance class  Assurance components 
ADV_FSP.3 Semiformal functional specification 
ADV_HLD.4 Semiformal high-level explanation 
ADV_IMP.3 Structured implementation of the TSF 
ADV_INT.2 Reduction of complexity 
ADV_LLD.2 Semiformal low-level design 
ADV_RCR.2 Semiformal correspondence demonstration 
Class ADV: 
Development 
ADV_SPM.3 Formal TOE security policy model 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance Class AGD: Guidance 
Documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures 
ALC_LCD.2 Standardized life-cycle model 
Class ALC: Life cycle 
Support 
 ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts 
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage 
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: low-level design 
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing 
Class ATE: Tests 
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample 
AVA_CCA.2 Systematic covert channel analysis 
AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states 




 AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant 
Table 12. EAL 6 Requirements 
(From Ref. 8) 
 
EAL 7 – Formally Verified Design and Tests. This is required for systems in 
extremely high-risk situations. It requires a formal model supplemented by a formal 
presentation of the functional specification and high-level design. The developer must 
provide “white box” testing and the system must undergo complete independent 
confirmation of developer’s test results. Also, the complexity of the design must be 
minimized. Table 13 indicates the requirements for EAL 7. 
Assurance class  Assurance components 
ACM_AUT.2 Complete CM automation 
ACM_CAP.5 Advanced support 
Class ACM: Configuration 
Management 
 ACM_SCP.3 Development tools CM coverage 
ADO_DEL.3 Prevention of modification Class ADO: Delivery and 
Operation ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures 
ADV_FSP.4 Formal functional specification 
ADV_HLD.5 Formal high-level design 
ADV_IMP.3 Structured implementation of the TSF 
ADV_INT.3 Minimization of complexity 
ADV_LLD.2 Semiformal low-level design 
ADV_RCR.3 Formal correspondence demonstration 
Class ADV: Development 
ADV_SPM.3 Formal TOE security policy model 
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Assurance class  Assurance components 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance Class AGD: Guidance 
Documents AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures 
ALC_LCD.3 Measurable life-cycle model 
Class ALC: Life cycle 
Support 
 ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts 
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage 
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: implementation representation 
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing 
Class ATE: Tests 
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing - complete 
AVA_CCA.2 Systematic covert channel analysis 
AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states 
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation 
Class AVA: Vulnerability 
Assessment 
 
AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant 
Table 13. EAL 7 Requirements 
(From Ref. 8) 
 
2. Backward Compatibility and Legacy Application 
Environment EALs outlined in the Common Criteria do not cross EALs to a risk 
index for evaluating which physical environment the EALs should be used in 
(Unclassified through Multi-categories). What it provides is a cross-reference table of 
what EALs are equivalent to class criteria in the United States’ TCSEC and the European 
ITSEC. Table 14 is incorporated in the Common Criteria to provide backward 
compatibility for legacy systems. It also ensures the results of previous evaluations 




US TCSEC European 
ITSEC 
- D: Minimal Protection E0 
EAL 1 - - 
EAL 2 C1: Discretionary Security Protection E1 
EAL 3 C2: Controlled Access Protection E2 
EAL 4 B1: Labeled Security Protection E3 
EAL 5 B2: Structured Protection E4 
EAL 6 B3: Security Domains E5 
EAL 7 A1: Verified Design E6 
Table 14. Criteria Evaluation Cross Reference 
(From Ref. 8) 
 
D.   COMPARISON OF B2 AND EAL 5 
Since the NP is being evaluated for use in various physical environments, from 
unclassified to multi-categories, the TCSEC requires the minimum assurance of B2 that 
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crosses over to the desired level of EAL 5 outlined in the Security Target for the NP. 
Therefore, it is necessary to carefully compose TCSEC B2 and Common Criteria EAL 5 
requirement.   
After reviewing the criteria of Class B2 and the detailed Assurance Families of 
EAL 5 the results are as follows, broken down using the Assurance Classes of the 
Common Criteria: 
Design – Both require formal models. 
Configuration Management (CM) – B2 requires stringent CM while EAL 5 
requires the CM to be partially automated. 
Delivery and Operations – B2 does not include delivery requirements while 
EAL 5 requires controls to ensure that component is delivered to the user without any 
changes throughout the system. 
Development – For B2, the design documentation is to be top-level system 
architecture and must include a security policy of DAC and MAC, while EAL 5 requires 
the design documentation to be high-level and include a formal security policy. All other 
aspects are the same. 
Guidance – For B2, the guidance is outlined using the Trusted Facility Manual 
(TFM) and the Security Functional User Guide (SFUG). EAL 5 requires all guidance to 
be provided to the users and system administrators, not necessarily designating a specific 
common publication. 
Life Cycle Support  - B2 requires the life cycle support to be included in the 
TFM, while EAL 5 only requires that documentation be provided. The larger difference 
between the two lies in testing. B2 requires that all flaws identified in the evaluation be 
corrected and retested to ensure that the corrections do not cause any more flaws. EAL 5 
requires flaws to be identified. 
Vulnerability Assessment – B2 requires that the developer conduct covert 
channel analysis and identify the maximum bandwidth for each channel. EAL 5 requires 
an independent penetration test and covert channel analysis, but does not require the 
identification of the maximum bandwidth for each channel.  
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Table 15 below summarizes the differences between TCSEC B2 and Common 
Criteria EAL 5. 
Class Component TCSEC B2 EAL5 
Design Formal Model X X 
Stringent Control X  Configuration Management 
Partially Automated  X 
Prevent        Changes in 
Route 
 X Delivery 
Not Specified X  
Top Level X  
High Level  X 
DAC X Through SFR 
Development 
MAC X Through SFR 
TFM X  
SFUG X  
Guidance 
Some form of Guidance in 
any format 
 X 
Life Cycle support listed  
in TFM 
X  
Provided in some form of 
Documentation 
 X 
Flaws Identified and Fixed X  
Life Cycle Support 
Flaws Realized (Identified)  X 










Identify Bandwidth X  
Table 15. TCSEC-B2 Summary Comparison 
Other areas of interest to assess which evaluation system should be used to 
classify the NP are as follows: For B2 the TCSEC identifies stringent labeling 
requirements for marking the output of the system. The TCSEC also discusses the 
requirements for object reuse and the implicit requirements for DAC and MAC. For EAL 
5 there is no discussion on labeling, object reuse or DAC/MAC Policy. However the 
security functions in the Common Criteria give the User, Developer and the Evaluator 
requirements the component must meet to address the threats and objectives relative to 
the threats. The Security Functions are delineated in the Protection Profile (user’s 
requirements for a given component) and/or the Security Target (developer’s answers to 
meeting the goals of the Protection Profile) if the Common Criteria is used.  
The new DoDD 8500.1 specifies that all systems will be certified and accredited 
using a NSA (National Security Agency) approved method, and components will be 
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Certified and Accredited using the Common Criteria (which is an approved NSA method) 
[Ref. 6]. Therefore, we will evaluate the NP to meet the Common Criteria EAL 5 level. 
By choosing the EAL 5, the NP will qualify as a GOTS device that can be incorporated 
into many existing, and systems requiring an evaluation up to an EAL 5.  
Using the Common Criteria EAL 5 method of evaluation also allows the NP to be 
evaluated under less constraining requirements than the TCSEC B2, but still addressing 
all threats and security objectives identified to overcome the threats. The TCSEC was 
written to provide specific requirements in certification and accreditation of a component 
or system. The Common Criteria’s intent was to provide a broader set of requirements to 
be more adaptable over a larger range of components and systems. Although, there are 
specific Assurance class requirements within the Common Criteria, it is up to the 
implementation of the Security Function Requirements (SFRs) as they are applied to 
support the identified threats and objectives for the certification of a component. Not all 
components require the same specific functions (i.e. MAC, Mail, etc); therefore 
implementing the pertinent SFRs allows a component to be certified appropriately and 
without the need to identify exceptions. 
The next part of this review analyzes, the DITSCAP criteria with respect to 
certifying and accrediting the NP to be used aboard ships. 
E. INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
The Department of Defense Directive 8500.1 dictates policies to achieve 
Information Assurance through a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates the 
capabilities of personnel, operations, and technology. It applies to all DoD owned or 
controlled information systems that receive, process, store, display, or transmit DoD 
information regardless of mission assurance category, classification, or sensitivity. All 
DoD information systems shall maintain an appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation, and availability that is a balance among sensitivity of the 
information, documented threats and vulnerabilities, trustworthiness of users and 
interconnecting systems, the impact of disruption or destruction to the DoD information 
system and cost effectiveness. 
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The 8500.1 also states that interconnections among DoD information systems of 
different security domains or with other U.S. Government systems of different security 
domains shall be employed only to meet compelling operational requirements, not for 
operational convenience. Because of the NP’s functionality as a guard, interconnecting 
information systems of different security domains brings it into direct conflict with the 
8500.1 except in the rare cases where compelling operational requirements are proven. 
This conflict could significantly jeopardize the possible benefits brought to the fleet by 
interconnecting information systems of different security domains for operation 
convenience such as reduced system costs, greater functionality, improved efficiency, 
centralized access to data, and the promotion of communication and cooperation. For this 
thesis, we assume that the intent of this statement in the 8500.1 is meant for crossing 
different security agency boundaries. If this is not the case then the fleet will never be 
able to use the NP to connect the SIPR and NIPR nets because it will not meet the 
compelling operational requirement, but instead fall under the operational convenience 
category. 
Finally, the 8500.1 directs the requirements for component and system 
certification. All Information Assurance products incorporated into DoD information 
systems must comply with the evaluation and validation requirements of National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy Number 11, of 
which the Common Criteria is part. Once compliance is verified, all DoD information 
systems shall be certified and accredited in accordance with the DITSCAP.  
F.  DITSCAP 
The DITSCAP is the standard Certification and Accreditation process for the 
Department of Defense. It provides a detailed approach to the activities compromising 
the C&A process leading to accreditation and establishes a process and management 
baseline. It establishes a standard process, set of activities, tasks, and a management 
structure to certify and accredit Information Systems and security postures of the Defense 
Information Infrastructure (DII). The principal purpose of the process is to protect and 
secure the DII with a proper balance between the benefits to the operational mission, the 
risks to those same missions, and life-cycle costs. Standardizing the process helps to 
ensure the shared interests are represented and accounted for in the decision making 
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process. Tailoring of the DITSCAP to fit the size and complexity of the system and the 
required level of IA is authorized, but each phase shall be accomplished.  
The DITSCAP consists of four phases: Definition, Verification, Validation, and 
Post-Accreditation. The definition phase includes activities to verify the system mission, 
environment and architecture, identify the threat, define the levels of effort, identify the 
Designated Approving Authority (DAA) and Certification Authority, and document the 
C&A security requirements. This phase culminates with a documented agreement 
between the DAA, Certifier, and user representatives on the approach and results of 
phase one activities. The verification phase includes activities to document compliance of 
the system with previously agreed upon security requirements. For each life-cycle 
development activity, a corresponding set of security activities verifies compliance with 
the security requirements and constraints and evaluates vulnerabilities. The validation 
phase includes activities to assure the fully integrated system in its specific operating 
environment and configuration provides an acceptable level of residual risk. Validation 
culminates in an approval to operate. The post accreditation phase includes activities to 
monitor system management, configuration, and changes to the operational threat 
environment to ensure an acceptable level of residual risk is preserved. This phase 
includes periodic security management, configuration management, and compliance 
validation reviews. Changes to the system environment or operations may warrant 
beginning a new DITSCAP cycle. 
During the DITSCAP cycle, the certification portion is a comprehensive 
evaluation of the technical and non-technical security features of an information system 
and other safeguards, made in support of the accreditation process. It establishes the 
extent to which a particular design and implementation meets a set of specified security 
requirements. The technical security features evaluate and establish the extent to which a 
particular design meets a set of specified security requirements with respect to the 
INFOSEC measures of COMPUSEC, COMSEC, and EMSEC. This assessment is done 
against a developed product. A Type Certification allows the effort to be performed once, 
independent of specific implementation, and the results reused many times. The non-
technical security features evaluate and establish the extent to which a particular 
implementation meets a set of specified security requirements with respect to the 
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INFOSEC measures of PHYSEC, PERSEC, PROSEC, and SETA. This assessment is 
against a product implemented in an operational environment called an Operational Site 
Certification. 
The accreditation portion includes a formal declaration by a DAA that a site or an 
information system is approved to operate in a prescribed operational configuration using 
a defined set of safeguards and countermeasures against stated threats and vulnerabilities. 
Upon completion of the accreditation process, the DAA may take one of the following 
actions: 
• Accredit the system to process information in the given operational 
environment. 
• Issue an Interim Authority To Operate (IATO) when the DAA determines 
changes are needed to the system or its environment, but the system will 
operate in the interim. An IATO may not exceed one year. 
• Reject accreditation and recommend enhancements that will lead to 
accreditation. 
• Reject accreditation because of inherent security deficiencies and provide 
rationale. 
 
Throughout the DITSCAP, all of the information relevant to the C&A is collected 
into one document, the Systems Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA). The SSAA 
is a living document that is produced at the completion of the definition phase and 
continuously updated and incorporated into a Site SSAA. The Site SSAA is reviewed 
periodically or whenever there is a change to the information system. Characteristics 
common to SSAAs are: 
• Description of the operating environment and threats. 
• Description of the component/system architecture. 
• Establishment of the C&A boundary of the system to be accredited. 
• Documentation of the formal agreement among the DDAA or DAA, 
Certifier, User Representative, and Program Manager. 
• Documentation of all requirements necessary for accreditation. 
• Documentation of all security criteria for use throughout the IS lifecycle. 
• Minimization of documentation requirements by consolidating applicable 
information into the SSAA. 
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• Documentation of the DITSCAP plan. 
• Documentation of test plans and procedures, certification results, and 
residual risk. 
• The SSAA contributes the baseline security configuration document. 
 
In Chapter III a formal development of the protection profile used to accomplish 
the technical certification of the NRL NP is developed. Chapter IV then discusses the 
steps necessary to complete phases one, two, and three of the DITSCAP and provides an 
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III. NETWORK PUMP PROTECTION PROFILE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To Facilitate the Certification and Accreditation (C&A) of the NP, we have 
employed the Common Criteria to provide the guidance and direction necessary to meet 
or exceed the requirements for the NP at a rating of EAL 5. The C&A using the Common 
Criteria requires two specific documents to be provided to the evaluator (certifier): the 
Protection Profile and the Security Target. The Protection Profile is a user-generated 
document (further described in para. 3.B.) that outlines the user’s requirements for 
meeting all security requirements for a given assurance level. The Security Target is the 
developer’s document that addresses all aspects of the Protection Profile to ensure the 
component is meeting the requested security requirements and ensures the user’s desires 
are met. This chapter describes in more detail what a Protection Profile is, compare and 
contrast three Protection Profiles reviewed to create the NP Protection Profile, and 
describe the Protection Profile we have created for the NP.  
The Security Target can be found at [Ref. 14]. It was developed by NRL for use in 
certifying the NP. 
This chapter also provides a comparison and contrast of the Controlled Access 
Protection Profile (CAPP) [Ref. 15], the Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) [Ref. 
16], and the DoD Mail Guard for High Robustness Environments Protection Profile 
(MGHREPP) [Ref 17], which were the profiles used in creating the NP Protection 
Profile. A brief description of each Protection Profile is as follows: 
• CAPP – This Protection Profile is for a set of security-functional and 
assurance requirements for Information Technology products. The 
components for CAPP support access controls that are capable of 
enforcing access limitations on individual users and data objects. CAPP 
provides a level of protection that is appropriate for a non-hostile and 
well-managed user community requiring protection against threats and 
inadvertent or casual attempts to breach system security [Ref. 15]. 
• LSPP – This Protection Profile is for a set of security-functional and 
assurance requirements for Information Technology products. The 
components for LSPP support access controls capable of enforcing access 
limitations on individual users and data objects. Specifically, two classes 
of access controls are provided:  
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• Those that allow individual users to specify how resources under 
their control are to be shared. 
• Those that enforce limitations on sharing among users (Labeling). 
The LSPP does not fully address the threats posed by malicious system 
development or administrative personnel. [Ref. 16].   
• MGHREPP –This Protection Profile is for a Mail Guard that sits between 
two protected network enclaves at different classification levels, 
controlling the flow of electronic messages sent between the two 
networks. The guard employs various processing, filtering, and data-
blocking techniques in an attempt to provide data sanitation or separation 
between enclaves. The guard provides identification and authentication, 
trusted path and audit capabilities, providing services for confidentiality 
and integrity of mail messages [Ref. 17]. 
 
B. WHAT IS A PROTECTION PROFILE? 
1. Definition and Use 
A Protection Profile is an independent document that states the security 
requirements that address the threats that exist in a specified environment. A Protection 
Profile could be used by a consumer group, government agency, or an organization that 
wishes to specify security requirements for an application type, a component, a class of 
security product, or an IT system.  
Using the Protection Profile concept, similar products can be evaluated using an 
existing Protection Profile for their security requirements or use a Protection Profile that 
is close to its function, tailoring it to reduce the effort. Protection Profiles reduce the need 
to reinvent the process for like applications, components, etc.  
2.  Protection Profile Breakdown 
As described in [Ref. 8], the Protection Profile is broken down into six sections: 
Introduction, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description, TOE Security Environment, 
Security Objectives, IT Security Requirements, and Rationale.  
• Section One provides overview and the organizational layout for the 
Protection Profile. It also provides any references to other Protection 
Profiles. 
• Section Two provides a description of the application, component or 
system being evaluated. 
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• Section Three describes the expected environment in which the TOE will 
be used, along with any assumptions that need to be defined. It also 
defines the set of threats that are relevant to the secure operation of the 
TOE. 
• Section Four defines the set of security objectives required to satisfy the 
TOE threats. 
• Section Five defines the functional and assurance requirements derived 
from the Common Criteria, Part 2 and Part 3, respectively, that are 
required to be satisfied by the TOE. 
• Section Six provides the rationale that the security objectives satisfy the 
threats and policies. This section also provides the justification of the 
appropriate security function requirements to satisfy a specific objective 
[Ref. 8].  
 
C.  COMPARISON OF PROTECTION PROFILES 
1. LSPP Versus CAPP 
The CAPP was written to provide a protection profile for a C2 level of assurance 
using the recently canceled DoDD 5200.28std. It was also evaluated for an assurance 
rating of EAL 3 [Ref. 16]. The LSPP was written to provide a Protection Profile for a B1 
level of assurance and was also evaluated at an augmented EAL3. The LSPP was derived 
from the CAPP, using the same Section 1 and Section 2 [Ref. 17]. The key difference 
between the two is the addition of the Labeling and Mandatory Access Controls (MAC) 
in the Security Functional requirements of the LSPP. The assurance levels are identical 
for both PPs. The old Assurance level B1 requires the TOE to provide security labels and 
also MAC. The security labels and MAC are the augmented portion of the EAL 3 
augmented rating that NSA assigned during its validation.  
Although the LSPP was being validated for a rating of B1 this is not consistent 
with the Common Criteria cross reference of the DoDD 5200.28std. The cross-reference 
states that TOEs evaluated with an existing B1 are equivalent to a rating of an EAL4. The 
lower rating is related to the lack of documentation in the LSPP Security Functional 
Requirements and Assurance Level Requirements.  
We are writing a Protection Profile for an EAL 5 level component that requires 
certification and accreditation. Since the LSPP does not address the need for Covert 
Channel Analysis, it is necessary to look at another existing (draft) Protection profile that 
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requires covert channel analysis. The protection profile chosen is the MGHREPP [Ref. 
17]. The MGHREPP closely resembles the NP and is being evaluated for a rating of an 
EAL 4+. 
2.  LSPP Versus MGHREPP 
The LAPP was written to address generic TOEs requiring or already having an 
assurance level of B1. The MGHREPP was written to address all the requirements of the 
LSPP, covert channel analysis, more formal documentation, and the requirements for a 
specific TOE [Ref. 17].  
Since the two Protection Profiles are different in the end TOE result, it is 
necessary to break down the differences by section.  
Section one of the LSPP does not follow the Common Criteria template, (there is 
no requirement for the sections to be identical to the Common Criteria guidance. The 
protection profiles must only meet the minimum for each section.) The LSPP does not 
include the breakdown of the protection profile for the evaluator, but it does include a 
paragraph for the strength of environment; that is used to identify the protection profile as 
an EAL 3 augmented and the Strength of Function as a SOF-medium. 
Section Two of the LSPP gives a generic description and summary of the 
requirements for a TOE that would use the LSPP. The MGHREPP gives a description of 
a specific mail guard and its proposed architecture. It covers the information flow of the 
TOE and what security functions it should perform. It also gives a summary explanation 
for the EAL 4+, which will be discussed in greater detail in the comparison and contrast 
of Section Six. 
Section Three of the MGHREPP identifies the threats it perceives to be addressed 
in the security functions of the Mail Guard. The LSPP leaves the threat assessment up to 
the Organization Security Policy. Both protection profiles specify the assumptions for 
secure usage of the environment of the TOE. 
Section Four outlines the security objectives for both protection profiles, however 
the MGHREPP breaks the objectives down into TOE security objectives and security 
objectives for the environment in which the TOE will be incorporated. The LSPP breaks 
the objectives into IT security objectives and non-IT security objectives. Although these 
37 
two approaches are different, they both outline the required objectives to be addressed by 
the security Function Requirements in Section Five. 
Section Five of the MGHREPP outlines the security functions that relate to covert 
channel analysis, importing and exporting data, cryptographic operations, and in-depth 
formal testing of the TOE. The LSPP, being a generic protection profile, allows for 
greater flexibility in the security functions required and is written to address the basic 
security requirements of Discretionary Access Control (DAC), MAC, and security 
labeling. The LSPP Security Functional requirements do address the exporting and 
importing of data. The difference is that the LSPP assumes the data is of the same 
security classification and the MGHREPP processes mail crossing between different 
classification environments. 
The MGHREPP also includes the Security Assurance Requirements in its Section 
five, where the LSPP makes a new section for the Security Assurance Requirements. 
Both Assurance sections follow the Common Criteria conventions for the Assurance 
Classes.  
The LSPP follows a straight EAL3 Security Assurance Requirements with the 
exception of requiring Security Policy Modeling of the TOE. The MGHREPP follows the 
Common Criteria conventions for an EAL 4 rating, but it requires the TOE to meet the 
development assurance requirements up to an EAL6 to ensure that the high-level and 
low-level design are described in a semi-formal manner and are supported by a semi-
formal security policy model. The other deviation from the EAL 4 rating is in the Testing 
and Vulnerability Assessment classes. The requirements must meet an EAL 6 rating to 
ensure that the functional testing, covert channel analysis, and thorough analysis for 
vulnerabilities are performed. 
Section Six of the MGHREPP and Section Seven of the LSPP provide the 
rationale that show how the Security Functional Requirements address and achieve the 
objectives for the TOE. Since both protection profiles use different objectives the two 
cannot be compared directly. Never the less, each protection profile provides the 
relationship of Security Functional Requirements to the objectives to ensure all objectives 
are met as would be expected by any protection profile.         
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Table 16 below provides a summary comparison between the LSPP and the 
MGHREPP. 
Assurance Components by 






EAL1  EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7 
ACM_AUT  O   




ACM_SCP  X O    
ADO_DEL  
 






  X  O   
ADV_FSP    X  O   
ADV_HLD   X   O  
ADV_IMP    O  
ADV_INT   O  
ADV_LLD    O  





X   O    
AGD_ADM  
 
  X  O   Class AGD: 
Guidance 
Documents 
 AGD_USR    X  O   
ALC_DVS  X  O   
ALC_FLR O   





ALC_TAT  O    
ATE_COV   X  O   
ATE_DPT  X  O   




ATE_IND    X   O  
AVA_CCA   O  
AVA_MSU  X   O  




AVA_VLA   X   O  
Legend: LSPP = X     MGHREPP = O 
Table 16. Comparison of LSPP and MGHREPP  
 
D. CREATION OF THE NP PROTECTION PROFILE  
The Protection Profile can be derived by any of the following: 
• Creating a new Protection Profile from scratch, using the guidance 
provided in the Common Criteria.  
• Identifying an existing Protection Profile that matches the uses of the 
component, application, etc. to be evaluated and using it as the TOE 
Protection Profile. 
• Identifying an existing profile and tailoring it to meet the requirements of 
the TOE.  
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The NP Protection Profile was derived from the last. NIAP (National Information 
Assurance Partnership) maintains a listing of validated, and draft Protection Profiles 
available for reuse. The NP Protection Profile was tailored from the MGHREPP. The 
MGHREPP provided the closest applicable use between the CAPP, the LSPP, and the 
MGHREPP. Although the NP does not require MAC or security labels it does require 
covert channel analysis and formal documentation. The MGHREPP is a draft Protection 
Profile, not yet validated by NIAP [Ref. 18].  
The following describes how each section of the NP Protection Profile is derived: 
Section One is tailored to introduce the NP as a device that will be used in a high 
robustness environment. It provides the basic introduction of the NP and identifies the 
key players involved in the initial C&A process. 
Section two is taken directly from the Security Target [Ref. 14]. The TOE 
Functional description from the Security Target is the same as required by the NP 
Protection Profile. 
Section Three’s assumptions are that the NP will be installed in a shipboard 
environment. Three options have been identified for deploying/installing the NP into the 
ship’s network. The options have been incorporated in the current shipboard structure 
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Figure 2.   Current Shipboard Environment (DDG 51 Class) 
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Option 1 incorporates the unclassified LAN (NIPRNET) passing data to the 
















































































































































Figure 3.   Shipboard Option 1  
Option 2 incorporates the installation of two NPs to pass data from the 
Unclassified LAN to the Secret LAN and then from the Secret LAN to the Top Secret 






























































































































































Figure 4.   Shipboard Option 2 
41 
Option 3 incorporates the installation of one NP to pass data from the 
Unclassified LAN and the Secret LAN to the Top Secret LAN, concurrently (as shown in 















































































































































































Figure 5.   Shipboard Option 3 
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Table 17. Current Shipboard Space and Personnel Security 
 
Cryptographic threats and objectives have been included in the NP Protection 
Profile to address the future use of smart cards in conjunction with user login, 
authentication, and verification. With the NP located on the high side it is assumed that 
all physical security measures have been to taken to adequately secure the high side 
space. 
The threats were evaluated based on the above environments in which the NP 
would be incorporated. The threats were tailored from the MGHREPP. The NP Security 
Target threats were also reviewed as to applicability to the NP Protection Profile. 
Section Four’s identification of objectives is tailored from the MGHREPP. The 
NP Security Target objectives were also reviewed as to applicability to the NP Protection 
Profile. The objectives chosen best fit the NP’s threats and intended environments. 
Section Five’s identification of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are 
tailored from the MGHREPP. The NP Security Target SFRs also reviewed and applicable 
security functions are incorporated to best identify the SFRs required to address the 
threats and objectives previously identified. The desired security assurance level was 
identified to be an EAL5 to address the need to conduct covert channel analysis. 
Therefore, the security assurance requirements are exactly what the Common Criteria 
requires for an EAL5 Protection Profile. No tailoring on the security assurance 
requirements was performed to ensure the evaluation maintains the level of EAL5. 
Section Six is derived from evaluating the threats, objectives and SFRs. All 
threats were supported by objectives and all objectives were supported by the SFRs. 
Tables were provided to give snap shots of the relationships between the threats and 
objectives and SFRs and objectives to give the developer, evaluator and other interested 
personnel an overview of their relationship.  Table 18 below shows how an EAL 5 
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Security Components of 
Concern 
EAL5 Solution 
Confidentiality Administrative/User Guidance 
Authentication Administrative/User Guidance 
Availability Auditing 
Administration 
Network Integrity Administrative Guidance 
Auditing 
Confidentiality Independent Covert Channel Analysis 
Stringent Configuration Management 
Semi-Formal Development Methods 




Accountability  Auditing 





Availability Administrative/User Guidance 
Data Integrity Administrative/User Guidance 
Identification/ 
Authentication 
Network Integrity Administrative/User Guidance 
Auditing 
Table 18. Threat and Security Component Solutions  
As table 18 illustrates, the EAL5 certification does not provide all site-specific 
security functionality. The additional security functionality required to protect against the 
above threats are delineated in Table 17. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The NP Protection Profile is a working document and should be reviewed and 
updated on a regular basis. As the process of evaluating the threats and objectives is 
conducted, new vulnerabilities may arise or technologies may reduce or induce threats 
that may need to be addressed. Security evaluation is an ongoing process. The TOE and 
its documentation should be kept current to provide the best product and ensure the 
validation of the TOE still meets the C&A.   
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IV.  NETWORK PUMP CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The recently approved Directive 8500.1 [Ref. 6] has caused a fundamental shift in 
the approach used to certify and accredit information technology and information 
systems. In the past the DoN developed and employed government designed and 
developed products. The SYSCOMS was responsible for ensuring the security of a site 
information system. Under 8500.1, the users and war-fighters verify the protection of 
their own information systems. Commands now purchase COTS products or integrate 
GOTS products directly into their information systems. Because of the lack of training 
most site DAAs and ISMOs receive, together with their lack of IT experience, 
information systems that are easier to exploit. The lack of training and experience is a 
result of the Navy’s stets ways of conducting business- systems installed by contractors, 
certified by contractors, and then accredited by contractors. The DAAs trusted the 
contractor’s assessment of a site’s security without understanding or knowing the actual 
process used to determine their recommendation. Today, with fewer system installations 
occurring and more component or application installations, accreditation has shifted to 
the local DAAs and ISMOs. This chapter will provide the site DAAs and ISMOs an 
outline of the process and responsibilities necessary to accomplish phases one through 
three of the certification and accreditation process for the NP. 
 
B. PHASES ONE AND TWO 
By definition, the NP is a guard, or cross-domain component, that limits the 
exchange of information between systems of different security levels [Ref. 3]. According 
to SPAWAR, the Navy’s certification authority, a project manager must manage all 
guards [Ref. 19]. Because of this, the NP is a Program of Record (POR) component. This 
means that the first two phases of the C&A process are the responsibility of the project 
manager and will result in a type certification [Ref. 20]. 
The type certification allows for the segregation of the technical set of specified 
security requirements to the NP’s particular design, in order that a comprehensive 
evaluation of the technical security requirements is performed once. The evaluation can 
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be reused at multiple sites with different DAAs. It is imperative that the Operational 
DAAs remember that the type certification evaluated the NP in a specific system against 
a specified set of requirements with assumptions about the operational environment.  
Since this portion is controlled by a project manager, the key members of the 
C&A team will be a Developmental DAA (DDAA) who supports the program acquisition 
during the design and development of the NP and accredits it prior to deployment, a 
Certification Authority, a Certification Agent, and User Representatives. It is the PM’s 
responsibility for overseeing the organization and management of the team to accomplish 
the required tasks and generate the type SSAA and any other support documentation 
[Ref. 9]. 
The goal of phase one is to acquire and develop the information necessary to 
understand the NP so that a detailed list of tasks can be established. Since the NP is not a 
legacy system the phase one activities of preparation, registration, and negotiation will 
start from scratch because the existing documentation upon which to base the SSAA does 
not exist.  
The preparation activity must include looking at all available documents 
concerning the NP and applicable DoD and DoN information assurance and security 
instructions and policies. Since the NP is still under development by NRL there is no 
mission needs statement. The protection profile (Appendix C) identifies the user 
requirements. Other documents to be reviewed include the security target, architecture 
and design document, user manuals, operating procedures, configuration management 
documents, and the threat analysis. 
The registration activity guides the C&A team to develop tasks for the evaluation 
of the NP necessary to address risk management. These tasks identify the security 
requirements and the level of effort necessary to complete the type certification. Once 
these are known, the DITSCAP will be tailored to prepare an effective plan that leads to 
the draft SSAA [Ref. 9].  
In order to complete phase one for the NP, all parties involved will review the 
draft SSAA. The DDAA is responsible for verifying that all applicable information 
assurance and security requirements are included in the SSAA. SPAWAR is responsible 
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for conducting an evaluation of the technical security features of the NP based on the 
draft SSAA. The PM reviews the SSAA for completeness, while the user representative 
reviews it to ensure that the NP will still support their needs. After all reviews are 
completed and it is determined that the appropriate assurance is being applied, the phase 
one SSAA is approved and phase two begins. Appendix D contains a proposed draft 
SSAA for the NP. 
Phase two involves ensuring compliance of the NP specifications, design, and 
code with the security requirements developed in phase one [Ref. 9]. These activities 
include preparing certification test plans and procedures, conducting a vulnerability 
evaluation, and performing the certification test and evaluation (CT&E). The CT&E is 
usually performed in a laboratory environment but could be performed at a selected field 
site [Ref. 21]. During phase two the SSAA may undergo refinement based upon things 
such as NP modifications, or changes in the user requirements. During this technical 
evaluation of the NP the certifying team will develop the Security Features Users Guide 
(SFUG) and the Trusted Facility Manual (TFM). 
After all of the phase two activities are complete and the SSAA has been updated 
the results are reviewed and evaluated by SPAWAR who will then prepare a Certification 
Statement to advise the DDAA on whether to certify the NP for deployment. The DDAA 
makes the certification decision. In this thesis we assume that the NP obtains an Approval 
to Deploy, with a type SSAA. The type SSAA and the ISSO of the SSAA should clearly 
state the assumptions made about the operational environment. 
 
C.  PHASE THREE 
Now that the NP has been granted a hypothetical Type Accreditation, the 
responsibility for completing the C&A process shifts to the Operational DAA; for the 
ship, this is the Commanding Officer. The NP should arrive with the required SSAA 
documenting the completion of phases one and two activities along with the type 
Accreditation, SFUG, TFM, and Users’ Manual [Ref. 21]. It is possible, though, for the 
NP to be received from SPAWAR without a type SSAA and type Accreditation. 
According to reference 5239-13 Volume II the site should not accept the installation as 
complete if this happens.  
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During phase three, the site ISSM must perform the activities necessary to 
accredit the systems based upon the NP’s integration into the local site. These activities 
include a review of the type SSAA, an evaluation of the integrated information system, 
certification of the system, and accreditation. During the review of the type SSAA, the 
ISSM must determine if there are any more stringent local security requirements, or 
unique site security risks, or deviations from the standard configuration or assumptions 
that change the Type Certification. If there are, then the ISSM must update the 
Requirements Tractability Matrix (RTM) in the Type SSAA and develop test procedures 
to validate those requirements.  
With this completed, the ISSM can begin the certification and evaluation of the 
integrated system, which consists of eight tasks. The first four tasks: 
1. Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E), 
2. Penetration Testing, 
3. TEMPEST and RED-BLACK Evaluation, and  
4. COMSEC Compliance Evaluation, 
 are to assess the technical security features and assumptions of the configuration and 
implementation to ensure features affecting confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
accountability have been implemented and performed properly. The baseline for these 
tests were established in phase two during CT&E by the type certification team. Because 
of this, the site team does not need to repeat the baseline tests. Instead they must only 
verify that the NP does not introduce additional risk to the site. This is done by 
examining any unique security issues to the site that were not accounted for in the CT&E. 
If any tests are repeated then an analysis report must be included in the SSAA 
documenting the findings including an evaluation of vulnerabilities discovered during the 
evaluations, summary of the level of effort, tools used, and any recommendations. The 
last four certification evaluation tasks focus on the non-technical security features: 
1. System Management Analysis, 
2. Site Accreditation Survey, 
3. Contingency Plan Evaluation, and 
4. Risk Management Review. 
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These tests are designed to focus on Physical Security, Personnel Security, 
Procedural Security, Security Education, Training, and Awareness [Ref. 9]. Networks 
that the NP connects are required to run an automated security assessment tool to 
determine the security posture of the systems configuration [Ref. 21].  
After the required tasks are completed, the results are evaluated by the ISSM for 
completeness and to determine if the activity is consistent with the SSSA. They are then 
added to the SSSA. If any problems are discovered during this process the PM must be 
informed. If a problem can be fixed the ISSM can then repeat the task and document the 
problem and the solution in the appropriate analysis report.  
After completing the appropriate tasks for the evaluation of the integrated 
information system a residual risk assessment must be completed. This is a risk-based 
review of the task analysis reports to determine if the risk to confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and accountability is being maintained at an acceptable level. The level of 
acceptable risk will vary from site to site depending upon DAA comfort levels.  
From the risk assessment the ISSM can then prepare a local certification 
statement and accreditation recommendation for the DAA. This recommendation along 
with the finalized SSAA is presented to the DAA for review and decision on whether to 
accredit the system, not accredit the system, or grant an Interim Approval To Operate 
(IATO). When the system is accredited, the ISSM then incorporates the finalized type 
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V.  NETWORK PUMP IMPLEMENTATION  
A.  CONCLUSION 
This thesis project’s overall goal was to determine the certification process 
required for the NP and the appropriate plan to implement this process. In answering this 
question there were four supporting questions that were answered first to determine a 
recommended path for certification of the NP. 
The first supporting question involved a brief description of the NP and the 
required Protection Profile to incorporate into a component certification. Chapter I gives 
a general description of the NP’s operation and also explains how it can benefit the Navy 
and fits in to the DoD goal of defense in depth. Then Chapter III discussed the methods to 
develop an EAL5 protection profile culminating in Appendix C, which is the protection 
profile for the NP. 
The next question to answer was to determine the actual type certification and 
accreditation requirements from the appropriate DoD and DoN documents. Chapter IV 
gives discussions of the appropriate steps from the DITSCAP that are needed to type 
certify the NP for installation on board a ship. With this analysis the draft Type SSAA 
was created; this is Appendix D.  
During the creation of the Protection Profile and draft Type SSAA common 
assumptions about the environment the NP was to be installed in were made to facilitate 
an effective analysis. These assumptions are described in Chapter III and in the ISSP of 
the draft Type SSAA. Once the NP achieves an EAL5 and Type certification it can be 
installed aboard ships. During the installation and certification these assumptions must be 
reviewed in detail to ensure that any inconsistencies between the assumed environment 
and actual installation environment do not degrade the overall site certification. 
The final supporting question dealt with factors that will impede the successful 
implementation of the NP, and how they can be overcome. The largest factor that will 
impede successful implementation of the NP comes from the stove piped certification and 
accreditation processes used by NRL and SPAWAR.  
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The NP is currently undergoing a component-level certification at NRL, with no 
sponsorship from SPAWAR. NRL’s goal is to certify the NP in the most generic 
environment available. This ensures that once component certification is complete NRL 
can try to sell the NP to as many DoD and other federal security agencies as possible. 
This certification is based strictly on the Common Criteria, using only a developer based 
Security Target which may not meet all defined user requirement as described in their 
Protection Profile. This thesis provides the PP needed by NRL to combine with their ST 
and CT&E to develop the ST&E to achieve the EAL5 certification. Figure 6 shows the 









Figure 6.   Present Certification Configuration 
 
At the time of this writing SPAWAR and DoN have yet to decide upon the 
relevance of the NP to the fleet. Active fleet components have expressed a desire for a 
component with the NP capabilities. Until the leadership decides that the NP has a viable 
position in Navy systems the NP will continue to progress towards a generic component 
certification at NRL.  
What this means is that if SPAWAR determines that the NP is applicable in the 
fleet, there will be significant delay before installation and application to certify the NP in 
Navy environments. SPAWAR will be required to establish a unique Program 
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Management Office. They will also be required to generate a protection profile to be used 
to implement the certification of the NP if a new greater EAL level is required. Once this 
is complete SPAWAR will need to enter into the DITSCAP process, starting with the 
production of a draft, Type SSAA, and create the CT&E, to complete phases one and 
two. Once this is completed a site specific ST&E must be prepared to certify and accredit 
the NP in a specific environment. Currently this all would be done through the efforts of 
NRL or in conjunction with NRL. Either path will result in a longer time delay for fleet 
deployment which early planning can avoid. Figure 7 shows the proposed path the NP 













Figure 7.   NRL Proposed Path 
  
This thesis supports both NRL and SPAWAR efforts in evaluating the NRL NP. 
To NRL it provides the protection profile that is needed to accomplish the certification of 
the NP. To SPAWAR it provides a draft Type SSAA to start the DITSCAP process 
leading to the Type Certification and then to an accreditation for use by the fleet. Even 
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with these two much needed documents, the current stove piped work of NRL is not 
progressing towards fleet implementation.  
In order to get this product to the fleet sooner it is recommended that SPAWAR 
establish a program with NRL to accomplish the Common Criteria requirements in 
conjunction with the phase one and two DITSCAP requirements. As discussed earlier, the 
program must be under the supervision of a program manager and it is recommended that 
the NP be placed under a pre-existing PM. This allows immediate funding to be provided 
for the certification of the NP.  
Students in the Information Technology and Computer Science curriculums could 
accomplish the certification work at the Naval Postgraduate School. Their task would be 
to merge the ST and CT&E from NRL along with the PP and Type SSAA from this 
thesis to develop a common CT&E plan. This common CT&E plan could then be used in 
a simulated shipboard environment at NPS with appropriate ship specific security 
assumptions as needed to accomplish an EAL certification and complete a final Type 
SSAA. With this completed, SPAWAR could develop the appropriate ST&E for 
shipboard installation. By working together with NRL, SPAWAR, and NPS, the fleet can 
realize the benefits of the NP much sooner with a reduced overall cost. Figure 8 shows 
the recommend implementation path for the NP to be integrated into a shipboard system 
while obtaining an EAL 5 Certification. 
DITSCAP


















Figure 8.   Proposed Implementation Path For System Integration  
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B. RECOMMEND FOLLOW-ON STUDIES 
During the course of our research and discussion with individuals at the shipboard 
level, the concept of SSAAs and their management seemed unfamiliar. The Navy has 
policies for periodicity and system configuration changes that require a full or partial 
SSAA to be conducted. An effective tool for senior Navy leadership would be a baseline 
of site SSAAs across the entire fleet. This analysis would be for representative sites 
across DoN to determine the actual ability of the fleet to maintain the required 
accreditation. Part of this analysis work would also be to look at the training that is given 
to various people in the C&A process, for example the PCO and PXO school 
curriculums. This work could also be used to help develop more automated tools to assist 
those on the deck plates maintain their site’s accreditation. 
The area of IT community manpower and personnel, has the potential to identify 
weaknesses and recommend solutions to senior leadership. The Navy is unique in the fact 
that because we go to sea we must rotate people from sea to shore and back to sea. Other 
services do not have this problem because all of their billets are shore billets. The 
challenge that arises for the Navy from our sea and shore rotation is that when IT 
personnel go from a shore command to sea they are stepping backwards in technology. 
They also lose valuable training time in schools and professional conferences. These lost 
opportunities lead to stagnation that puts the Navy farther behind the technology curve. A 
study that identifies possible solutions to avoid this stagnation while keeping well trained 
operators in critical billets, could help the Navy move ahead in the IT world. 
A final area of recommended study is in the area of IT system guidelines and 
procedures. Currently in DoD and DoN there is a plethora of high-level policy. This 
policy is good for senior-level technicians at a SYSCOM, but there is nothing in writing 
for the ship CO and his support staff of junior technicians to follow. For other technical 
areas of the ship there are operating manuals that give immediate actions for possible 
casualties or standard operating procedures from the SYSCOM. There is no such thing 
for the IT personnel. An analysis of this high level policy that is then turned into a set of 
actions or operating procedures for ships that may not have a large experienced IT 
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APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS 
 
ACK  Acknowledgement 
AIS  Automated Information System  
BLP   Bell-La-Padula  
CAPP  Controlled Access Protection Profile 
C&A  Certification and Accreditation 
CEM  Common Evaluation Methodology 
CM  Configuration Management 
CNO  Chief of Naval Operations 
COTS  Commercial Off the Shelf 
CRR  Certification Requirements Review 
CSA  Communication Support Agreement 
CT&E  Certification Test and Evaluation 
CTCPEC Canadian Criteria 
DAA  Designated Approving Authority 
DAC  Discretionary Access Control 
DCID  Defense Central Intelligence Directive 
DDAA  Developmental Designated Approving Authority 
DITSCAP Defense Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoDD  Department of Defense Directive 
DoN   Department of the Navy 
DTLS  Descriptive Top-Level Specification 
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EAL  Evaluation Assurance Level 
ESI  Extremely Sensitive Information 
FCD  Final Committee Draft 
FIWC  Fleet Information Warfare Center 
FIPS  Federal Information Processing Standards 
FOUO  For Official Use Only 
FTLS  Formal Top-Level Specification 
GMT  General Military Training 
GOTS  Government Off the Shelf 
IA  Information Assurance 
INFOCON Information Condition 
INFOSEC Information Security 
ISO  International Organization for Standards 
ISSM  Information System Security Manager 
ISSP  Information System Security Policy 
IT  Information Technology 
ITSEC  European Criteria 
LAN   Local Area Network 
LSPP  Labeled Security Protection Profile 
MAC  Mandatory Access Control 
MGHREPP  Mail Guard for High Robustness Environments Protection Profile 
MLS  Multi-Level Secure 
MOA  Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
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NCIS  Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
NIAP  National Information Assurance Partnership 
NIST  National Institute of Standards and technology 
NOC  Network Operations Center 
NP   Network Pump 
NRL  Navy Research Laboratory 
NSA  National Security Agency 
NSO  Network Security Officer 
NSTISSC National Security Telecommunications & Information Systems 
Security Committee  
PDS  Protection Distribution System 
PM  Program Manager 
POR  Project of Record 
RTM  Requirements Traceability Matrix 
SFR  Security Functional Requirements 
SFUG  Security Functional User Guide 
SSAA  System Security Authorization Agreement 
ST&E  Security Test & Evaluation 
TCSEC Trusted Computer Security 
TFM  Trusted Facility Manual 
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APPENDIX B.  GLOSSARY 
Clearances (The elements of the Glossary are paraphrased from [Ref. 7]): 
Uncleared (U) - Personnel with no clearance or authorization. Permitted access to any 
information for which there are no specified controls, such as openly published 
information. 
Unclassified Information (N) - Personnel who are authorized access to sensitive 
unclassified (e.g., For Official Use Only (FOUO)) information, either by an explicit 
official authorization or by an implicit authorization derived from official assignments or 
responsibilities. 
Confidential Clearance (C) - Requires U.S. citizenship and typically some limited 
records checking. In some cases, a National Agency Check (NAC) is required (e.g., for 
U.S. citizens employed by colleges or universities). 
Secret Clearance (S) - Typically requires a NAC, which consists of searching the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation fingerprint and investigative files and the Defense 
Central Index of Investigations. In some cases, further investigation is required. 
Top Secret Clearance based on a current Background Investigation (TS(BI)) -
Requires an investigation that consists of a NAC, personal contacts, record searches, and 
written inquiries. A BI typically includes an investigation extending back 5 years, often 
with a spot check investigation extending back 15 years. 
Top Secret Clearance based on a current Special Background Investigation 
(TS(SBI)) - Requires an investigation that, in addition to the investigation for a BI, 
includes additional checks on the subject's immediate family (if foreign born) and spouse 
and neighborhood investigations to verify each of the subject's former residences in the 
United States where he resided six months or more. An SBI typically includes an 
investigation extending back 15 years. 
One category (1C)1 - In addition to a TS(SBI) clearance, written authorization for access 
to one category of information is required. Authorizations are the access rights granted to 
a user by a responsible individual (e.g., security officer). 
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Multiple categories (MC) - In addition to TS(SBI) clearance, written authorization for 
access to multiple categories of information is required. 
Data Sensitivities: 
Unclassified (U)--Data that is not sensitive or classified: publicly releasable information 
within a computer system. Note that such data might still require discretionary access 
controls to protect it from accidental destruction. 
Not Classified but Sensitive (N) - Unclassified but sensitive data. Much of this is FOUO 
data, which is that unclassified data that is exempt from release under the Freedom of 
Information Act. This includes data such as the following: 
1.  Manuals for DoD investigators or auditors. 
2.  These are actually authorizations rather than clearance levels, but they are 
included here to emphasize their importance. 
3.  Examination questions and answers used in determination of the qualification 
of candidates for employment or promotion. 
4.  Data that a statute specifically exempts from disclosure, such as Patent 
Secrecy data. 
5.  Data containing trade secrets or commercial or financial information. 
6.  Data containing internal advice or recommendations that reflect the decision-
making process of an agency. 
7.  Data in personnel, medical, or other files that, if disclosed, would result in an 
invasion of personal privacy. 
8.  Investigative records. DoD Directive 5400.7 prohibits any material other than 
that cited in FOI Act exemptions from being considered or marked FOUO. 
One other form of unclassified sensitive data is that pertaining to unclassified 
technology with military application. This refers primarily to documents that 
are controlled under the Scientific and Technical Information Program or 
acquired under the Defense Technical Data Management Program. In addition 
to specific requirements for protection of particular forms of unclassified 
sensitive data, there are two general mandates. The first is Title 18, U.S. Code 
1905, which makes it unlawful for any office or employee of the U.S. 
Government to disclose information of an official nature except as provided 
by law, including when such information is in the form of data handled by 
computer systems. Official data is data that is owned by, produced by or for, 
or is under the control of the DoD. The second is Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) Circular A-71, Transmittal Memorandum Number I, which 
establishes requirements for Federal agencies to protect sensitive data. 
Confidential (C) - Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. 
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Secret (S) - Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably 
could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. 
Top Secret (TS) - Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national 
security. 
One Category (1C) - Applied to Top Secret Special Intelligence information (e.g., 
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) or operational information (e.g., Single 
Integrated Operational Plan/Extremely Sensitive Information (SIOP/ESI)) that requires 
special controls for restrictive handling. Access to such information requires 
authorization by the office responsible for the particular compartment.  
Multiple Categories (MC) - Applied to Top Secret Special Intelligence or operational 
information that requires special controls for restrictive handling. This sensitivity level 
differs from the 1C level only in that there are multiple compartments involved. The 
number can vary from two to many, with corresponding increases in the risk involved. 
Discretionary Access Control - A means of restricting access to objects based on the 
identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are discretionary in 
the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is capable of passing that 
permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject. 
Environment - The aggregate of external circumstances, conditions, and objects that 
affect the development, operation, and maintenance of a system. (See Open Security 
Environment and Closed Security Environment.) 
Label – A piece of information that represents the security level of an object and that 
describes the sensitivity of the information in the object. 
Malicious Logic - Hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally included in a 
system for the purpose of causing loss or harm. 
Mandatory Access Control - A means of restricting access to objects based on the 
sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the 
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APPENDIX C.  NP PROTECTION PROFILE (PROPOSED) 
1.0 PROTECTION PROFILE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Protection Profile Identification  
Title: Network Pump Protection Profile 
Sponsor: Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) 
Authors: Ronald Rich and Jonathon Holmgren 
Contributors: George Dinolt and Craig Rasmussen 
CC Version: Common Criteria (CC) Version 2.1 
Registration: <to be provided upon registration> 
PP Version: Version 1.0, dated 01 November 2002 
Keywords: Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), Naval Research Laboratories (NRL), 
Certification, Accreditation, Multi-Level Security, Secure Electronic Pump, Protection 
Profile, EAL5. 
Note:  The following outlines how the NP Protection Profile was derived: Section 
1 is formatted from the CC, part 2; Section 2 is quoted directly from Section 2 of the 
NRL’s Security Target; Section 3 is paraphrased from the DoD Mail Guard for High 
Robustness Environment, formatted from the CC, part 2 and tailored to meet the NRL NP 
security requirements; Section 4 is paraphrased from the DoD Mail Guard for High 
Robustness Environment, formatted from the CC, part 2 and tailored to meet the NRL NP 
security requirements; Section 5 is paraphrased from the DoD Mail Guard for High 
Robustness Environment, formatted from the CC, part 2 and tailored to meet the NRL NP 
security requirements; and Section 6 is paraphrased from the DoD Mail Guard for High 
Robustness Environment, formatted from the CC, part 2 and tailored to meet the NRL NP 
security requirements. 
 
1.2 Protection Profile Overview 
This Protection Profile (PP) specifies the information security requirements for 
the NP for High Robustness Environments. The NP specified in this PP sits between two 
protected network enclaves at different classification levels, controlling the flow of 
electronic messages sent between the two networks. The protection approach employs 
various processing, filtering, and data-blocking techniques in an attempt to prevent data 
exchange from the high side and the low side. Besides enforcing an information flow 
policy and providing services for confidentiality, assurance and integrity of messages, the 
NP provides identification and authentication, trusted path and audit capabilities and has 
been designed with a high degree of assurance. 
The specific functional and assurance requirements are contained in Section 5 of 
this document. 
1.3 Conventions 
The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Protection Profile are 
largely consistent with those used in version 2.1 of the Common Criteria (CC). Selected 
presentation choices are discussed here to aid the PP user. 
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The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; 
 refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2 
of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this PP. 
 
The refinement operation is used to add detail, and thus further restricts a 
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text. 
 
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC 
in stating a requirement. Selections are denoted by italicized text. 
 
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified 
parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignment is indicated by showing the 
value in square brackets, [assignment_value]. 
 
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying 
operations. Iteration is denoted by showing the iteration number in parenthesis following 
the component identifier, (iteration_number). 
 
The security target writer operation is used to denote points in which the final 
determination of attributes is left to the security target writer. Security Target writer 




In the CC, many terms are defined in Section 2.3 of Part 1. The following 
definitions are listed here to aid the users understanding of this PP. 
 
Authorized Administrator - A role which human users may be associated with to 
administer the security parameters of the TOE. An Authorized Administrator is not 
subject to any access control requirements once authenticated to the TOE and is therefore 
trusted to not compromise the security policy enforced by the TOE. The Authorized 
Administrator is responsible for administering the TOE (i.e., operating system 
configuration) security parameters. 
 
User Agent (UA) - A process that makes the services of the NP available to the 
user. A UA may be implemented as a computer program that provides utilities to create, 
send, receive, and perhaps archive messages. 
 
1.5 PP Organization 
Section 1, PP Introduction, provides document management and overview 
information necessary to identify the PP along with references to other related PPs.  
 
Section 2, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description, defines the TOE and 
establishes the context of the TOE by referencing generalized security requirements. 
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Section 3, TOE Security Environment (TSE), describes the expected environment 
in which the TOE is to be used. This section defines the set of threats that are relevant to 
the secure operation of the TOE, organizational security policies with which the TOE 
must comply, and secure usage assumptions applicable to this analysis. 
  
Section 4, Security Objectives, defines the set of security objectives to be satisfied 
by the TOE and by the TOE operating environment. 
 
Section 5, IT Security Requirements, defines the functional and assurance 
requirements derived from the Common Criteria, Part 2 and Part 3, respectively, that 
must be satisfied by the TOE. 
 
Section 6, Rationale, provides rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives 
satisfy the threats and polices. This section also explains how the set of requirements are 
complete relative to the security objectives and presents a set of arguments that address 
dependency analysis and Strength of Function (SOF). 
 
Expansion of acronyms is provided to facilitate comprehension of frequently used 
terms. 
 
References are provided, as background material, for further investigation by 
interested users of the Protection Profile. 
 
2.0 TOE DESCRIPTION 
The general architecture in which the NP resides is shown in Figure 1. The NP 
supports communication connections from the Low LAN Interface to the High LAN 
Interface. These connections may support random traffic, e.g., e-mail, from the Low to 
High or more structured updates of High LAN databases, e.g., SQL updates that replicate 
Low LAN database updates to the High LAN. The NP supports a specialized protocol, 
called the Pump Protocol, across the LAN interfaces for ease of re-use and maintenance. 
The NP operates compatibly with protocols from the TCP/IP suite. TCP/IP is usually 
described as supporting four layers (listed from lowest to highest): network access layer, 
internet layer, host-host transport layer, and application layer. The Pump Protocol is 




























Figure 9.   Network Pump 
 
The ability to support a variety of applications is provided by components called 
wrappers. These components run on the application systems in the Low and High 
enclaves that communicate with the NP over their respective LANs. Each application on 
the Low LAN that uses the NP communicates via an interface to a Low Wrapper, and, 
similarly, each application on the High LAN that receives information from the NP 
communicates via an interface to a High Wrapper. The wrappers are responsible for 
supporting the Pump Protocol on one side and the particular application protocol on the 
other. Different wrappers will support different applications; installing or modifying a 
wrapper is a change to the software configuration on the application system, but not to 
the NP. As shown in Figure 2, each wrapper is further divided into an application-
dependent part, which can be tailored to support the particular set of objects, or calls the 
application expects to see, and a NP-dependent part, which is a library of routines that 
implement the Pump Protocol. These functions can be called as required by the 


























Figure 10.   Structure of a Wrapper 
 
The NP also provides the interface to an Administrator Terminal. The NP receives 
initial configuration and other control information across this interface and provides error 
and performance reports, if requested by the Administrator. The configuration 
information defines which users on the Low LAN are permitted to open connections (and 




2.1 Pump Protocol 
The Pump Protocol is a special-purpose protocol implemented at the application 
layer that defines the communications at this level between the NP and the Low Wrapper 
and High Wrapper. The protocols used below the application layer (transport, internet, 
and network interface layers) must support communication across Ethernet LANs. The 
Pump Protocol is specified in terms of the messages it transmits. There are two classes of 
messages: Control Messages and Data Messages. 
 
2.1.1 Control Messages 
Control Messages support the creation and termination of connections. 
There are three types of control messages: 
1. Request Connection: This message specifies the desired source 
and destination of the connection as an IP address and port number and specifies whether 
a recoverable or non-recoverable connection is desired. It is sent from the Low Wrapper 
to a well-known port on the NP. 
2. Connection Valid/Invalid: This message is sent from the NP to a 
Low Wrapper in response to a Request Connection Message. If the message indicates a 
connection is invalid, it implies that the re-quested connection is not consistent with the 
Configuration Table or that the host is unavailable. If the requested connection is valid, 
the Low Wrapper is expected to listen for a Connection Granted message. 
3. Connection Granted: This message is sent from the NP to a Low 
Wrapper following a Connection Valid message and indicates that the Low Wrapper can 
begin sending messages across the connection. The same message is also sent to the High 
Wrapper at the IP address and port specified in the connection request. It also provides 
communication parameters for the connection, including Connection ID, maximum 
message size, window size, and initial time out value. If the requested connection was re-
coverable, and the previous connection between this pair of IP/port addresses was both 
recoverable and terminated abnormally within the past 24 hours, then the last message 
transmitted to High Wrapper across the previous connection is appended to this control 
message. 
4. Connection Exit: This is a message sent by the NP to the High 
Wrapper and Low Wrapper to indicate that an existing connection is being terminated 
abnormally. It is to be sent when an Administrator requests that a connection be closed or 
when the NP detects an abnormal condition on a connection (e.g., High Wrapper ceases 
to accept messages, Low Wrapper ceases to send messages). 
 
2.1.2 Data Messages 
Data Messages support the flow of messages and acknowledgments across 
an existing connection and can also indicate the normal termination of a connection. 
 
1. Data Message (Low to High): This protocol unit transmits a 
single, non-zero-length message from Low Wrapper to High Wrapper over the 
connection specified by a connection ID. The sender of a Data Message also provides a 
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Message ID, which can act as a sequence number. This Data Message is sent from the 
Low Wrapper to the NP and, subsequently, from the NP to the High Wrapper. 
 
2. Acknowledgment (High to Low): This protocol unit 
acknowledges receipt by the receiver of a message, specified by a Message ID, over a 
connection, specified by a Connection ID. The NP will send a message of this type to the 
Low Wrapper after it successfully receives a Data Message from the Low Wrapper. The 
High Wrapper will send a message of this type to the NP whenever the High Wrapper 
successfully receives a Data Message from the NP. 
 
3. Close Connection Message: This protocol unit is sent from the 
Low Wrapper to the NP, and subsequently from the NP to the High Wrapper to terminate 
a connection normally. It specifies a Connection ID. 
 
2.2 Low Wrapper Functions 
The Low Wrapper shall include an application-dependent part and Pump-
dependent part. The Pump-dependent part of the Low Wrapper shall provide the 
following functions to the application-dependent part by invoking appropriate Pump 
Protocol operations: 
 
1.  Request Connection: The application specifies the desired destination 
and connection type. 
 
2. Send Data: The application requests data to be sent over an existing 
connection. 
 
3. Close Connection: The application signals that it has no more data to 
transmit. 
The application-dependent part of the Low Wrapper will map application 
communication requirements into these functions as needed. The Pump-dependent part of 
the Low Wrapper may return information to the application-dependent part in response to 
each of these operations (for example, the connection request may be accepted or refused, 
and an acknowledgment may be returned after data are sent). Whether this information is 
conveyed by the application-dependent part back to the Low Application will depend on 
the Low Application’s requirements. 
 
2.3 High Wrapper Functions 
The High Wrapper shall include a Pump-dependent part and an application-
dependent part. The Pump-dependent part shall provide the following functions: 
 
1. Receive Connection: This function returns the information provided by 
the Connection Granted message to enable initialization of data structures for a new 
connection. 
 
2. Receive Message: This function returns the next message received from 
the NP for the connection that corresponds to this High Wrapper 
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3. Send Acknowledgment: This function transmits an Acknowledgment to 
be transmitted over the specified connection for a specified message. 
 
The application-dependent part of the High Wrapper will map application 
communication requirements into these functions as needed. The Pump-dependent part of 
the High Wrapper may return information to the application-dependent part in response 
to each of these operations (for example, the NP may terminate a connection, causing an 
abnormal return from the requested operation). Whether this information is conveyed by 
the application-dependent part back to the High Application will depend on the High 
Application’s requirements. 
 
2.4 NP Functions 
The fundamental function of the NP is to provide reliable transmission of 
information from the Low LAN to the High LAN while ensuring that High information 
cannot leak to the Low LAN. Confidentiality properties of the NP depend solely on the 
NP itself and not on the Wrappers. Wrapper function, including both application-
dependent and Pump-dependent parts, is not confidentiality critical and can be altered or 
replaced without affecting system confidentiality. The confidentiality critical nature of 
NP function stems from the ability of a High user/process to control the timing of 
application-layer acknowledgements, as in the case of the Store and Forward Buffer 
when the buffer is full. 
 
The NP ensures that communication over the LAN Interfaces conforms strictly to 
the Pump Protocol; any other application-level traffic is logged as erroneous and 
discarded. The NP controls the timing of the acknowledgments sent across the Low LAN 
interface, and thus the covert timing channel, according to an algorithm provided in 
reference [1]. This algorithm bounds the capacity of the covert channel analytically as 
follows: 
 
For each active connection, the NP maintains a separate variable that reflects the 
moving average of the time it takes the High Wrapper to accept messages from the High 
LAN Interface. The NP delays application-layer acknowledgments, which are sent in 
response to messages received from the Low Wrapper over this connection, randomly 
according to this moving average. At the application layer, messages received over this 
connection shall be acknowledged in the same order they are received. The only 
information flow from the High Wrapper to the Low Wrapper over a connection occurs 
through changes in the value of the moving average variable. This variable shall not be 
provided directly to the Low Wrapper but the Low Wrapper may estimate its value by 
observing the randomized delays between message transmission and receipt of 
acknowledgments. 
The NP supports the functions of the Pump Protocol and Administrator Terminal 
requests as follows: 
 
1. The NP responds to a Request Connection control message received from 
a Low Wrapper over the well-known port designated for this purpose by checking the 
request against the Configuration Table and, if the request is invalid, sending a 
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Connection Invalid message to the Low Wrapper. If the request is valid, a Connection 
Valid message is sent, and a Connection ID is allocated for this connection. The NP then 
constructs a Connection Granted message containing appropriate data for this connection. 
If the request is valid and recoverability is requested, the NP also check to see whether 
the previous connection between the requested sender and receiver was terminated 
abnormally. If so, it returns the last message successfully transmitted from Low to High 
on that connection to the Low Wrapper along with the Connection Valid message. 
 
2. The NP responds to a Data Message from the Low Wrapper by checking 
that the specified connection is valid and that the message fits the connection’s 
parameters. If the connection is valid, and there is space available in the NP Buffer, it 
stores the message in the NP Buffer, generates an acknowledgment delay based on the 
current value of the moving average for this connection and a random factor in 
accordance with the NP algorithms. After this delay elapses, the NP transmits the 
appropriate acknowledgment to the Low Wrapper. If space is not available in the NP 
Buffer, the NP will generate a timeout event for itself. If space becomes available in the 
NP Buffer prior to the occurrence of the timeout, the message will be handled as in the 
preceding paragraph, except that the random delay computed for the acknowledgment 
will be modified to take into account the time elapsed between the receipt of the message 
and its placement in the buffer. If the timeout occurs before space becomes available, the 
message is discarded without sending an acknowledgment, since the Low Wrapper, not 
having received an acknowledgment, will retransmit the message. 
 
3. The NP responds to a Close Message from the Low Wrapper by 
forwarding that message to the High Wrapper freeing the data structures allocated to this 
connection, and recording the connection as having terminated normally. 
 
4. The NP responds to an Acknowledgment received from the High Wrapper 
on a given connection by updating the value of the moving average for this connection 
appropriately and releasing all storage associated with this message. If this is a 
recoverable connection, the NP places the message corresponding to the acknowledgment 
in the “last successfully transmitted message” stable storage buffer for this connection 
prior to releasing the storage associated with this message. 
 
5. The NP terminates any protocol operation that takes longer than the 
configured Network Inactivity Timeout Value to return a result. Following such a 
termination, the NP logs the fact of the termination and continues as if a Connection Exit 
request had been received from the Administrator Terminal to terminate this connection 
(see item 6 below).  
 
6. The NP responds to a Connection Exit request from the Administrator 
Terminal by releasing temporary storage related to this connection, and, if it is a 
recoverable connection, marking the connection as abnormally terminated in a data 
structure that can be consulted the next time a connection between the same 
sender/receiver pair is requested. 
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7. The NP responds to a Load Configuration request received from the 
Administrator Terminal by immediately replacing the existing Configuration Table with 
the new Table. The Configuration table specifies general parameters such as window 
sizes, buffer sizes, time out periods, maximum connections per host, maximum 
connections per NP, the IP addresses and port numbers on the Low LAN from which the 
NP will accept connection requests and messages whether a particular IP address/port 
requires recoverable service, the IP addresses and port numbers on the High LAN to 
which the NP will deliver messages, and which of the Low addresses is authorized to 
send to which of the High ad-dresses. 
 
8. The NP responds to a Retrieve Status request from the Administrator 
Terminal by returning the Configuration Table and the current contents of auditing and 
error-logging data structures. Status information includes error reports, such as the 
number of erroneous messages received and number of improper connections attempted 
since the last report, and performance data, such as the number of connections initiated, 
number of messages successfully transmitted per connection, average delay per message, 
and current moving average values.  
 
9. The NP responds to a Renew Status request by both returning the current 
status information and reset-ting all counters and status indicators to their initial states, 
except for the system clock. The NP releases any messages saved from abnormally 
terminated conditions that are older than 24 hours in response to this request.  
 
The NP maintains the following characteristics while implementing the functions 
of the Pump Protocol:  
 
Throughput: The NP supports a minimum average data throughput of 2 megabits 
per second, from Low Wrapper to High Wrapper. On average, the NP can receive data on 
a particular connection from the Low Wrapper at the same rate that the High Wrapper for 
that connection accepts data from the NP. 
 
Recoverability: The NP provides recoverable service. That is, once Low 
Wrapper receives an application layer acknowledgment from the NP for a given message, 
it can safely assume that the message will be delivered to the High Wrapper by the NP, 
even if power failures or system crashes occur, either in the NP or the High Wrapper. 
 
Accuracy and Validity: The NP and Wrappers do not degrade the accuracy or 
validity of any applications to which they are connected. Each message delivered to a 
High Application by the High Wrapper over a given connection corresponds exactly to a 
message received from the Low Application by the Low Wrapper. 
 
Message and Acknowledgment Ordering: For each message received 
successfully by the NP from a Low Wrapper over a connection, the NP sends an 
acknowledgment message back to the Low Wrapper over the same connection, and the 
acknowledgments are sent in the same order that the messages are received. The NP 
delivers messages to the High Application by the High Wrapper in the same order they 
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are received from the Low Application by the Low Wrapper. (Note that these 
requirements apply at the application protocol layer and do not preclude the use of lower 
level protocols that may permit subdividing messages into packets, packet duplication, 
out-of-order delivery of packets, packet retransmission, etc., over both the High LAN and 
Low LAN interfaces). 
 
Non-Duplication of Messages: The NP successfully delivers each data message 
successfully received from the Low Wrapper to the High Wrapper exactly once, for 
recoverable connections, and at most once, for non-recoverable connections. 
 
Connection Independence: Abnormal behavior (such as message flooding or 
refusal to accept messages) on one connection will not affect the performance of other 
connections. 
 
Connection Fairness: Connections that are behaving normally receive service on 
a fair basis. 
 
Note: Section 2, TOE description, is taken directly from the NP Security Target 
[Ref. 8].  
 
3.0 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
DoD Directive 8500.1 Information Assurance requires that all information 
systems employ protection mechanisms according to the level of robustness required 
relative to the sensitivity of the data to be protected and the threat agents likely to be 
involved. TOEs compliant with this PP are intended to be used in a High Robustness 
Environment (HRE). High Robustness is defined in the 8500.1 as: “Security services and 
mechanisms that provide the most stringent protection and rigorous security 
countermeasures [Ref. 5].”  
 
The remainder of this section addresses assumptions about the security aspects of 
a compliant TOE environment, threats to TOE assets or to the TOE environment that 
must be countered, and organizational security policies that compliant TOEs must 
enforce. 
 








Authorized Administrators and NP users are non-hostile, appropriately trained 





The TOE will reside in a physically secure environment on the high side. 
 
The physically secure environment will be under controlled access where 
personnel will have authorization into the command, be on a controlled access list, or be 




Information cannot flow between the two enclaves without passing through the 
TOE. 
 
3.2 Organizational Security Policies 
P. MANDATORY_ACCESS_CONTROL 
 
A mandatory access control policy based on hierarchical security levels and 
categories shall be enforced at the network level. Information shall not be allowed to flow 
from a higher security level to a lower security level or between non-comparable security 
levels. The only downward flow will be acknowledgements from high side, through the 
NP, to the low side. 
 
3.3 Threats Addressed by the TOE 
Note: The Threats are paraphrased from the MGHEPP and tailored for the NP. 
T. ADMINISTRATION 
 
A threat agent may make an error in the management of the TOE. Also, a threat 




A threat agent may cause audit records to be lost or prevent future records from 









A threat agent may repeatedly try to guess authentication data in order to launch 









A threat agent may use an entity not normally viewed as a data container (e.g., 
object) to transfer information from a container at one security level to a container at 




A threat agent may be able to gain access to information that is released in 
violation of the TOE security policy due to lack of confidentiality protection. 
T. EXCESS_AUDIT 
 
A threat agent may cause an Authorized Administrator to be unable to analyze 




A threat agent possessing high attack potential may attempt to bypass or tamper 




A threat agent may attempt to perform actions on the TOE without being held 









A threat agent may capture and replay valid identification and authentication 




A threat agent may cause data to be improperly protected due to the TOE’s 







A threat agent may cause the TOE to perform incorrectly resulting in a system 
failure. 
 
3.4 Threats to the Environment 
Threats to the physical environment could include fire or theft. However the 
likelihood of either in a shipboard (or controlled) environment is extremely low. 
 
4.0 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
4.1 TOE Security Objectives 




The TOE must be able to hold all users accountable for their actions. It must be 
possible to identify the user responsible for performing an action or sending a message. 
Security relevant events must be associated with the identity of the user. It must be 




The TOE must provide administrative tools to enable Authorized Administrators 
to effectively manage and maintain the TOE. The TOE must support these administrators 
in the performance of their duties and be designed to reduce the likelihood of 





The TOE must provide a means to accurately detect and record security-relevant 
events in audit records. The TOE must detect and notify the Authorized Administrator 















The TOE must require that Authorized Administrators be authenticated (via a 
single-use authentication mechanism) before performing any TSF-mediated activities. 
Authentication of information passing through the TOE must be based on cryptographic 
mechanisms. The TOE must prevent brute force attacks by limiting the number of 









The TOE must limit the number (i.e., capacity) and type of illicit information 









The TOE must maintain its own domain for execution and ensure that it cannot be 




The TOE must provide a trusted path for Authorized Administrators to assure that 




The TOE must not release information from a higher-level enclave to a lower 
level enclave or between non-comparable levels. Only communication from NP to low 




The TOE must ensure that a message cannot be released unless the configured 











From its initial startup, the TOE must protect itself against attempts to modify, 




A TOE must provide and execute self-tests during initial start-up, at the request of 
the security administrator, and during automated recovery to verify the integrity of its 




The TOE must be able to meet strength of function equivalent to SOF-high. 
 
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
Note: The Objectives For the Environment are paraphrased from the MGHEPP 








Authorized Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained and follow all 








Mail cannot flow between the two enclaves without passing through the TOE. 
 
5.0 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
This section provides functional and assurance requirements that must be satisfied 
by a Protection Profile-compliant TOE. These requirements consist of functional 
components from Part 2 of the CC and assurance components from Part 3 of the CC. 
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5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements 
 
The applicable security functional requirements for the TOE are summarized in 
Table 19 below [Ref. 1, Part 2]. The functional components are presented in alphabetical 
order, by component name, in the CC. 
 
Functional Components 
FAU_GEN.1  Audit data generation 
FAU_SAA.1  Potential violation analysis 
FAU_SEL.1  Selective audit 
FAU_STG.1  Protected audit trail storage 
FAU_STG.3  Action in case of possible audit data loss 
FAU_STG.4  Prevention of audit data loss 
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Object Access Control 
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control 
FDP_ACF.3 Access Authorization and Denial 
FDP_IFC.1  Subset information flow control 
FDP_IFF.2  Hierarchical security attributes 
FDP_IFF.3  Limited illicit information flows 
FDP_RIP.2  Full residual information protection 
FIA_AFL.1  Authentication failure handling 
FIA_ATD.1  User attribute definition 
FIA_UAU.2  User authentication before any action 
FIA_UAU.4  Single-use authentication mechanisms 
FIA_UID.2  User identification before any action 
FMT_MOF.1  Management of security functions behavior 
FMT_MSA.1  Management of security attributes 
FMT_MSA.2  Secure security attributes 
FMT_MSA.3  Static attribute initialization 
FMT_MTD.1  Management of TSF data 
FMT_REV.1 Revocation 
FMT_SMR.2  Restrictions on security roles 
FMT_SMR.3  Assuming roles 
FPT_AMT.1  Abstract machine testing 
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State 
FPT_ITT.1  Basic internal TSF data transfer protection 
FPT_RCV.2  Automated recovery 
FPT_RPL.1  Replay detection 
FPT_RVM.1  Non-bypassability of the TSP 
FPT_SEP.2  SFP domain separation 
FPT_STM.1  Reliable time stamps 
FPT_TDC.1  Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency 
FPT_TST.1  TSF testing 
FTP_ITC.1  Inter-TSF trusted channel 
FRU_RSA.1 Minimum and Maximum Quotas 
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Functional Components 
FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment 
FTP_TRP.1  Trusted path 
Table 19. Security Functional Requirements 
The above SFRs are discussed in Section 5.1.1. The specific details will be filled 
in by Security Target writers upon further evaluation of the NP in a specific environment. 
 
5.1.1 Security Audit (FAU) 
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 
  
FAU_GEN.1.1 - The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the Audit 
Lo Events: 
 
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the 
following information: 
 
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the 
outcome  (success or failure) of the event; and 
 
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the  
Functional components included in the PP/ST, are source IP address, destination IP 
address, service, packet data, other data {to be determined by the Security Target 
writer}. 
 
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis 
 
FAU_SAA.1.1 - The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the 
audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the TSP. 
 
FAU_SAA.1.2 - The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited 
events: 
a)  Accumulation or combination of [unsuccessful use of authentication 
mechanisms] known to indicate a potential security violation; and 
 
b)  Other events {to be determined by the Security Target writer}. 
 
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit 
 
FAU_SEL.1.1 - The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from 
the set of audited events based on the following attributes: 
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a)    Event type; and 
 
b) IP address, named sender, named recipient, type of attachment, and other 
attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer}. 
 
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 
 
FAU_STG.1.1 - The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorized 
deletion. 
 
FAU_STG.1.2 - The TSF shall be able to prevent modifications to the audit 
records. 
 
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 
 
FAU_STG.3.1 - The TSF shall take [measures to notify the Authorized 
Administrator] if the audit trail exceeds [90% storage capacity]. 
 
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss 
 
FAU_STG.4.1 - The TSF shall prevent auditable events, except those taken by the 
Authorized Administrator and [shall limit the number of audit records lost] if the audit 
trail is full. 
 
Application Note: The Security Target writer is expected to provide, as part of the 
“Security Requirements Rationale” section, an analysis of the maximum amount 
of audit data that can be expected to be lost in the event of audit storage failure, 
exhaustion, and/or attack. 
 
5.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP) 
 
FDP_ACC.1 - Subset Object Access Control 
 
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Admin Access Policy for all users 
accessing Admin Operations. 
 
FDP_ACF.1 - Security Attribute Based Access Control 
 
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Admin Access Policy to objects based 
on the role of the user accessing Admin Operations. 
 
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that only users authorized for the 
Administrator role can access Admin Operations on Admin Objects and that all new 
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connection requests immediately enforce any changes to the NP configuration that result 
from these operations. 
 
FDP_ACF.3 – Access Authorization and Denial 
 
FDP_ACF.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that the access control SF that enforces the 
Admin Access Policy shall explicitly authorize access to Admin Operations for users 
authorized for the Administrator role. 
FDP_ACF.3.2 The TSF shall ensure that the access control SF that enforces the 
Admin Access Policy shall explicitly deny access to Admin Operations for users not 
authorized for the Administrator role. 
 
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 
 
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Mandatory Access Control SFP] on  
 
[Operations: Information flow from one network enclave to another network 
enclave]. 
 
Application Note: With respect to the Mandatory Access Control SFP, a flow is 
equivalent to a write to the destination network enclave. 
 
FDP_IFF.2 Hierarchical security attributes 
 
FDP_IFF.2.1 - The TSF shall enforce the [Mandatory Access Control SFP] based 
on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [ 
 
a) Subject Security Attributes: Security level of the source network enclave; and 
b) Information Security Attributes: 
     Security level of the destination network enclave; 
     Sender status (restricted or unrestricted); 
Recipient status (restricted or unrestricted); 
Other security attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer}]. 
 
FDP_IFF.2.2 - The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled 
subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules, based 
on the ordering relationships between security attributes hold: [A subject can read an 
object if the hierarchical classification in the subject’s security level is greater than or 
equal to the hierarchical classification in the object’s security level and the non-
hierarchical categories in the subject’s security level include all the non-hierarchical 
categories in the objects security level. A subject can write an object only if the 
hierarchical classification in the subject’s security level is less than or equal to the 
hierarchical classification in the object’s security level and the non-hierarchical 
categories in the Subject’s security levels are included in the non-hierarchical categories 
in the object’s security level]. 
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FDP_IFF.2.3 - The TSF shall enforce the [Additional Information Flow Control 
rule as follows: The NP shall be configured to allow messages to flow from one network 
enclave at one security level to another network enclave at a potentially different security 
level (i.e., one for each source to destination network pair). The NP shall be configured to 
ensure that messages shall only flow between network enclaves under conditions that 
support the enforcement of the Mandatory Access Control SFP]. 
FDP_IFF.2.4 - The TSF shall provide the following [configurable security filters 
to support the Additional Information Flow Control rule]. 
 
FDP_IFF.2.5 - The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on 
the following rules: 
 
a) The TOE shall allow each received message whose destination identification 
data is destined for one or more authorized recipients to pass through the TOE. An 
authorized recipient is a recipient on a network connected to the TOE who is allowed to 
receive messages through the TOE. An authorized recipient shall be a direct addressee 
(i.e., identified as a "TO:" recipient) or a courtesy copy addressee (i.e., identified as a 
"CC:" recipient). 
 
b) The TOE shall allow each received message whose source identification data is 
from an authorized host to pass through the TOE. 
 
c) The TOE shall allow each received message whose destination identification 
data is from an authorized host to pass through the TOE. 
 
d) Additional Mandatory Access Control SFP rules {to be determined by the 
Security Target writer}]. 
 
FDP_IFF.2.6 - The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the 
protocols not supported by the TOE shall not be allowed to traverse the TOE. 
 
FDP_IFF.2.7 - The TSF shall enforce the following relationships for any two 
valid information flow control security attributes: 
 
a) There exists an ordering function that, given two valid security attributes, 
determines if the security attributes are equal, if one security attribute is greater than the 
other, or if the security attributes are incomparable; and 
 
b) There exists a "least upper bound" in the set of security attributes, such that, 
given any two valid security attributes, there is a valid security attribute that is greater 
than or equal to the two valid security attributes; and 
 
c) There exists a "greatest lower bound" in the set of security attributes, such that, 
given any two valid security attributes, there is a valid security attribute that is not greater 
than the two valid security attributes. 
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FDP_IFF.3 Limited illicit information flows 
FDP_IFF.3.1 - The TSF shall enforce the [Mandatory Access Control SFP] to 
limit the capacity of [network-accessible illicit information flows] to a [ST assignment: 
maximum capacity]. 
 
Application Note: The ST author is expected to define the maximum capacity of 
all network-accessible illicit information flows and to provide an argument as to why 
each capacity is appropriate. 
 
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection 
 
FDP_RIP.2.1 - The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a 
resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects. 
 
5.1.4 Identification And Authentication (FIA) 
TOE security functions implemented by a probabilistic or permutation 
mechanism (e.g., password function) are required (at EAL2 and higher) to include a 
Strength of Function (SOF) claim. The single-use authentication mechanism must 
demonstrate SOF-high. SOF-high is defined in Part 1 of the CC to be ideal level of the 
TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate 
protection against deliberately, planned, or organized breach of TOE security by attackers 
possessing a high attack potential. 
 
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling 
 
FIA_AFL.1.1 - The TSF shall detect when [a settable, non-zero number {to be 
determined by the Security Target writer(s)}] of unsuccessful authentication attempts 
occur related to [user authentication]. 
 
FIA_AFL.1.2 - When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts 
has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall [prevent the identified user from successfully 
authenticating itself to the TOE until an action is taken by the Authorized Administrator]. 
 
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition 
 
FIA_ATD.1.1 - The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes 
belonging to individual users: [identity, role associations, security clearance, and any 
other user security attributes {to be determined by the Security Target writer(s)}]. 
 
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action 
 
FIA_UAU.2.1 - The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated 





FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms 
 
FIA_UAU.4.1 - The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 
[one-time passwords, digital certificates or biometrics]. 
 
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action 
 
FIA_UID.2.1 - The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified 
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. 
 
5.1.5 Security Management (FMT) 
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior 
 
FMT_MOF.1.1 - The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable, disable, determine 
and modify the behavior of the functions: 
 
a) Security monitoring rules; 
b) Actions to be taken in case of imminent audit storage failure; 
c) Actions to be taken in the event of authentication failure; 
d) Group of users assigned to a security role and their assigned functions; 
e) Conditions under which abstract machine testing and self-test occurs; 
f) Types of service failures handled; 
g) List and actions for which replay is detected; and 
h) Actions requiring trusted path;  
to [an Authorized Administrator]. 
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
 
FMT_MSA.1.1 - The TSF shall enforce the Admin Policy to restrict to users 
authorized for the Administrator role the ability to modify the roles of the users. 
 
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 
 
FMT_MSA.2.1 - The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for 
security attributes. 
 
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization 
 
FMT_MSA.3.1 - The TSF shall enforce the [Mandatory Access Control SFP] to 
provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. 
 
FMT_MSA.3.2 - The TSF shall allow the Authorized Administrator to specify 






FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data 
 
FMT_MTD.1.1 - The TSF shall restrict the ability to read or modify the Admin 
Objects to users authorized for the administrator role. 
FMT_REV.1 - Revocation 
 
FMT_REV.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke role permissions 
associated with users within the TSC to users authorized for the Administrator role. 
 
FMT_REV.1.2 The TSF shall enforce revocation of a user’s Administrator role 
on the next authentication of that user. 
 
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles 
 
FMT_SMR.2.1 - The TSF shall maintain the roles: [Authorized Administrator and 
other roles {to be determined by the Security Target writer(s)}]. 
 
FMT_SMR.2.2 - The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. 
 
FMT_SMR.2.3 - The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [Authorized 
Administrator functions are appropriately separated and a user authorized to exercise 
functions in one role can be prevented from exercising functions simultaneously in 
another role] are satisfied. 
 
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming roles 
 
FMT_SMR.3.1 - The TSF shall require an explicit request to assume the 
following roles: 
[Authorized Administrator and other roles {to be determined by the Security 
Target writer(s)}]. 
 
5.1.6 Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT) 
 
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing 
 
FPT_AMT.1.1 - The TSF shall run a suite of tests during initial start-up, at the 
request of an authorized Administrator, and during automated recovery to demonstrate 
the correct operation of the security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that 
underlies the TSF. 
 
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection 
 
FPT_ITT.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure when it is transmitted 




FPT_FLS.1 – Failure with Preservation of Secure State 
 
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the system, a 
connection or the power fails. 
 
FPT_RCV.2 Automated recovery 
 
FPT_RCV.2.1 - When automated recovery from a failure or service discontinuity 
is not possible, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return the 
TOE to a secure state is provided. 
 
FPT_RCV.2.2 - For [system failure and other failures {to be determined by the 
Security Target writer(s)}], the TSF shall ensure the return of the TOE to a secure state 
using automated procedures. 
 
FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection 
 
FPT_RPL.1.1 - The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [Authorized 
Administrator authentication]. 
 
FPT_RPL.1.2 - The TSF shall perform [ignore the attempted replay operation and 
generate an audit record] when replay is detected. 
 
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP 
 
FPT_RVM.1.1 - The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are 
invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed. 
 
FPT_SEP.2 SFP domain separation 
 
FPT_SEP.2.1 - The unisolated portion of the TSF shall maintain a security 
domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and tampering by 
untrusted subjects. 
 
FPT_SEP.2.2 - The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of 
subjects in the TSC. 
 
FPT_SEP.2.3 - The TSF shall maintain the part of the TSF related to [Mandatory 
Access Control SFP] in a security domain for their own execution that protects them from 
interference and tampering by the remainder of the TSF and by subjects untrusted with 
respect to those SFPs. 
 
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps 
 




FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency 
 
FPT_TDC.1.1 - The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret 
[security labels] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product. 
FPT_TDC.1.2 - The TSF shall use [the following rule to interpret security labels: 
if the security label of the message does not match the label in the classification field, the 
TOE shall not release the message] when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted 
IT product. 
 
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing 
 
FPT_TST.1.1 - The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, at 
the request of the authorized Administrator, and [during automated recovery] to 
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF. 
 
FPT_TST.1.2 - The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to 
verify the integrity of TSF data. 
 
FPT_TST.1.3 - The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to 
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. 
 
5.1.7 Resource Utilization 
FRU_RSA.2 – Minimum and Maximum Quotas 
 
FRU_RSA.2.1 The TSF shall enforce quotas limiting the maximum quantity of 
the currently allocated connection resources that individual users can use over a specified 
period of time. 
FRU_RSA.2.2 The TSF shall ensure the provision of minimum quantity of the 
currently allocated connection resources that individual users can use over a specified 
period of time. 
 
5.1.8 TOE Access 
FTA_TSE.1 – TOE Session Establishment 
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session (connection) establishment 
based on a user’s location and/or port of access. 
 
5.1.9 Trusted Path (FTP) 
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path 
 
FTP_TRP.1.1 - The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and 
local Authorized Administrator(s) that is logically distinct from other communication 
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the 
communicated data from modification or disclosure. 
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FTP_TRP.1.2 - The TSF shall permit local Authorized Administrator(s) to initiate 
communication via the trusted path. 
 
FTP_TRP.1.3 - The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial 
Authorized Administrator(s) authentication and [other services {to be determined by the 
Security Target writer}]. 
 
5.2 Security Requirements for the Environment 
 
a) All physical security precautions will be taken for the proper level on the 
high side in which the NP will reside.  
 
b) All personnel having access to the NP will hold the appropriate clearance 
commensurate to level of data being processed.  
 
5.3  TOE Security Assurance Requirements 
The TOE assurance requirements are EAL5 as shown in Table 20. 
 
Assurance Class  Assurance Components 
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation 
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance 
procedures 
Configuration Management 
ACM_SCP.3 Development tools CM coverage 
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification Delivery and Operations 
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up 
procedures 
ADV_FSP.3 Semiformal functional specification 
ADV_HLD.3 Semiformal high-level explanation 
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF 
ADV_INT.1 Modularity 
ADV_LLD.2  Descriptive low-level design 
ADV_RCR.2 Semiformal correspondence 
demonstration 
Development 
ADV_SPM.3 Formal TOE security policy model 
AGD_ADM.1  Administrator guidance Guidance Documents 
AGD_USR.1  User guidance 
ALC_DVS.1  Identification of security measures 
ALC_LCD.2  Standardized life-cycle model 
Life Cycle Support 
ALC_TAT.2  Compliance with implementation 
standards 
ATE_COV.2. Analysis of coverage 
ATE_DPT.2  
 
Testing: low-level design 
ATE_FUN.1  Functional testing 
Tests 
ATE_IND.2  Independent testing - sample 
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Assurance Class  Assurance Components 
AVA_CCA.1  Covert channel analysis 
AVA_MSU.2  Validation of analysis 
AVA_SOF.1  
 
Strength of TOE security function 
evaluation Vulnerability assessment 
Vulnerability Assessment 
AVA_VLA.3  Moderately resistant 
Table 20.  Security Assurance Requirements 
 
5.3.1 Configuration Management (ACM) 
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation 
Developer action elements: 
 
ACM_AUT.1.1D - The developer shall use a CM system. 
 
ACM_AUT.1.2D - The developer shall provide a CM plan. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ACM_AUT.1.1C - The CM system shall provide an automated means by which 
only authorized changes are made to the TOE implementation representation. 
 
ACM_AUT.1.2C - The CM system shall provide an automated means to support 
the generation of the TOE. 
 
ACM_AUT.1.3C - The CM plan shall describe the automated tools used in the 
CM system. 
 
ACM_AUT.1.4C - The CM plan shall describe how the automated tools are used 
in the CM system. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ACM_AUT.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ACM_CAP.4.1D - The developer shall provide a reference for the TOE. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.2D - The developer shall use a CM system. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.3D - The developer shall provide CM documentation. 
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Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ACM_CAP.4.1C - The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of 
the TOE. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.2C - The TOE shall be labeled with its reference. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.3C - The CM documentation shall include a configuration list, a 
CM plan, and an acceptance plan. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.4C - The configuration list shall describe the configuration items 
that comprise the TOE. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.5C - The CM documentation shall describe the method used to 
uniquely identify the configuration items. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.6C - The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.7C - The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.8C - The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is 
operating in accordance with the CM plan. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.9C - The CM documentation shall provide evidence that all 
configuration items have been and are being effectively maintained under the CM 
system. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.10C - The CM system shall provide measures such that only 
authorized changes are made to the configuration items. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.11C - The CM system shall support the generation of the TOE. 
 
ACM_CAP.4.12C - The acceptance plan shall describe the procedures used to 
accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ACM_CAP.4.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ACM_SCP.3 Development tools CM coverage 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ACM_SCP.3.1D - The developer shall provide CM documentation. 
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Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ACM_SCP.3.1C - The CM documentation shall show that the CM system, as a 
minimum, tracks the following: the TOE implementation representation, design 
documentation, test documentation, user documentation, administrator documentation, 
CM documentation, security flaws and development tools and related information. 
 
ACM_SCP.3.2C - The CM documentation shall describe how configuration items 
are tracked by the CM system. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ACM_SCP.3.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
5.3.2 Delivery and Operation (ADO) 
 
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADO_DEL.2.1D - The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the 
TOE or parts of it to the user. 
 
ADO_DEL.2.2D - The developer shall use the delivery procedures. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADO_DEL.2.1C - The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that 
are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to a user's site. 
 
ADO_DEL.2.2C - The delivery documentation shall describe how the various 
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications, or any 
discrepancy between the developer's master copy and the version received at the user site. 
 
ADO_DEL.2.3C - The delivery documentation shall describe how the various 
procedures allow detection of attempts to masquerade as the developer, even in cases in 
which the developer has sent nothing to the user's site. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ADO_DEL.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 





ADO_IGS.1 Installation generation and start-up procedures 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADO_IGS.1.1D - The developer shall document procedures necessary for the 
secure installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADO_IGS.1.1C - The documentation shall describe the steps necessary for secure 
installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
ADO_IGS.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets 
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ADO_IGS.1.2E - The evaluator shall determine that the installation, generation, 
and start-up procedures result in a secure configuration. 
 
5.3.3 Development (ADV) 
 
ADV_FSP.3 Semiformal functional specification 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADV_FSP.3.1D - The developer shall provide a functional specification. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADV_FSP.3.1C - The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its 
external interfaces using a semiformal style, supported by informal, explanatory text 
where appropriate. 
 
ADV_FSP.3.2C - The functional specification shall be internally consistent. 
 
ADV_FSP.3.3C - The functional specification shall describe the purpose and 
method of use of all external TSF interfaces, providing complete details of all effects, 
exceptions and error messages. 
 
ADV_FSP.3.4C - The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF. 
 
ADV_FSP.3.5C - The functional specification shall include rationale that the TSF 
is completely represented. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
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ADV_FSP.3.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets 
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ADV_FSP.3.2E -The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is 
an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements. 
 
ADV_HLD.3 Semiformal high-level design 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADV_HLD.3.1D - The developer shall provide the high-level design of the TSF. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADV_HLD.3.1C - The presentation of the high-level design shall be semiformal. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.2C - The high-level design shall be internally consistent. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.3C - The high-level design shall describe the structure of the TSF in 
terms of subsystems. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.4C - The high-level design shall describe the security functionality 
provided by each subsystem of the TSF. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.5C - The high-level design shall identify any underlying hardware, 
firmware, and/or software required by the TSF with a presentation of the functions 
provided by the supporting protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware, 
firmware, or software. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.6C - The high-level design shall identify all interfaces to the 
subsystems of the TSF. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.7C - The high-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to 
the subsystems of the TSF are externally visible. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.8C - The high-level design shall describe the purpose and method 
of use of all interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF, providing complete details of all 
effects, exceptions and error messages. 
 
ADV_HLD.3.9C - The high-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE 
into TSP-enforcing and other subsystems. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ADV_HLD.3.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
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ADV_HLD.3.2E - The evaluator shall determine that the high-level design is an 
accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements. 
 
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADV_IMP.2.1D - The developer shall provide the implementation representation 
for the entire TSF. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADV_IMP.2.1C - The implementation representation shall unambiguously define 
the TSF to a level of detail such that the TSF can be generated without further design 
decisions. 
 
ADV_IMP.2.2C - The implementation representation shall be internally 
consistent. 
 
ADV_IMP.2.3C - The implementation representation shall describe the 
relationships between all portions of the implementation. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ADV_IMP.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ADV_IMP.2.2E - The evaluator shall determine that the implementation 





Developer action elements: 
 
ADV_INT.1.1D - The developer shall design and structure the TSF in a modular 
fashion that avoids unnecessary interactions between the modules of the design. 
 
ADV_INT.1.2D - The developer shall provide an architectural description. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 




ADV_INT.1.2C - The architectural description shall describe the purpose, 
interface, parameters, and effects of each module of the TSF. 
 
ADV_INT.1.3C - The architectural description shall describe how the TSF design 
provides for largely independent modules that avoid unnecessary interactions. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ADV_INT.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets 
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ADV_INT.1.2E - The evaluator shall determine that both the low-level design 
and the implementation representation are in compliance with the architectural 
description. 
 
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADV_LLD.1.1D - The developer shall provide the low-level design of the TSF. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADV_LLD.1.1C - The presentation of the low-level design shall be semiformal. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.2C - The low-level design shall be internally consistent. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.3C - The low-level design shall describe the TSF in terms of 
modules. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.4C - The low-level design shall describe the purpose of each 
module. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.5C - The low-level design shall define the interrelationships 
between the modules in terms of provided security functionality and dependencies on 
other modules. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.6C - The low-level design shall describe how each TSP-enforcing 
function is provided. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.7C - The low-level design shall identify all interfaces to the 
modules of the TSF. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.8C - The low-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to 
the modules of the TSF are externally visible. 
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ADV_LLD.1.9C - The low-level design shall describe the purpose and method of 
use of all interfaces to the modules of the TSF, providing complete details of all effects, 
exceptions and error messages, as appropriate. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.10C - The low-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE 
into TSP-enforcing and other modules. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ADV_LLD.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ADV_LLD.1.2E - The evaluator shall determine that the low-level design is an 
accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements. 
 
ADV_RCR.2 Semiformal correspondence demonstration 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADV_RCR.2.1D - The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence 
between all adjacent pairs of TSF representations that are provided. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADV_RCR.2.1C - For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the 
analysis shall demonstrate that all relevant security functionality of the more abstract TSF 
representation is correctly and completely refined in the less abstract TSF representation. 
 
ADV_RCR.2.2C - For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, where 
portions of both representations are at least semi-formally specified, the demonstration of 
correspondence between those portions of the representations shall be semiformal. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ADV_RCR.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ADV_SPM.3 Formal TOE security policy model 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ADV_SPM.3.1D - The developer shall provide a TSP model. 
 
ADV_SPM.3.2D - The developer shall demonstrate or prove, as appropriate, 
correspondence between the functional specification and the TSP model. 
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Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ADV_SPM.3.1C - The TSP model shall be Formal. 
 
ADV_SPM.3.2C - The TSP model shall describe the rules and characteristics of 
all policies of the TSP that can be modeled. 
 
ADV_SPM.3.3C - The TSP model shall include a rationale that demonstrates that 
it is consistent and complete with respect to all policies of the TSP that can be modeled. 
 
ADV_SPM.3.4C - The demonstration of correspondence between the TSP model 
and the functional specification shall show that all of the security functions in the 
functional specification are consistent and complete with respect to the TSP model. 
 
ADV_SPM.3.5C - Where the functional specification is semiformal, the 
demonstration of correspondence between the TSP model and the functional specification 
shall be semiformal. 
 
ADV_SPM.3.6C – here the functional specification is formal, the proof of 
correspondence between the TSP model and the functional specification shall be 
semiformal. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ADV_SPM.3.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
5.3.4 Guidance Documents (AGD) 
 
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
AGD_ADM.1.1D - The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed 
to system administrative personnel. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
AGD_ADM.1.1C - The administrator guidance shall describe the administrative 
functions and interfaces available to the administrator of the TOE. 
 
AGD_ADM.1.2C - The administrator guidance shall describe how to administer 
the TOE in a secure manner.  
 
AGD_ADM.1.3C - The administrator guidance shall contain warnings about 
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment. 
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AGD_ADM.1.4C - The administrator guidance shall describe all assumptions 
regarding user behavior that are relevant to secure operation of the TOE. 
 
AGD_ADM.1.5C - The administrator guidance shall describe all security 
parameters under the control of the administrator, indicating secure values as appropriate. 
 
AGD_ADM.1.6C - The administrator guidance shall describe each type of 
security- relevant event relative to the administrative functions that need to be performed, 
including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF. 
 
AGD_ADM.1.7C - The administrator guidance shall be consistent with all other 
documentation supplied for evaluation. 
 
AGD_ADM.1.8C - The administrator guidance shall describe all security 
requirements for the IT environment that are relevant to the administrator. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
AGD_ADM.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
AGD_USR.1 User guidance 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
AGD_USR.1.1D - The developer shall provide user guidance. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
AGD_USR.1.1C - The user guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces 
available to the non-administrative users of the TOE. 
 
AGD_USR.1.2C - The user guidance shall describe the use of user-accessible 
security functions provided by the TOE. 
 
AGD_USR.1.3C - The user guidance shall contain warnings about user-accessible 
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment. 
 
            AGD_USR.1.4C - The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities 
necessary for secure operation of the TOE, including those related to assumptions 
regarding user behavior found in the statement of TOE security environment. 
 
AGD_USR.1.5C - The user guidance shall be consistent with all other 
documentation supplied for evaluation. 
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AGD_USR.1.6C - The user guidance shall describe all security requirements for 
the IT environment that are relevant to the user. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
AGD_USR.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
5.3.5 Life Cycle Support (ALC) 
 
ALC_DVS.1 Sufficiency of security measures 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ALC_DVS.1.1D - The developer shall produce development security 
documentation. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ALC_DVS.1.1C - The development security documentation shall describe all the 
physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect 
the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its 
development environment. 
 
ALC_DVS.1.2C - The development security documentation shall provide 
evidence that these security measures are followed during the development and 
maintenance of the TOE. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ALC_DVS.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ALC_DVS.1.2E - The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are 
being applied. 
 
ALC_LCD.2 Standardized life-cycle model 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ALC_LCD.2.1D - The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in 
the development and maintenance of the TOE. 
 




ALC_LCD.2.3D – The developer shall use a standardized life-cycle model to 
develop and maintain the TOE. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ALC_LCD.2.1C - The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the 
model used to develop and maintain the TOE. 
 
ALC_LCD.2.2C - The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control 
over the development and maintenance of the TOE. 
 
ALC_LCD.2.3C – The life-cycle definition documentation shall explain why the 
model was chosen. 
 
ALC_LCD.2.4C – The life-cycle definition documentation shall explain how the 
model is used to develop and maintain the TOE. 
 
ALC_LCD.2.5C – The life-cycle definition documentation shall demonstrate 
compliance with the standardized life-cycle model. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ALC_LCD.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ALC_TAT.2.1D - The developer shall identify the development tools being used 
for the TOE. 
 
ALC_TAT.2.2D - The developer shall document the selected implementation-
dependent options of the development tools. 
 
ALC_TAT.2.3D – The developer shall describe he implementation standards to 
be applied. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ALC_TAT.2.1C - All development tools used for implementation shall be well 
defined. 
 
ALC_TAT.2.2C - The documentation of the development tools shall 
unambiguously define the meaning of all statements used in the implementation. 
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ALC_TAT.2.3C - The documentation of the development tools shall 
unambiguously define the meaning of all implementation-dependent options. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ALC_TAT.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ALC_TAT.2.2E – The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards 
have been. 
 
5.3.6 Testing (ATE) 
 
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ATE_COV.2.1D - The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ATE_COV.2.1C - The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the 
correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation and the TSF as 
described in the functional specification. 
 
ATE_COV.2.2C - The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that the 
correspondence between the TSF as described in the functional specification and the tests 
identified in the test documentation is complete. 
 
ATE_COV.2.3C - The analysis of the test coverage shall rigorously demonstrate 
that all external interfaces of the TSF identified in the functional specification have been 
completely tested. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ATE_COV.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: low-level design 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ATE_DPT.2.1D - The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
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ATE_DPT.2.1C - The depth analysis shall demonstrate that the tests identified in 
the test documentation are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF operates in accordance 
with its high-level design and low-level design. 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ATE_DPT.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets 
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ATE_FUN.1 Ordered functional testing 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
ATE_FUN.1.1D - The developer shall test the TSF and document the results. 
 
ATE_FUN.1.2D - The developer shall provide test documentation. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
ATE_FUN.1.1C - The test documentation shall consist of test plans, test 
procedure descriptions, expected test results and actual test results. 
 
ATE_FUN.1.2C - The test plans shall identify the security functions to be tested 
and describe the goal of the tests to be performed. 
 
ATE_FUN.1.3C - The test procedure descriptions shall identify the tests to be 
performed and describe the scenarios for testing each security function. These scenarios 
shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests. 
 
ATE_FUN.1.4C - The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs 
from a successful execution of the tests. 
 
ATE_FUN.1.5C - The test results from the developer execution of the tests shall 
demonstrate that each tested security function behaved as specified. 
 
 Evaluator action elements: 
 
ATE_FUN.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample 
 
Developer action elements: 
 




Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
ATE_IND.2.1C - The TOE shall be suitable for testing. 
 
ATE_IND.2.2C - The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to 
those that were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
ATE_IND.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets 
all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
ATE_IND.2.2E - The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF as appropriate to 
confirm that the TOE operates as specified. 
 
ATE_IND.2.3E - The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test 
documentation to verify the developer test results. 
 
5.3.7 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) 
 
AVA_CCA.1 Covert channel analysis 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
AVA_CCA.1.1D - The developer shall conduct a search for covert channels for 
each information flow control policy. 
 
AVA_CCA.1.2D - The developer shall provide covert channel analysis 
documentation. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
AVA_CCA.1.1C - The analysis documentation shall identify covert channels and 
estimate their capacity. 
 
AVA_CCA.1.2C - The analysis documentation shall describe the procedures used 
for determining the existence of covert channels, and the information needed to carry out 
the covert channel analysis. 
 
AVA_CCA.1.3C - The analysis documentation shall describe all assumptions 
made during the covert channel analysis. 
 
AVA_CCA.1.4C - The analysis documentation shall describe the method used for 
estimating channel capacity, based on worst-case scenarios. 
 
AVA_CCA.1.5C - The analysis documentation shall describe the worst-case 
exploitation scenario for each identified covert channel. 
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Evaluator action elements: 
 
AVA_CCA.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
AVA_CCA.1.2E - The evaluator shall confirm that the results of the covert 
channel analysis show that the TOE meets its functional requirements. 
 
AVA_CCA.1.3E - The evaluator shall selectively validate the covert channel 
analysis through testing. 
 
AVA_MSU.2 Analysis and testing for insecure states 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
AVA_MSU.2.1D - The developer shall provide guidance documentation. 
 
AVA_MSU.2.2D - The developer shall document an analysis of the guidance 
documentation. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
AVA_MSU.2.1C - The guidance documentation shall identify all possible modes 
of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their 
consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation. 
 
AVA_MSU.2.2C - The guidance documentation shall be complete, clear, 
consistent and reasonable. 
 
AVA_MSU.2.3C - The guidance documentation shall list all assumptions about 
the intended environment. 
 
AVA_MSU.2.4C - The guidance documentation shall list all requirements for 
external security measures (including external procedural, physical and personnel 
controls). 
 
AVA_MSU.2.5C - The analysis documentation shall demonstrate that the 
guidance documentation is complete. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
AVA_MSU.2.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
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AVA_MSU.2.2E - The evaluator shall repeat all configuration and installation 
procedures, and other procedures selectively, to confirm that the TOE can be configured 
and used securely using only the supplied guidance documentation. 
 
AVA_MSU.2.3E - The evaluator shall determine that the use of the guidance 
documentation allows all insecure states to be detected.  
 
AVA_MSU.2.4E - The evaluator shall confirm that the analysis documentation 
shows that guidance is provided for secure operation in all modes of operation of the 
TOE. 
 
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
AVA_SOF.1.1D - The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security 
function analysis for each mechanism identified in the ST as having a strength of TOE 
security function claim. 
 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
AVA_SOF.1.1C - For each mechanism with a strength of TOE security function 
claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds 
the minimum strength level defined in the PP/ST. 
 
AVA_SOF.1.2C - For each mechanism with a specific strength of TOE security 
function claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or 
exceeds the specific strength of function metric defined in the PP/ST. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
AVA_SOF.1.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
AVA_SOF.1.2E - The evaluator shall confirm that the strength claims are correct. 
 
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant 
 
Developer action elements: 
 
AVA_VLA.3.1D - The developer shall perform and document an analysis of the 
TOE deliverables searching for ways in which a user can violate the TSP. 
 




Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
 
AVA_VLA.3.1C - The documentation shall show, for all identified 
vulnerabilities, that the vulnerability cannot be exploited in the intended environment for 
the TOE. 
 
AVA_VLA.3.2C - The documentation shall justify that the TOE, with the 
identified vulnerabilities, is resistant to obvious penetration attacks. 
 
AVA_VLA.2.3C - The evidence shall show that the search for vulnerabilities is 
systematic. 
 
Evaluator action elements: 
 
AVA_VLA.3.1E - The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided 
meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
AVA_VLA.3.2E - The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, building on the 
developer vulnerability analysis, to ensure the identified vulnerabilities have been 
addressed. 
 
AVA_VLA.3.3E - The evaluator shall perform an independent vulnerability 
analysis. 
 
AVA_VLA.3.4E - The evaluator shall perform independent penetration testing, 
based on the independent vulnerability analysis, to determine the exploitability of 
additional identified vulnerabilities in the intended environment. 
 
AVA_VLA.3.5E - The evaluator shall determine that the TOE is resistant to 
penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a moderate attack potential. 
 
6.0 RATIONALE 
This section describes the rationale for the Security Objectives and Security 
Functional Requirements as defined in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. 
Additionally, this section describes the rationale for the Assurance Requirements; 
rationale for not satisfying all of the dependencies; and the rationale for the Strength of 
Function (SOF). 
Table 21 illustrates the mapping from Security Objectives to Threats and Policies. 











This security objective is necessary to counter the threats:  
T.IDENTIFICATION_AUTHENTICATION because it requires that users be properly 
identified and held accountable for their actions (including sending messages) or when 
they use security functions. This security objective also necessitates that security-related 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.ADMINISTRATION 
and T.EXCESS_AUDIT which have to do with ensuring that Authorized Administrators 
have the proper administrative tools to effectively perform their duties, maintain the 
secure operation of the TOE and decrease the likelihood of administrative errors. This 
security objective necessitate that an action, required by the TOE, be taken prior to 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.AUDIT_FULL and 
T.AUDIT_UNDETECTED. It ensures that security-relevant events are detected 
and completely and accurately recorded. This security objective also ensures that the 





This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.AUDIT_FULL and 





This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.EXCESS_AUDIT 
because it ensures that the Authorized Administrator is able to change the selection of 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.BRUTE_FORCE and 
T.IDENTIFICATION_AUTHENTICATION because it requires that users are uniquely 
identified via a single-use authentication mechanism and only granted a limited number 





This security objective is necessary to counter the threats and policy: 
T.DISCLOSURE, T.INCORRECT_LEVEL because it requires that the TOE utilizes 
encryption and employs cryptography of adequate strength to protect messages and data 
from unauthorized disclosure. 
 
O. COVERT_CHANNEL 
This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: 
T.COVERT_CHANNEL because it requires that the type and capacity of elicit 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.MODIFY_DATA 





This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.MODIFY_DATA 
because it ensures that the TOE is resistant to interference, modification or destruction by 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.REPLAY. It requires 
that a trusted path be established between the user and the TOE when entering 





This security objective is necessary to counter the threats and policy: 
T.INCORRECT_LEVEL, T.SECURITY_LEVEL, and 
P.MANDATORY_ACCESS_CONTROL because it ensures that information residing on 
the TOE is not released from a higher-level enclave to an enclave containing a lower 
security level or between non-comparable security levels. This security objective also 





This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.BYPASS, 
T.DISCLOSURE and T.MODERATE_ATTACK_POTENTIAL because it requires that 
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the TOE is always invoked and that messages are not releasable until the security 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: T.SYSTEM_FAILURE 
because it requires that the TOE automatically recovers to a secure state upon the event 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.BYPASS, 
T.MODIFY_DATA, T.SYSTEM_FAILURE, and 
T.MODERATE_ATTACK_POTENTIAL because it requires that the TOE protect itself 





This security objective is necessary to counter the threats: T.MODIFY_DATA 
and T.SYSTEM_FAILURE because it requires the TOE to execute a suite of self tests 
during initial startup, upon request by the Authorized Administrator and during 
automated recovery (i.e., in the event of a system failure) to ensure the integrity of the 




This security objective is necessary to counter the threat: 
 
T.MODERATE_ATTACK_POTENTIAL because it requires that the TOE is 


























































































































































































































T.ADDRESS_SPOOFING X     X             
T.ADMINISTRATION  X                 
T.AUDIT _FULL   X X               

























































































































































































































T.BRUTE_FORCE      X             
T.BYPASS             X   X   
T.COVERT_CHANNEL        X           
T.DISCLOSURE       X      X      
T.EXCESS_AUDIT  X  X X              
T.MODERATE ATTACK_POTENTIAL             X   X  X
T.IDENTIFICATION_AUTHENTICATI
ON 
X     X         X    
T.INCORRECT_LEVEL       X     X       
T.MODIFY_DATA         X X      X X  
T.REPLAY           X        
T.SECURITY_LEVEL            X       
T.SYSTEM_FAILURE              X  X X  
P.MANDATORY_ACCESS_CONTROL            X       
Table 21. Security Objectives to Threats/Policies Mapping 
 
6.2 Rationale for Security Objectives/Requirements for the Environment 
All of the security objectives for the environment are restatements of assumptions 
found in Section 3. Therefore, those security objectives for the environment trace to the 
assumptions trivially.  
 
6.3 Rationale for Security Requirements 
The functional and assurance requirements presented in this PP are mutually 
supportive and their combination meets the stated security objectives. The security 
requirements were derived according to the general model presented in Part 1 of the 
Common Criteria. 
Table 21 demonstrates the relationship among the threats, policies and TOE 
security objectives. Table 22 demonstrates the mapping between the security 
requirements and the security objectives. Together these tables demonstrate the 







FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation 
 
This component outlines the data that must be included in audit records and the 
events that must be audited. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the 
following objective: O.AUDIT. 
 
FAU_SAA.1 Potential Violation Analysis 
 
This component ensures that repeated failed attempts to authenticate are 
monitored and alarmed if a threshold is reached. This component traces back to and aids 
in meeting the following objective: O.AUTHENTICATION. 
 
FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit 
 
This component ensures that the Authorized Administrator can dynamically 
change the set of events to be audited. This component traces back to and aids in meeting 
the following objectives: O.ADMIN_SUPPORT and O.AUDIT_SELECT. 
 
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage 
 
This component ensures that the audit trail is always protected from tampering. 
This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: 
O.AUDIT_PROTECT. 
 
FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss 
 
This component ensures that the Authorized Administrator is notified when the 
audit trail is reaching its maximum capacity. This component traces back to and aids in 
meeting the following objective: O.AUDIT. 
 
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss 
 
This component ensures that the Authorized Administrator will be able to 
administer the audit trail should it become full. This component traces back to and aids in 
meeting the following objective: O.AUDIT. 
 
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Object Access Control  
 
This component ensures that the TOE EN enforces the Admin Access Policy for 
all users accessing the Admin Operations. This component traces back to and aids in 







FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control 
 
This component ensures that the TOE enforces the Admin Access Policy to 
objects based on the role of the user accessing Admin Operations. This component traces 
back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.ADMIN_SUPPORT and 
O.AUTHENTICATION. 
 
FDP_ACF.3 Access Authorization and Denial 
 
This component ensures that the TOE enforces the processes that control the 
Admin Access policy to explicitly authorize access to Admin Operations for users 
authorized for the Administrator role. This component traces back to and aids in meeting 
the following objective: O.ADMIN_SUPPORT  and O.AUTHENTICATION. 
 
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control 
 
This component identifies the entities involved in the Mandatory Access Control 
SFP. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: 
O.INFORMATION_FLOW. 
 
FDP_IFF.2 Hierarchical Security Attributes 
 
This component identifies the attributes of the subjects sending and receiving the 
information in the Mandatory Access Control SFP, as well as the attributes for the 
information itself. Then the operations identify under what conditions information is 
permitted to flow through the TOE. This component traces back to and aids in meeting 
the following objective: O.INFORMATION_FLOW. 
 
FDP_IFF.3 Limited Illicit Information Flows 
 
This component ensures that certain types of illicit information flows are limited 
to an acceptable capacity. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the 
following objective: O.COVERT_CHANNEL. 
 
FDP_RIP.2 Subset Residual Information Protection 
 
This component ensures that all electronic messages that have traversed through 
the TOE and all TOE internal data are inaccessible after deletion. This component traces 
back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.CONFIDENTIALITY. 
 
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling 
 
This component ensures that human users who are not Authorized Administrators 
cannot endlessly attempt to authenticate. After some number of failures, defined by the 
Authorized Administrator, the user is unable from that point on to authenticate. This 
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component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: 
O.AUTHENTICATION. 
 
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition 
 
This component exists to provide attributes to distinguish Authorized 
Administrators from one another for accountability purposes and to associate the roles in 
FMT_SMR.2 with a user. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the 
following objective: O.ACCOUNTABILITY. 
 
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before Any Action 
 
This component ensures that the users are authenticated before any action is 
allowed by the TSF. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following 
objective: O.AUTHENTICATION. 
 
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use Authentication Mechanisms 
 
This component was chosen to ensure that Authorized Administrators use an 
authentication mechanism of adequate strength when authenticating to the TOE. This 
component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: 
O.AUTHENTICATION. 
 
FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before Any Action 
 
This component ensures that the users are identified to the TOE before anything 
occurs on behalf of the user. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the 
following objective: O.ACCOUNTABILITY. 
 
FMT_MOF.1 (1) Management of Security Functions Behavior 
 
This component ensures that the TOE restricts the ability to enable, disable, and 
modify the security filters to the Administrator. This component traces back to and aids 
in meeting the following objective: O.ADMIN_SUPPORT. 
 
FMT_MOF.1 (2) Management of Security Functions Behavior 
 
This component ensures that the TOE restricts the ability to modify the behavior 
of functions (e.g., security monitoring rules; actions to be taken in case of imminent audit 
storage failure; actions to be taken in the event of authentication failure; group of users 
assigned to a security role and their assigned functions; conditions under which abstract 
machine testing and self-test occurs; types of service failures handled; list and actions for 
which replay is detected; and actions requiring trusted path) to the Authorized 




FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes 
 
This component ensures that the TSF restricts the ability to add, delete, and 
modify the\ security attributes that affect the Mandatory Access Control SFP to only the 
Authorized Administrator. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the 
following objectives: O.ADMIN_SUPPORT. 
 
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes 
 
This component ensures that appropriate values are assigned to the security 
attributes used in the Mandatory Access Control SFP. This component traces back to and 
aids in meeting the following objective: O.ADMIN_SUPPORT. 
 
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization 
 
This component ensures that there are restrictive default values implemented in 
the Mandatory Access Control SFP that the Authorized Administrator can change. This 
component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: 
O.SELF_PROTECT. 
 
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data 
 
This component ensures that the TSF restricts the ability to modify, delete, and 
assign user attributes (as defined in FIA_ATD.1.1), user identities (as defined in 
FIA_UID.2), authentication data (as defined in FIA_UAU.2) and timestamps (as defined 
in FPT_STM.1) to only the Authorized Administrator. This component traces back to and 




This component ensures that the TOE restricts the ability to revoke role 
permissions associated with users with the TSC to users authorized for the Administrator 
role. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: 
O.ACCOUNTABILITY. 
 
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles 
 
This component was chosen because each of the FMT components depends on the 
assignment of a user to the Authorized Administrator roles. This component traces back 
to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.ROLE_SEPARATION. 
 
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming Roles 
 
This component ensures that users must take an explicit action in order to assume 
a trusted role (i.e., Authorized Administrator). This component traces back to and aids in 
meeting the following objective: O.ADMIN_SUPPORT. 
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FPT_AMT.1 Underlying Abstract Machine Test 
 
This component ensures that the security assumptions provided by the underlying 
abstract machine are tested during start-up. This component traces back to and aids in 
meeting the following objective: O.SELF_PROTECT. 
 
FPT_FLS.1 Export of User Data without Security Attributes 
 
This component ensures that the TOE preserves a secure state when the system, 
connection or the power fails. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the 
following objective: O.RECOVERY. 
 
FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection 
 
This component ensures that the cryptographic keys and data transmitted between 
different parts of the TOE are not disclosed. This component traces back to and aids in 
meeting the following objective: O.CONFIDENTIALITY. 
 
FPT_RCV.2 Automated Recovery 
 
This component ensures that the TOE returns to a secure state in the event of 
system failure. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following 
objective: O.RECOVERY. 
 
FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection 
 
This component ensures that replay of authentication attempts are detected and 
disallowed. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objectives: 
O.AUTHENTICATION and O.IMPERSONATE. 
 
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP 
 
This component ensures that the TOE enforcement functions are always invoked 
from initial start-up. This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following 
objective: O.NON_BYPASSABILITY. 
 
FPT_SEP.2 SFP Domain Separation 
 
This component ensures that the TSF has a domain of execution that is separate 
and that cannot be violated by unauthorized users. This component traces back to and 







FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps 
 
This component was included because FAU_GEN.1 depends on having the date 
and time accurately recorded in the audit records. This component traces back to and aids 
in meeting the following objective: O.AUDIT..FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF TSF Data 
Consistency.  
 
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing 
 
This component ensures the integrity of the operation of the TSF and to provide 
the Authorized Administrator a means to verify the integrity of the TSF code and data. 
This component traces back to and aids in meeting the following objective: 
O.SELF_TEST. 
 
FRU_RSA.2 Minimum and Maximum Quotas 
 
This component ensures that the TOE enforces the minimum and maximum 
quantities of the currently allocated connection resources that individual users can use 
over a specified period of time: O. COVERT_CHANNEL. 
 
FTA_TSE.1 TOE Sessions Establishment 
 
This component ensures that the TOE be able to deny session (connection) 
establishment based on a user’s location and/or port of access. This component traces 
back to and aids in meeting the following objective: O.AUTHENTICATION 
 
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path 
 
This component ensures that a trusted path is available to users, giving them 
assurance that they are communicating with the TOE. This component traces back to and 





















































































































































































































FAU_GEN.1   X               
FAU_SAA.1      X            
FAU_SEL.1  X                
FAU_STG.1    X              





















































































































































































































FAU_STG.4   X               
FDP_ACC.1  X    X            
FDP_ACF.1  X    X            
FDP_ACF.3  X    X            
FDP_IFC.1            X      
FDP_IFF.2            X      
FDP_IFF.3        X          
FDP_RIP.2       X           
FIA_AFL.1      X            
FIA_ATD.1 X                 
FIA_UAU.2      X            
FIA_UAU.4      X            
FIA_UID.2 X                 
FMT_MOF.1(1)  X                
FMT_MOF.1(2)  X                
FMT_MSA.1  X                
FMT_MSA.2  X                
FMT_MSA.3                X  
FMT_MTD.1  X                
FMT_REV.1 X                 
FMT_SMR.2               X   
FMT_SMR.3  X                
FPT.AMT.1                X  
FPT_FLS.1              X    
FTP_ITC.1           X       
FPT_ITT.1       X           
FPT_RCV.2              X    
FPT_RPL.1      X     X       
FPT_RVM.1             X     





















































































































































































































FPT_STM.1   X               
FPT_TDC.1                  
FPT_TST.1                 X
FRU_RSA.1        X          
FTA_TSE.1      X            
FTP_TRP.1           X       
Table 22. Functional Requirement to Security Objective Mapping 
 
6.4 Rationale for Security Requirements 
EAL5 Augmented was chosen to ensure a high-level of confidence in the security 
services used to protect information in NPs for high-robustness environments. The 
assurance selection was based on: 
• Detailed conversations with the sponsor of the PP; 
• Recommendations documented in the 8500.1 [Ref. 5]; 
• The required strength of function, SOF-high (Section 4.1) 
• EAL requirements as specified in the Preferred Assurance   
Components/Processes for Devices Protecting Classified Information 
table (Reference Appendix C); and 
• The postulated threat environment (Section 3.3). 
 
The sponsor of this PP determined that certain security critical components of the 
NP require an EAL of 5 to ensure that the security engineering performed by the 
developer was based on rigorous development practices supported by specialized security 
engineering techniques, such as the use of a structured development process, 
development of environment controls, comprehensive configuration management and 
evidence of secure product delivery. The former guidance in the recently canceled 
5200.28_STD policy was consulted and found to also support the chosen assurance level 
EAL 5. 
In order to ensure the security of a high-assurance system, not only must 
vulnerability analysis be performed by the developer, but the NSA evaluator, through the 
use of independent functional testing, must search for vulnerabilities and demonstrate that 
they are highly resistant to penetration attackers with moderate attack potential 
(T.MODERATE_ATTACK_POTENTIAL). This level of testing is supported by 
requirements ATE_FUN.1, ATE_COV.2, and ATE_DPT.2. 
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The developer shall provide a mechanism to track and correct security flaws in 
the TOE that are discovered after initial delivery and installation. Additionally, the 
developer must provide for automatic distribution of security flaw reports and corrections 
to registered users that may be affected by the defect. 
 
Lastly, the NSA evaluator must validate the developer’s systematic covert 
channel analysis specified by requirement AVA_CCA.1, to confirm the non-existence of 
illicit information flows that may be exploited by threat agents possessing moderate 
attack potential. 
 
6.5 Rationale for Not Satisfying All Dependencies 
 
The FDP_IFC.1 dependency (i.e., FDP_IFF.1) is not included in this PP. This 
dependency is satisfied in this PP with the inclusion of FDP_IFF.2, which subsumes 
FDP_IFF.1.  
 
The functional requirements FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.2, 
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1 and FMT_SMR.2 are dependent on the requirement 
FMT_SMR.1 (Security Roles). Since there are multiple roles within this PP (i.e., 
Authorized Administrators), it is required that the conditions or rules that control the 
relationship between these roles are specified. Therefore, functional requirement 
FMT_SMR.2 is included and is hierarchical to FMT_SMR.1. As such, the requirement 
FMT_SMR.1 is satisfied. 
 
6.6 Rationale for Strength of Function Claim 
 
Part 1 of the CC defines the “strength of function” in terms of the minimum 
efforts assumed necessary to defeat the expected security behavior of a TOE security 
function. 
There are three strength of function levels defined in Part 1: SOF-basic, SOF-
Medium and SOF-high. SOF-high is the strength of function level chosen for this PP. 
SOF-high states, the level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the 
function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organized breach of 
TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential. The rationale for choosing 
SOF-high was based on the TOE security objectives documented in Section 4 of this PP. 
Additionally, the sponsor determined that the SOF-high level is vital to address 
the TOE security objectives that counter the threat 
T.MODERATE_ATTACK_POTENTIAL. 
Consequently, the metrics (i.e., password and keys) chosen for inclusion in this 
PP were determined to be sufficient for SOF-high and would adequately protect data and 







CC  Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation 
CM  Configuration Management 
 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DSA  Directory Service Agent 
DUA  Directory User Agent 
 
EAL  Evaluation Assurance Level 
 
HRE  High Robustness Environment 
 
IP  Internet Protocol 
IT  Information Technology 
 
MAC  Mandatory Access Control 
MTA  Mail Transfer Agent 
MTS  Mail Transfer System 
 
NSA  National Security Agency 
 
PP  Protection Profile 
 
SFP  Security Function Policy 
SOF  Strength of Function 
 
TOE  Target of Evaluation 
TSE  TOE Security Environment 
TSF  TOE Security Functions 
TSP  TOE Security Policy 
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APPENDIX D. DRAFT SSAA 
The draft SSAA was created using the DITSCAP instruction, DITSCAP 
application manual, and appropriate certification templates provided from SPAWAR. 
Using these resources the template SSAA was tailored along with the ISSP to apply 
directly to the NP in a basic shipboard environment. 
 
1.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION 
1.1 System Name and Identification 
Center for High Assurance Computer Systems, Code 5540 Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL), Washington, D.C. developed the NP for Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command, PD – 161, San Diego, CA acting as a Low to High network 
connection link. 
The following shipboard environmental assumptions were made during the 
certification of the NP: 
 
4 Windows NT 4.0 File Servers 
2 MS Exchange Servers 5.0 
2 Cisco 4000 Routers 
2 MS Proxy Servers 
7 Xylan ATM Switches 
150 Windows NT 4.0 Workstations, UNCLAS 
45 Windows NT 4.0 Workstations, CLASSIFIED 
1.2 System Description 
I. Purpose 
a. DoD levels of classification - information transfer from low to 
high. 
i. Cannot compromise high 
ii. How to send information 
1. Without compromising high 
2. Providing assurance 
3. Providing Non-repudiation 
b. The NP is a general-purpose device to provide reliable, secure 
communications between systems in two enclaves, one operating 
at low and the other at high. The NP connects two or more LANs 
operating at different security levels. 
II. Capability Desired 
a. Allow trusted users to send information from low to high. 
b. Ensure high users can access all required low information on high. 
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Figure 11.   Architecture Overview 
[Ref. 1] 
 
1.3 Functional Description 
1.3.1 System Capabilities 
a. Support TCP/IP 
i. Implemented at application layer 
ii. Uses transport layer 
iii. Only operates with asynchronous applications 
b. Use Wrappers 
i. Support Pump Protocol 
ii. Application portion/NP dependent part 
iii. Low Wrappers 
1. Request connection 
2. Send Data 
3. Close connection 
iv. High Wrapper 
1. Receive connection 
2. Review Message 
3. Send Acknowledgement  
v. Administrator Terminal (NP Console) 
1. Initial Configuration – define which users of Low 
LAN can open connections to which users on high. 
2. Changes in configuration 
3. Control Information 
4. User/performance reports (logging) 
vi. NP 
1. Reliable information transfer from Low to High 

























2. Ensure LAN communications interface conforms to 
NP Protocol operating policy 
3. Control timing of Ack sent across Low LAN 
interface to prevent covert channels from high to 
low 
4. Store Data message in buffers 
5. Establish High connections 
6. Control Low LAN to High LAN connections;     
Re-establish if required. 
7. Maintain configuration table 
a. Windows like interface 
b. Buffer size 
c. Time out period 
d. Port connections/host 
e. Port connections/NP 
f. IP address and port numbers for Low LAN 
g. IP address and port numbers for High LAN 






d. Usage and Acknowledgement of Design 
e. Non-duplication 
f. Connection Independence 
g. Connection Fairness 
1.3.2 System Criticality 
The NP is a tool that increases the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
personnel onboard US Naval vessels. For this SSAA the NP is situated in an operational 
environment such that the loss of the NP could be absorbed for a period of days without 
having an adverse impact upon mission accomplishment. After more than two days 
without NP operation, the effectiveness of the unit degrades due to the additional labor 
required to accomplish the mission. 
1.3.3 Classification and Sensitivity of Data Processed  
Information stored, processed, and transmitted through the NP includes 
data from a low-security level system to a high-security level system. The degree of 
sensitivity (high, medium, and low) is used to identify specific information security 
requirements and cost effective measures to protect NP transferred information. All 
classified data are protected by measures appropriate for system high operations in 
accordance with DoD security requirements as specified in DoD Dir. 8500.1. Need-to-
know controls are an element of protective measures placed on compartmentalized 
environments. In this SSAA we assume that the highest data processed will be Top 
Secret, Compartmentalized (One Classification and Multi-categories), the data types 
involved include Privacy act, financial, mission critical operation, proprietary, and 
administrative. 
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1.3.4 System User Description and Clearance Levels  
The system users could include military, government, civilian, and 
contractor personnel. Users on the high side will be required to have, at a minimum, a 
security clearance equal to the security level of system receiving the data. All high side 
users must be cleared in accordance with local command’s security requirements 
mandated for access to physical locations where the high side operates.    
1.3.5 Life Cycle of the System 
The NP is in a developmental state and is evolving from a single 
workstation with one server to multiple workstations using multiple servers. Once 
incorporated for use the compatibilities of the NP will be expand and future uses will be 
defined.   
The NP is currently in the preliminary test and evaluation stages at NRL. 
The component is under continued development; the goal is that Test and Evaluation will 
be conducted by the end of FY03. Upon acceptance by DoD and DoN the system will be 
placed under configuration control of SPAWAR. Maintenance of the NP will be initially 
provided by NRL and SPAWAR until the completion of training of qualified military 
technicians. The maintenance concept for on-site repair will be isolation and replacement 
of faulty components. Faulty components will be transferred to a control facility for 
repair or replacement. On-site maintenance personnel will require a minimum of the DoD 
Top Secret level. Before being released from government control and custody, all 
defective system components containing non-volatile memory will be sanitized using 
DoD and command approved sanitation methods for Top Secret equipment. 
1.4 System CONOPS Summary 
The NP concept of operations is to provide a trusted, reliable interface for 
automating the transfer of data from low to high-level systems. This will allow the 
sharing of tactical information, and performance of analysis and administrative activities. 
Access to information from the Low LAN will be available almost immediately. This 
increased access to information will help support the activity in its mission. 
 
2.0 ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION 
2.1   Operating Environment 
NP protection mechanisms include physical as well as environmental controls 
described in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. The NP will operate in the high environment of an 
incorporated system. It will be located in a High environment to provide the appropriate 
physical security for the high-level data being processed by the NP. All administrative 
access to the NP will be by personnel in the secure physical high environment. There is 
no access to the NP from outside the high environment.  
2.1.1   Facility Description 
The NP facility requirement will require the facility requirements dictated 
by other high systems on the ship. 
 
 
2.1.2 Physical Security 
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The same physical security required for the high side will be required to 
provide physical security for the NP. 
 
2.1.3 Administrative 
Only system administrators will have access to the administrator terminal 
(NP Console). Only system administrators will be authorized to perform maintenance on 
the NP to ensure that system administrator settings are not disrupted or removed. Each 
administrator will have their own login and password to ensure audit logs reflect system 
administrator usage and tasks performed. Administrator clearances must be at the highest 
level for systems receiving the data. 
2.1.4 Personnel 
A minimum of one system administrator (two is desired) trained in the 
maintenance of the NP will be required to conduct all NP maintenance. 
2.1.5 COMSEC 
COMSEC will obtain the system high requirements [that the NP is 
incorporated.] 
2.1.6 TEMPEST 
TEMPEST will obtain the system high requirements [that the NP is 
incorporated.] 
2.1.7 Maintenance Procedures 
System administrators with clearance, equal to that required for the high 
side physical environment, will conduct all NP maintenance. The technicians will be 
properly trained to troubleshoot and repair the NP to ensure the NP maintains the highest 
level of assurance. 
2.1.8 Training Plans 
All unit system administrators will undergo NP training prior to receiving 
and installing the NP in a classified system. Previously trained system administrators can 
provide On-The-Job training (OJT) to provide system administrator continuity in job turn 
over and ability to maintain network availability. 
2.2 Software Development and Maintenance Environment 
The NP is being developed in a Closed Security Environment. 
2.3 Threat Description 
The NP is subject to a range of generic threats applicable to most government 
information systems processing unclassified and classified information. A potential threat 
exists to the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the information processed, 
stored, and transmitted by the system. A potential threat also exists to the availability of 
the assets of the Low LAN system to assist in executing the desired command mission. 
The potential threats to the NP are from natural and manmade sources. Natural disasters 
and damage can result from fire, water, wind, and electrical sources. Manmade threats are 
from those who would target the command LAN for espionage, criminal activity, 
unlawful use, denial of service, or malicious harm. External or internal agents of threat 
include espionage, terrorist, hackers, and vandals. 
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Insider threat: We believe the greatest threat to the NP is insider threat from a 
trusted agent who has access to the system. The most likely incident involves an 
authorized user who accidentally or inadvertently commits or omits some action that 
damages or compromises the system, one of its components, or information processed, 
stored, or transmitted by the system. The next most likely incident involves an authorized 
user who takes deliberate action to damage the system, one of its components, or its data 
for personal gain or vengeful reasons. Such a person could also engage in espionage, 
other criminal activity, or exploitation or expropriation of the assets of the system for 
personal gain. The NP will undergo covert channel analysis to mitigate potential risk 
from possible malicious attack. 
These insider threats can be manifested in the following ways: 
• The unauthorized reading, copying or disclosure of sensitive information. 
• The execution of denial of services attacks. 
• The introduction into the system of viruses, worms or other malicious 
software. 
• The destruction or corruption of data (intentional or unintentional).   
The most serious of all types of possible attacks against the system could be 
mounted by corrupted system administration personnel with their ability to alter or 
bypass most, if not all, of the system’s protection mechanisms. 
 
3.0   SYSTEM ARCHITECTURAL DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Hardware 
NP and System Administrator terminal (NP Console). 
3.2 Software 
The software is a complex integration of the pump protocol and run time system 
services. In this environment, the NP operator/programmer is presented with standard 
interfaces that provide access to NP functionality, utilities, and management services. It is 
government development specialized software designed exclusively for the NP by NRL. 
The components are: 
• Operating System 
• Pump Protocol  
• Access Control 
The NP protocol utilizes a combination of personnel, physical and system security 
mechanisms to control access to the NP.  To control initial system access, the NP 
Console utilizes a combination of user identification and an authentication (password) 
known only to that user.  To control access to specific information and access to 
components of the NP, a set of system defined resource access control lists are used (such 
as discretionary access control (DAC) tables). The NP Console Security Policy provides 
the foundation for the system administration and operation of the NP security software 
and implementations.   
Applications are accessed based upon user access privileges (sometimes termed 
profiles).  At log on, system level software determines which applications, databases, 
levels of data (if mandatory access controls (MAC) is in effect), and executables an 





3.4 System Interfaces and External Connections 
NP Console – System Interface 
The NP has a console interface. A VT100 compatible terminal or terminal 
emulator must be connected to this interface. The NP administrator uses the console to 
manage the NP. 
NP 
There are two standard Ethernet RJ-45 network interfaces (for High and Low 
interfaces). The console interface is a DB 9 connector. The high and low side need to be 
marked in accordance with COMSEC requirements. The NP has a built-in 
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS).  
 
3.5 Accreditation Boundary 
The physical scope and context of the assumed ship’s LAN boundaries are up to 
the ship’s premise routers (CISCO 4000 or others). The CISCO 4000 provides the ship its 
primary connection to the NOC via the Super High Frequency (SHF) system during 
underway periods. During in-port periods the ship connects to the pier side firewall. (The 
Low Wrappers and High wrappers reside with the respective Low LAN server and High 































4.0 ITSEC SYSTEM CLASS 
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In this section we describe the specific ITSEC modes that will apply to the NRL 
NP. We describe the specific alternative for each mode. The goal is to determine a total 
“weight” that can be used to determine the certification level. 
4.1 Interfacing Mode 
Active – An active system has direct interaction with other systems. With both 
physical and logical relationships the active case may allow multiple interactive sessions 
with multiple operations, systems, infrastructure, or data. 
4.2 Processing Mode 
Multi-level – In multi-level mode some of the users have direct or indirect access 
to the system, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts but do not have a valid 
security clearance for all the information processed in the information system. All users 
have the proper security clearance, formal access approval, and a valid need-to-know for 
that information to which they have access.   
4.3 Attribution Mode 
Comprehensive – Comprehensive means all or almost all processing, 
transmission, storage, or data carries the need to attribute them to users or processes. 
4.4 Mission-reliance factor 
Cursory – Cursory means that the mission is only indirectly dependent on the 
specific aspect (the operation, data, infrastructure, or system). 
 
4.5 Availability Factor 
Reasonable – Reasonable means that the specific aspect (the operation, data, 
infrastructure, or system) must be available in reasonable time to avoid operational 
impacts.  
4.6 Integrity Factor 
Exact – Exact means that the degree of integrity for a specific aspect (the 
operation, data, infrastructure, or system) must be exact in order to avoid operational 
impacts. 
4.7 Information Categories 
Compartment/Special Access Classified – This category includes all information 
that requires special access and a security clearance. Examples include Sensitive 
Compartmented Information (SCI), Single Integrated Operations Plan – Extremely 
Sensitive Information (SIOP-ESI) and special access programs. 
4.8 System Class Level 
The certification team has determined the DITSCAP certification level to be 
Level 3. 
Level 3 requires the completion of the minimum-security checklist and a more in 
depth, independent analysis. 
4.9 Certification Analysis Level 
Detailed Analysis 
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Characteristic Alternatives and Weights Weight 
Interfacing Mode Benign (w=0), Passive (w=2), Active (w=6) 6 
Processing Mode Dedicated (w=1), System High (w=2), Compartmented (w=5), Multi-level (w=8) 8 
Attribution Mode None (w=0), Rudimentary (w=1), Selected (w=3), Comprehensive (w=6) 6 
Mission-Reliance 
Factor None (w=0), Cursory (w=1), Partial (w=3), Total (w=7) 1 
Availability Factor Reasonable (w=1), Soon (w=2), ASAP (w=4),  Immediate (w=7) 1 
Integrity Factor Not-applicable (w=0), Approximate (w=3), Exact (w=6) 6 
Information 
Categories 
Unclassified (w=1), Sensitive (w=2), Confidential (w= 3), 
Secret (w=5), Top Secret (w=6), Compartmented/ 
Special Access Classified (w=8) 
8 
 Total of all Weights 36 





Level l If the total of the weighing factors in Table 23 is < 16. 
Level 2 If the total of the weighing factors in Table 23 is 12 - 32. 
Level 3 If the total of the weighing factors in Table 23 is 24 - 44. 
Level 4 If the total of the weighing factors in Table 23 is 38 - 50. 
Table 24. Certification Level 
 
5.0   SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
5.1   National/DOD Security Requirements 
The NP shall comply with requirements specified in ISO 15408. Design and 
implementation shall meet or exceed those contained under EAL5, Structured Protection.  
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publications, Office of Management 
and Budget circulars and bulletins, Executive Orders, and US legislative documents 
validate requirements articulated in DoD 8500.1.  Additionally, the NP shall comply with 
those requirements necessary to implement requirements associated with ensuring 
compliance with the Privacy Act of the United States, Code 552a.  The National, DoD, 
and DoN information assurance requirements are derived from the directives and 
instructions provided in the references. 
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5.2 Governing Security Requirements 
The assumed security requirements for analysis and evaluation are provided in the 
Information System Security Policy (ISSP), Appendix D. The objectives stated in the 
ISSP were drawn from National, DoD, and DoN directives and instructions documented 
in the references. These references provide the governing security requirements.     
5.3   Data Security Requirements 
Many of the data security requirements depend on the security policy associated 
with the various categories and classifications of information processed on the system.  
Systems processing sensitive information also have additional security requirements.  
Table 25 identifies the types of data processed by the NP. 
 
Data Type Definition System 
Applicability 
 Non Sensitive Information  
 This category of information includes all information that is not classified and is not 
sensitive as defined below.  Small programs, easily reconstructed.  No effect on 
agency operations if data is lost or compromised.  No financial liability 
 Sensitive Information  
Financial 
Sensitive 
This category includes financially and contractually sensitive information.  
Information may be either classified or unclassified.  Financially sensitive category 
information usually requires handling according to a common sensitivity, but may 
require special assurance mechanisms such as two-person verification of transactions.  
Financially sensitive category information requires system and information access 
control. 
Privacy Act 
This category includes all information covered by the Privacy Act, including medical, 
pay, and personnel information.  Information may be either classified or unclassified.  
Privacy Act category information requires handling according to a common 




This category includes DoD information associated with housekeeping activities, 
information marked For Official Use Only, sensitive company and customer 
information, and unclassified information that does not fall into any of the other 
information categories. 
Proprietary 
This category includes information provided by a source or sources under the 
condition that it not be released to other sources.  This information may require system 
or information access control. 
 Classified Information  
Confidential 
Includes all classified information designated Confidential.  The disclosure of 
confidential information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national 
security.  A security clearance is required for access to Confidential materials and 
systems. 
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Data Type Definition System 
Applicability 
Secret 
Includes all classified information designated Secret.  The disclosure of secret 
information could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national 
security.  A security clearance is required for access to Secret materials and systems. 
Yes 
Top Secret 
Category includes all classified information designated Top Secret.  The disclosure of 
top-secret information could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave 
damage to national security.  A security clearance is required for access to Top Secret 





Category includes all information that requires special access and a security clearance.  
Examples include Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), Single Integrated 
Operations Plan-Extremely Sensitive Information (SIOP-ESI), and special access 
programs. 
Yes 
Table 25. Data Types 
 
5.4   Security CONOPS 
The NP security policy is enforced by the implementation, to the fullest extent 
possible, of EAL5.  This includes controlling access to systems processing sensitive 
information by using identification and authentication mechanisms (e.g., passwords), and 
using protection features such as mandatory access controls, individual accountability 
and auditing.   
5.5   Security Policy 
Security Policy will be in accordance with all DoD security policies and local 
instructions. 
5.6   Network Connection Rules 
The connection of the NP to another network must be approved by the command 
Configuration Management process. Specific agreements regarding the resources 
required for the installation, operation, and maintenance of the security protection should 
be delineated in a Memorandum of Agreement between the appropriate officials 
responsible for the two network entities. The NP Memorandum of Agreement must be 
generated and owned by the DAA of the High side owner. Issues that pertain to rules 
related to the connection of the NP to other systems will consider the following:   
• Sensitivity of the data processed on the network entities. 
• Security characteristics of the interface device(s) between the two 
networks, 
• Interface between the Computer Security Program Manager and the 
Computer System Security Officers (CSSO) for the two networks, 
respectively.  
5.7   Configuration and Change Management Requirements 
The NPs technical evaluation and type certification requires configuration 
management and control of hardware and software. Life-cycle configuration and change 
control shall be maintained over all NP hardware and software. Proposed changes to the 
NP software or hardware configuration will be reported to the program manager at 
SPAWAR PM-161 for a determination about the security implications of the change. 
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Configuration Management is enforced to assist in the overall security posture of the 
fleet.   
5.8   Reaccredidation Requirements 
OMB A-130 Appendix III requires the review of security documentation for each 
AIS when significant modifications are made to the federation/system or at least every 
three years. The scope and frequency of the review should be commensurate with the 
acceptable level of risk for the federation/system. This periodic review includes a review 
of the AIS Security Plan, and a re-certification and re-accreditation process if required. 
The activities performed during the review and re-accreditation process are similar to 
those required during the initial C&A, except that areas where no change has occurred 
need only be verified that no change has occurred and that there is no impact to existing 
software/functionality by the introduction of the new capability/hardware/software.  It 
does not require that the entire C&A process/test be redone. However, as a minimum, 
security documentation shall be reviewed and revised as appropriate under the following 
circumstances: 
• Significant changes in the hardware, software, or data communications 
configuration. 
• Changes in the security mode of operation. 
• A breach of security, violation of system integrity, or unusual situation 
that appears to invalidate the certification. 
• Three years have elapsed since the date of certification. 
 
6.0   ORGANIZATIONS AND RESOURCES 
6.1   Organizations 
The organization comprises NRL as the NP developer, SPAWAR code 161 as the 
DDAA and Certifying Authority, and user representatives designated by the PM to 
provide fleet level experience and knowledge.  
SPAWAR and user representatives are responsible for outlining the requirements 
associated with integrating the NP into operational systems. NRL is responsible for 
development and documentation of the NP to the Mission needs Statement of the user. 
SPAWAR is responsible for evaluation of the NP documentation and security aspects 
required for type certification and accreditation in accordance with the DITSCAP. 
6.2   Resources 
Type Certification 
SPAWAR -PM 
SPAWAR  -DDAA 
NRL  -Technical Expert and Certification Lead/Planners 
User Rep -Fleet Representative 
Site Certification 
 CO  -DAA 
 SPAWAR -Certification Authority 
 ISSM  -Certification Lead 
 User Rep -Command System Administrator 
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6.3 Certification of Program of Record (POR) Components 
Certification of the NP is the responsibility of NRL. Certification of the POR is 
the responsibility of the program manager’s office. The program manager’s office will 
provide the required system security documentation (SSAA, CT&E, SFUG, etc.) for the 
POR when delivered to the command. 
6.4   Training 
The site certification and accreditation teams require training on NP operations. 
The team shall have access to NP operator and maintenance manuals developed for 
fielding of the NP. 
 
7.0   DITSCAP PLAN 
7.1   Tailoring factors 
The following subparagraphs identify DITSCAP tailoring factors that are 
designed to address the specific needs of the system, security requirements, and program 
requirements. 
7.1.1 Programmatic Considerations  
The hardware and software components of the defined system are 
identified in Section 3. There are plans to change, upgrade, or add to the current hardware 
or software components. Only one unique software application has been developed to 
integrate the various component software elements of the NP. 
7.1.2 Security Environment 
The security environment has been described in Section 5 with the ITSEC 
classification determination in Section 4. In determining certification level there are three 
characteristics that could affect the level of effort required. The processing mode could be 
changed if the environment falls under the compartmented definition. Integrity could 
significantly affect the level of effort if the threat to mission success, due to integrity, is 
determined to be very low causing this value to decrease. Finally, if mission reliance is 
determined to be none then the weight would also change.  
7.1.3 IT System Characteristics 
Since the software used in the NP is experimental, specialized code, 
incorporated into an experimental hardware device, the level of effort to certify and 
accredit the system may be significantly more than expected in the initial drafting of the 
SSAA. 
7.2   Tasks and Milestones 
The certification and accreditation team lead must develop a plan that contains 
tasks and milestones required to conduct security testing of the NP and culminating in 
awarding of an accreditation for the NP. The plan should contain the certification and 
accreditation schedule with estimated duration of individual tasks, team that are 
responsible for the activity, and completion criteria for each security-related function. 
7.3   Schedule Summary 
The DITSCAP schedule summary is all-inclusive. 
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7.4   Roles and Responsibilities 
This section of the SSAA identifies the security related duties and responsibilities 
for each of the organizational and functional offices associated with the implementation 
and life cycle support of the NP.  The system lifecycle is divided into four DITSCAP 
phases. 
a. DITSCAP Phase 1, Definition.  The Definition Phase includes activities to 
verify the system mission, environment and architecture, identify the threat, define the 
levels of effort, identify the Design Designated Approving Authority (DDAA) and 
Certification Authority (Certifier), and document the C&A security requirements.  Phase 
1 culminates with a documented agreement between the Program Manager, DDAA, 
Certifier, and user representative on the approach and results of the Phase 1 activities. 
b. DITSCAP Phase 2, Verification.  The Verification Phase includes activities to 
document compliance of the system with previously agreed on security requirements.  
For each life-cycle development activity, a corresponding set of security activities 
verifies compliance with the security requirements and constraints and evaluates 
vulnerabilities. 
c. DITSCAP Phase 3, Validation.  The Validation Phase includes activities to 
assure the fully integrated system in its specific operating environment and configuration 
provides an acceptable level of residual risk.  Validation culminates in an approval to 
operate. 
d. DITSCAP Phase 4, Post Accreditation.  The Post Accreditation Phase includes 
activities to monitor system management, configuration, and changes to the operational 
and threat environment to ensure an acceptable level of residual risk is preserved.  
Security management, configuration management, and periodic compliance validation 
reviews are conducted.  Changes to the system environment or operations may warrant 
beginning a new DITSCAP cycle. 
7.4.1 Security Team Responsibilities 
7.4.1.1 Design and Site Designated Approving Authority 
Responsibilities. 
The DDAA and DAA must continuously review the system for 
compliance with the SSAA. During the C&A, the Certifier, and certification team support 
the DDAA/DAA. At other times, the DDAA/DAA is supported by the system ISSM.  
The DDAA/DAA’s responsibilities during each of the DITSCAP phases are identified in 
Table 26 that is derived from rules and responsibilities outlined in DoD 8510.1-M [Ref. 
2] chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 for the DDAA/DAA. 
 
DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 




Reviews SSAA to ensure 
it accurately describes the 
system, the threat, 
environment, security 
requirements, system 
vulnerabilities, and all 
conditions under which 
the system will be 
Assess the vulnerabilities 
and residual risk. 
Review proposed security 
changes. 
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DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 
DITSCAP Phase 4 
Post Accreditation 
operated. 
Obtain a threat assessment 
for the system. 
Grant Interim Approval 
to Operate (IATO) if 
appropriate. 
Decide if the security 
safeguards and residual 
risk are acceptable. 
Oversee compliance 
validation. 
Assign a Certifier to conduct 
vulnerability and risk 
assessments. 
 Approve/disapprove 
proposed corrective actions 
and countermeasures. 
Monitor C&A integrity. 
Support the DITSCAP 
tailoring and level of effort 
determination. 
 Determine if system should 
be granted full accreditation, 
interim accreditation, or an 
IATO. 
Establish reaccredidation 
requirements and ensuring all 
assigned systems comply with 
these requirements. 
Approve the SSAA.   Decide to reaccredit, or if the 
SSAA is no longer valid, 
terminate system operations. 
Table 26. DDAA/DAA Responsibilities 
[Ref. 2] 
 
7.4.1.2 Certifier and Certification Team Responsibilities. 
The Certifier and Certification Team responsibilities during each 
of the DITSCAP phases are identified in Table 27 that is derived from rules and 
responsibilities outlined in DoD 8510.1-M [Ref. 2] chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 for the certifier. 
 
DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 
DITSCAP Phase 4 
Post Accreditation 
Support the DAA as the 
technical expert in the 
certification process. 
Conduct the DITSCAP 
Phase 2 certification 
analysis tasks. 
Complete the DITSCAP 
Phase 3 certification 
analysis tasks. 
The Certifier and 
certification team 
normally are not 
involved with the system 
in Phase 4. 
Begin vulnerability and 
risk assessments. 
Identify and assess 
system vulnerabilities. 
Maintain C&A 
schedules, plan of action 
and milestones based on 






results to the DAA, 
program manager, and 
user representative. 
Integrate changes to the 
security architecture and 
system security 
requirements into the 
SSAA. 
 
Identify the security 
requirements. 
Provide advice to the 
DAA, program 
manager, and user 
representative regarding 
the readiness of the 
system to move into the 




DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 
DITSCAP Phase 4 
Post Accreditation 
Validation Phase. 
Tailor the DITSCAP, 
determine the 
appropriate certification 
level, and prepare the 
DITSCAP Plan. 
Maintain C&A 
schedules, plan of 
action, and milestones 
based on performance of 




Provide level of effort 
and resource 
requirements. 
Integrate changes into 
the SSAA. 
Report certification 
results to the DAA, 
program manager, and 
user representative. 
 








 Provide a 
recommendation for or 
against accreditation. 
 
Table 27. Certifier and Certification Team Responsibilities 
[Ref. 2] 
 
7.4.1.3 Information System Security Manager Responsibilities 
During Phase 1 and 2 the ISSM is a member of SPAWAR.  The 
ISSM supports the type certification team by performing the functions identified in Table 
28. Once the NP is type certified, the ISSM becomes the security focal point within the 
local command, responsible for the secure operation of the system within the 
environment agreed upon in the SSAA.   The ISSM ensures the system is deployed and 
operated according to the SSAA through integration of all the technical and non-technical 
security disciplines (COMPUSEC, COMSEC, EMSEC, personnel, Physical, and 
administrative procedures) to maintain an acceptable level of residual risk.  The ISSM 
responsibilities during each of the DITSCAP phases are identified in Table 28 that is 
derived from rules and responsibilities outlined in DoD 8510.1-M [Ref. 2] chapters 3, 4, 
5, and 6 for the ISSM. 
DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 
DITSCAP Phase 4 
Post Accreditation 
Assist the DAA, Certifier, 
and certification team in 
the certification effort. 
Review the mission 
statement to determine if it 
accurately describes the 
system. 
Serve as a member of the 
validation/certification team. 
Periodically review the 
mission statement, 
operating environment, and 
security architecture to 
determine compliance with 
the approved SSAA. 
Review the business case 
or mission statement to 
determine that it 
accurately describes the 
system. 
Review the environment 
description to determine if 
it accurately describes the 
system. 
 Maintain the integrity of 
the site environment and 
accredited security posture. 
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DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 
DITSCAP Phase 4 
Post Accreditation 
Review the environment 
description to verify that it 
accurately describes the 
system. 
  Ensure that configuration 
management adheres to the 
security policy and security 
requirements. 
   Initiate the C&A process 
when periodic 
reaccredidation is required 
or system change dictates. 
Initiate the dialogue with 
the DAA, Certifier, and 
user representative. 
Develop system or system 
modifications. 
Support certification team 
performance of Phase 3 
tasks. 
Report security related 
changes in the IS to the 
DAA and user 
representative. 
Define the system 
schedule and budget. 
Support the certification 
efforts by providing 




Provide access to the IS for 
the ST&E. 
Update the IS to address 
reported vulnerabilities and 
patches under 
configuration management. 
Support the DITSCAP 
tailoring and determine 
the certification level. 
Review the certification 
results. 
Approve system 
modifications as necessary 
to reduce or eliminate 
system vulnerabilities. 
Review and update life-
cycle management policies 
and standards. 
Define the system 
architecture. 
Approve system 
modifications as necessary 
to reduce or eliminate 
system vulnerabilities. 
 Resolve security 
discrepancies. 
Integrate system security 
requirements into the 
system. 
   
Prepare Life-Cycle 
Management Plans. 
   
Define the security 
architecture. 
   
Determinate the level of 
effort. 
Determinate the level of 
effort. 
Determine the level of 
effort. 
Determine the level of 
effort for recertification 
and reaccreditation’s. 
Support cost and schedule 
determinations. 
Support cost and schedule 
determinations. 
Support the cost and 
schedule determinations. 




 Monitor progress. Monitor C&A progress. Maintain system 
documentation. 








Provide hardware and 




Develop or integrate 
technical security solutions 
and security requirements. 
Provide hardware and 
software architecture to the 
acquisition organization. 
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DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 
DITSCAP Phase 4 
Post Accreditation 
Provide target hardware 
and software architecture. 
Provide technical 
equipment environment 
requirements to the 
acquisition organization. 
 Provide system 
modifications or changes 
to the ISSO and informing 
the program manager, 
DAA, Certifier, and user 
representative. 
Provide information 
regarding the system 
development organization. 
Develop or integrate 
technical security solutions 
and security requirements. 
 Develop or integrate 
technical security solutions 
and security requirements. 
Determine the feasibility 
of technical solutions and 
security requirements. 
   
Table 28. ISSO Responsibilities 
[Ref. 2] 
 
7.4.1.4 User Representative Responsibilities 
The user representative provides input into the SSAA to ensure 
that the system meets the operational need, will meet availability and integrity 
requirements, and has a realistic security policy that can be maintained in the operational 
environment.  The User Representative responsibilities during each of the DITSCAP 
phases are identified in Table 29 that is derived from rules and responsibilities outlined in 




DITSCAP Phase 1 
Definition 
DITSCAP Phase 2 
Verification 
DITSCAP Phase 3 
Validation 
DITSCAP Phase 4 
Post Accreditation 
Support the DITSCAP 






Oversee the system 
operation according to the 
SSAA. 
Provide a business case or 
mission statement. 
Prepare Security Rules of 
Behavior and Standard 
Operating Procedures. 
Implement and maintain 
Standard Operating 
Procedures and Rules of 
Behavior. 
Report vulnerability and 
security incidents. 








structure to the 
certification team. 




structure to the 
certification team. 
Report threats to the 
mission environment. 
Provide data sensitivity, 
end user functionality, and 
user organization 
information. 
Verify the feasibility of 
security solutions and the 




Review and update the 
system vulnerabilities. 
Verify the ability to 
comply with the SSAA 
during operations. 
  Review changes to the 
security policy and 
standards. 
   Initiate SSAA review if 
there are changes in the 
threat or system 
configuration. 
Table 29. User Representative Responsibilities 
[Ref. 2] 
 
7.4.2 Acquisition or Maintenance Organization Responsibilities 
7.4.2.1 Configuration Management Responsibilities 
The configuration management duties are integrated into the ISSM 
responsibilities.  
7.4.2.2 System Administration Responsibilities 
The System Administrator responsibilities include: 
 
• Assist the validation/certification team in testing the system. 
• Operate the system according to the SSAA. 
• Maintain an acceptable level of residual risk. 
• Inform the ISSO of any proposed changes or modifications to the system, 







ACC Agency Computer Center 
AIS Automated Information System 
 
C&A Certification & Accreditation 
CONUS Continental United States 
CSSO Computer Systems Security Officer 
 
DAA Designated Approving Authority 
DAC Discretionary Access Control 
DISA Defense Information System Agency 
DITSCAP DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation 
Process 
DoD Department of Defense 
 
E-Mail Electronic Mail 
 
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard 
 
INFOSEC Information System Security 
ISSO Information Systems Security Officer 
 
LAN Local Area Network 
 
NSTISSC National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Committee 
NSTISSI 4009 National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Instruction Glossary 
 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
 
PM Program Manager 
POC Point of Contact 
 
RTM Requirements Traceability Matrix 
 
SAV Security Assessment Visit 
SBU Sensitive But Unclassified 
SSAA System Security Authorization Agreement 
ST&E Security Test and Evaluation 
 
TCSEC Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
 
USERID User Identification 
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WAN Wide Area Network 
WWW Worldwide Web 
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INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY POLICY (ISSP) 
 
1. The Designated Approving Authority (DAA) shall ensure continuous employment 
of appropriate physical, administrative and technical measures designed to protect the 
information system and its data, detect any penetration or compromise, and 
correct/restore any unauthorized modification or destruction of information and protect 
users against denial of service. 
 
2. Claimant DAA's  
a. The DAA for information systems processing National Crypto logic data 
is COMNAVSECGRU. 
b. The DAA for information systems processing SCI information is 
COMNAVINTCOM. 
c. The DAA for information systems processing SIOP-ESI is the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO). 
d. The DAA for all other information systems processing Top Secret, Secret, 
Confidential or Sensitive Unclassified not previously identified is the Commanding 
Officer. 
 
3. All information systems under the cognizance of a DAA other than the designated 
Commanding Officer shall conform to the conditions set forth by this security policy and 
the command DAA.  The connection of systems not under the DAA authority shall have 
an approved MOA between the Commanding Officers of each activity.   
 
4. All information systems under the purview of this plan shall meet the 
requirements outlined in DODINST 5200.40, DOD Information Technology Security 
Certification and Accreditation Guide.  Exceptions require prior written approval of the 
command Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM).   
 
5. Access to information systems, networks and other computer resources shall be 
controlled and monitored to ensure each person having access can be identified and held 
accountable for their actions.  An information system, network or other computer 
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resource will follow the "least privilege" principle so that each user is granted access to 
only the information to which the user is entitled by virtue of security clearance and 
formal access approval and only the resources necessary to perform assigned functions.  
In the absence of a specific positive grant of access, user access defaults to "no access". 
 
6. A specific security mode of operation (Dedicated, System High) shall be 
designated for each information system.  Stand- alone microcomputers and LAN 
workstations processing sensitive unclassified/classified information shall operate in the 
DEDICATED mode of operation.  All Local Area Networks processing up to SECRET 
information shall only operate in the System High mode of operation. 
 
7. Encryption methods, standards and devices used to protect classified data 
processed by an information system; network or computer resource must be approved or 
validated by NSA.  
      
8. All shipboard unclassified systems are determined to be sensitive but unclassified 
per SECNAVINST 5239.3.  
 
9. Software shall be thoroughly tested and verified in a "stand-alone" or “test” 
environment.  Additionally, the command ISSM prior to use must approve installation 
and use of the software. 
 
10. Copyright laws shall be enforced to ensure no unauthorized software duplication 
occurs. The command ISSM will coordinate with command Information Systems 
Division/Departments and will be primarily responsible to ensure the command adheres 
to copyright laws. 
 
11. The command ISSM will accreditate/re-accreditate command procured local area 
networks, LAN workstations, and laptops IAW DODINST 5200.40 DOD Information 
Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Guide.     
 
12. The ship fully supports the requirements of the Controlled Access Program 
(CAP), and shall meet these mandates for all information systems (classified and 
sensitive unclassified).  CAP controls to be provided by information systems personnel to 
ensure a fundamental level of protection are:    
• Identification and Authentication 
• Discretionary Access Control 
• Audit capability 
• Object Reuse 
 
13. A Risk Management program shall be implemented to determine how much 
protection is required, how much exists and the most economical way of providing 
needed protection.   
 
14. The ship will conduct a Risk Assessment and a Security Test and Evaluation 
(ST&E) on each information system or group of similar information systems using 
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DODINST 5200.40.  This will be accomplished by the command Information Systems 
Security Manager (ISSM), Network Security Officer (NSO) and the command 
Information System Security Staff. 
 
15. The command ISSM will ensure that the Contingency Plan for all command 
Information Systems are current and updated as required.  Additionally, the Contingency 
Plan will be tested and documented for all mission critical information systems.  This 
includes essential administrative support information systems.  Emergency destruction 
shall be addressed in the Contingency Plan. 
 
16. The accreditation statement shall specify constraints under which the system may 
operate, including the security modes of operation, external system interconnections, user 
authorization requirements, system configuration, and location. 
 
17. All Information Systems Security documentation disclosing capabilities, 
vulnerabilities, or limitations shall be marked at a minimum, For Official Use Only 
(FOUO).   
 
18. All Information System Security violations shall be reported immediately to the 
command Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) for immediate action and 
resolution.  The command ISSM is responsible in keeping the DAA informed of such 
incidents, as well as providing recommendations to resolve these incidents.    
Additionally, the command ISSM will provide the command Security Manager a copy of 
the incident report. 
 
19. Prior to public disclosure or discussion of specific capabilities, limitations or 
vulnerabilities of information systems comply with Chapter 5 of SECNAVINST 
5720.44A, Department of the Navy Public Affairs Policy and Regulations and 
OPNAVINST 5510.1H. 
 
20. Configuration management for hardware and software will be maintained by the 
command Information Systems Department.       
 
21. Any Information System operating temporarily outside this instruction shall 
adhere to requirements of this ISSP. In addition, users shall pay particular attention to 
information security requirements when processing or storing classified data. 
   
22. The command ISSM will establish an Information System Security Awareness 
Training Program and include (as a minimum): 
• Security notices, pamphlets or newsletters, when received, will be 
circulated via administrative channels. 
• Annual GMT lectures and classroom training will be provided as well as 
Information Assurance Indoctrination briefs for all newly reporting 
personnel. 
• Provide on-site training to activity Information Systems Security Staff on 
Risk Assessment, Security, Test & Evaluation, and Contingency Plan. 
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23. An Information System Security Policy (ISSP) shall be included in all 
information system support contracts, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and 
Communications Support Agreements (CSA). 
 
24. When information systems under the jurisdiction of separate DAAs are 
interconnected, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) shall be established that states the 
minimum Information Assurance requirements to be satisfied by the individual systems 
and their interconnections. The MOA shall describe the interconnections between 
information systems and the allowed interactions; describe the data flow between the 
systems including classification and sensitivity of the data, specify user authorization 
requirements and specify safeguards that are required before the interconnections become 
operational. The MOA shall be signed by each DAA whose system is part of the 
interconnection. When the interconnection involves more than two information systems, 
a lead DAA shall be mutually agreed upon who will be responsible for resolving 
conflicts.  This policy applies to the interconnection of DON information systems with 
other DON facilities, military departments, government agencies, and allied systems. 
 
25. Privately Owned Resources 
The use of privately owned or leased equipment (e.g., contractor) or information 
systems (e.g. microcomputers, public computer services, public telecommunications 
services) or software (e.g. system, applications) to support DoN functions or operating 
within DoN activities is prohibited without the prior written authorization of the 
Designated Approving Authority.  All privately owned resources shall meet the 
requirements of this instruction.  Classified data shall not be processed or transferred 
using privately owned resources. 
 
26. Entertainment Software  
Entertainment software such as music CD’s can be used on ships Information 
Systems with CD-ROM drives or at Designated Approving Authority’s discretion.  All 
other entertainment software on U.S. Government resources is strictly prohibited unless 
the software directly supports the organization's mission.  Entertainment software 
installed and/or used on a Government resource is subject to removal and disciplinary 
action taken against the violator. 
 
27. Virus Protection  
All file servers, LAN workstations, stand-alone PCs, and laptops will have an 
anti-virus program installed.  Additionally, virus signature files will be updated and kept 
current to minimize virus infections to local area networks and AIS assets.  The 
command ISSM, NSO and Information Systems personnel are responsible that the 
command anti-virus programs are updated and operational on all command AIS assets.  
When a virus is detected, users should notify the IS Help Desk.  
The command ISSM will ensure timely submission of computer virus reports is 
submitted via naval message or by e-mail to NAVCIRT@FIWC.NAVY.MIL or 
NAVCIRT@FIWC.NAVY.SMIL.MIL with the following reporting format: 
• NAME OF THE INFECTING VIRUS 
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• SOURCE AND DATE OF THE VIRUS, IF KNOWN 
• OTHER LOCATIONS, WITHIN OR OUTSIDE OF YOUR 
COMMAND, POSSIBLY INFECTED AS A RESULT OF THIS VIRUS 
• NUMBER AND TYPE OF SYSTEMS INFECTED 
• METHOD OF CLEAN-UP 
• NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED IN EFFORT 
• DAMAGE OR OBSERVATIONS RESULTING FROM THE VIRUS 
TRIGGERING 
• YOUR COMMAND AND LOCATION 
• POINT OF CONTACT AT YOUR COMMAND 
 
28. Information Conditions    
Information Conditions were established in response to increased computer 
network attacks. INFOCONS are analogous to THREATCON levels.  Events that would 
raise or lower those levels may directly affect the existing INFOCON level. Information 
Condition Levels are Normal ALPHA (Low Activity), BRAVO (Significant Activity), 
CHARLIE (Serious Activity), and DELTA (Critical Activity). Events that would raise 
or lower those levels may directly affect the existing INFOCON level.  However, 
INFOCONS are independent from DEFCON and THREATCON levels.  These response 
measures are directive and do not simply provide information security advisories.  All 
claimant activities will adhere and enforce INFOCON Conditions when directed. 
 
29. Reporting of Computer Network Incidents  
All successful and unsuccessful computer network incidents will be reported. 
Reports on probes, successful/unsuccessful intrusions will be submitted within 2 hours of 
validation of the incident.  Initial reports may not include all data, and may require 
follow-up reports.  Reports may be sent via E-mail.  Successful Computer Network 
Intrusions Reports for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) systems will be submitted via 
naval message or SIPRNET to: NAVCIRT@FIWC.NAVY.SMIL.MIL. Reports of 
unsuccessful Computer Network Intrusions and probes on SBU systems will be classified 
as UNCLASSIFIED FOUO and will be reported via naval message or NIPRNET E-mail 
when other means are not practical to: NAVCIRT@FIWC.NAVY.MIL. All successful 
computer network intrusions for SIPRNET and JWICS systems will be classified as 
SECRET.  Unsuccessful computer network intrusions, probes, or port scans reporting 
will be classified as SECRET.        
 
30. Network Pollution 
Upon receipt of a classified attachment to UNCLAS E-Mail, users should take the 
following action: 
• Immediately notify Information Systems Help Desk. 
• The Help Desk will notify the Network Security Officer (NSO) and 
Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM).  The ISSM will direct all 
corrective actions and provide report status of actions completed to the 
Commanding Officer via Executive Officer and Department Head.   
• Upon finding a classified document on the UNCLAS LAN (or TS/SCI 
document on the SECRET LAN), users shall not delete or forward the 
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illegal document, or do any further processing until the Network Security 
Officer (NSO), Information Systems Security Manager, and/or 
Information Systems personnel arrive on the scene to declassify the 
workstation, and authorize the user to continue processing.   Meanwhile, 
until the NSO, ISSM or IS personnel arrive on the scene; the workstation 
must be guarded by a person with the appropriate security clearance. 
 
31. Internet/E-mail Policy  
As our Sailors, Marines, and civilians become proficient in accessing the 
Internet, the following policy promotes the widest permissible use of government 
information systems to access and exchange information in an automated environment.  
This includes, but is certainly not limited to, accessing the Internet, browsing the World 
Wide Web, and communicating via Electronic Mail. 
Consistent with the Legal and Security rules described below, fleet personnel, 
military and civilian, are encouraged to use their government computers to access the 
Internet and develop their information skills.  To that end, we recognize that the best way 
to develop your Information Technology skills is to get on the Net and make it your 
preferred and routine choice to access, develop and exchange information. 
DOD Directive 5500.7-R, JOINT ETHICS REGULATION, Section 2-301 
supports this approach and recognizes that official uses of Information Systems include 
uses that previously may have been interpreted as personal uses.  Consistent with DOD 
Directive 5500.7-R, this instruction makes the following finding: Any permissible use of 
the Internet enhances the users professional skills and thus serves a legitimate public 
interest. 
Permissible uses are defined to include all uses not prohibited by Law, 
Regulation, Instruction, or Command Policy.  Prohibited uses include: 
• Introducing classified information into an unclassified system or 
environment. 
• Accessing, storing, processing, displaying, distributing, 
transmitting or viewing material that is Pornographic, Racist, 
promotes of Hate Crimes, or subversive in nature. 
• Storing, accessing, processing, or distributing Classified, 
Proprietary, Sensitive, For Official Use Only (FOUO) or Privacy 
Act protected information in violation of established security and 
information release policies. 
• Obtaining, installing, copying, pasting, transferring or using 
software or other materials obtained in violation of the 
appropriate vendor’s patent, copyright, trade secret or license 
agreement. 
• Knowingly writing, coding, compiling, storing, transmitting or 
transferring malicious software code, to include viruses, logic 
bombs, worms and macro viruses. 
•  Promoting partisan political activity. 
• Disseminating religious materials outside an established 
command religious program. 
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• Using the system for personal financial gain such as advertising 
or solicitation of services or sale of personal property, with the 
exception of utilizing a command approved mechanism such as a 
Welfare and Recreation Electronic Bulletin Board for advertising 
personal items for sale. 
• Fund raising activities, either for profit or non-profit unless the 
activity is specifically approved by the command (e.g. Welfare 
and Recreation Car Washes). 
• Gambling, wagering or placing of any bets.    
• Writing, forwarding or participating in chain letters. 
• Posting personal home pages. 
All users are reminded that they have no expectation of privacy in their use of 
Government Information Systems.  Use of Government Information Systems, including 
use of the Internet and E-mail, is subject to monitoring, interception, accessing and 
recording, and may be passed to law enforcement.  Any violation of the above policies 
can result in Disciplinary or Administrative action. 
NCIS has an active Computer Crime and Counterintelligence Response Program 
with teams in each field office.  Contact should be made whenever evidence is discovered 
that a Government Information System is being used for Criminal or Foreign Intelligence 
purposes. 
Commanders and Commanding Officers have the authority to control or limit the 
use of Government Information Systems for the purposes of Security, Morale, Good 
Order and Discipline and to promote the efficiencies of their command.  This authority 
may be delegated to System Administrators.  For example, A Commander could 
authorize a System Administrator to block access to specific sites, limit Internet due to 
resource constraints or revoke an individual’s Internet Access and use of Government 
Information System altogether.  Similarly, a Commander could place limits on the size 
and type of electronic files that could be downloaded, so as to prevent the system from 
being overburdened. 
 
32. Web page policy 
Ships publicly accessible Web Pages will be registered with the Government 
Information Locator Service (GILS). Ships Web pages will have a .mil domain. 
Additionally, information on all ship Web pages will be official, approved and released 
by the Commanding Officer and/or Public Affairs Officer. Ships publicly accessible web 
pages will be subject to semi-annual on-line surveys conducted by Fleet Information 
Warfare Center (FIWC).   
 
33. On-line Surveys 
Ships local area networks (LANs) will be subject to un-announced on-line 
surveys by the FIWC on a semi-annual basis. The purpose for these surveys is to assess 
vulnerabilities of command LANs. Results of the on-line surveys will be made available 
to the command ISSM by FIWC for review and corrective actions as required. Questions, 
concerns or requests for specific on-line surveys for the ship can be forwarded to the 
command ISSM.      
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34. Firewall/Intrusion Detection 
The ship is configured as a trusted host behind the NOC Firewalls.  The fleet 
firewall policy will be used by regional NOCs. Ship is configured behind the pier side 
Firewall for Internet and SIPRNET connectivity. NIPRNET/SIPRNET Firewall waiver 
requests will be forwarded to the appropriate fleet Information Assurance Office via 
naval message for consideration. 
  
35. Remote Access  
Use of dial-up lines, other than those that are protected with nationally 
certified cryptographic devices or protected distribution systems (PDS), will not 
be allowed for gaining access to systems resources that process classified 
information, unless the DAA provides specific written authorization for a 
system to operate in this manner in rare and limited circumstances.  Remote 
access requires the use of enhanced identification and authentication 
mechanisms to protect against eavesdropping on the communication links. 
 
36. Communications Security (COMSEC)   
The communications links connecting the components of network 
information systems, associated data communications, shall be protected in 
accordance with national policies and procedures applicable to sensitivity level 
of the data being transmitted. 
 
37. DOD Warning Banners 
All official automated information systems (AIS) will display the DoD 
legally approved logon-warning banner.  The DoD Warning Banner also serves 
to provide notification of, and consent to, COMSEC monitoring. 
   
38. Network Security Tools  
Network Security Tools will only be used by the command ISSM, NSO 
and Information Systems personnel.  Users other than those personnel identified 
will not procure or download such tools.  Procurement of such tools will be 
approved by the command ISSM and can be downloaded from the Navy 
INFOSEC Homepage, obtained from SPAWAR PMW-161, or through open 
purchase. At no time will the command ISSM, NSO or Information Systems 
personnel use these tools on another command’s AIS system without approval 
from the local DAA and the requesting activity DAA. Additionally, these tools 
are not to be used to scan public, private and/or commercial systems on the 
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